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This thesis is a qualitative study based on interviews and video material, of five therapists  
conducting couple therapy. Norwegian systemic couple therapists’ discourses about love and  
intimate relationships have been explored with the aim of shedding light on couple therapy as  
a professional field in which discourses about love, sexuality and intimate relationship are  
drawn on, exchanged and negotiated. The method of analysis is discourse analysis, and  
poststructuralist theory has informed the design and underpinned my epistemological stance.  
A main issue has been to explore how systemic couple therapists occupy a position of power  
as clients’ expectations of them as professionals are linked to notions of objective knowledge.  
This is simultaneously a challenge because most couple therapy issues are discursive. I have  
looked specifically at how a discursive dynamic has unfolded in couple therapy and how  
dominant discourses of love, as for instance ‘the romantic,’ stabilize and reproduce  
heteronormativity. This analysis is intended to provide new insight into the field of systemic  
couple therapy practice in relation to the importance of self-reflexivity. The limitations of the  
study are discussed, reflexivity issues are explored and ideas for further research are  
proposed. The implications of the study for therapeutic work with couples and training of  
couple therapists has been elaborated.  
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
Background for research interests  
 
What kinds of questions does this research address? My first and most direct answer is the  
question of how couple therapy as a field can improve so clients can be helped in the best  
possible way. I realize that this is a naïve and overly simplistic formulation for a thesis, but  
initially my linguistic resources when starting work on the research proposal were simplistic  
and naïve. However, when the aim of my research was to improve the practice of therapy, the  
concrete choice of research interest lay within my own experience as a couple therapist and in  
the fact that I often found myself drawing on my own ideas about love more than on a  
recognizable systemic theoretical framework; the initial background for my research interest  
is my experience as a couple therapist. I began to notice that whenever clients came to me at a  
critical crossroads in their life together, their “destiny” and choice of direction partly lay in  
my hands as a professional. In such cases, I started to observe myself to explore the  
professional ideology underpinning my work.  
 
In other words, I became curious and attentive toward what I draw upon as a couple therapist  
once I recognized that I do not draw systematically upon traditional therapy theories such as  
psychodynamic approaches, behavioural therapy or cognitive approaches.  
 
My not drawing upon traditional therapy models is not exceptional as I am trained in systemic  
family therapy; however, I became uncertain of what a systemic approach to couple therapy  
includes. In fact, I became aware that I talk mostly about movies, novels, friends’ experiences  
and an exploration of the couple’s own narratives and experiences. As I became aware of this  
less systematic theoretical influence when doing couple therapy I started to question why I  
was less concerned with traditional therapy theory in the particular work of couple therapy,  
and my impression initially was that my Norwegian colleagues more or less talked about the  
same experiences as mine. On a more overarching level I wondered if it is the case that  
Norwegian systemic couple therapists generally are less informed by research and academic  
literature compared with practitioners of other approaches in couple therapy, such as  
psychodynamic couple therapy. If so, might it be the case that the notion that systemic  
therapists are less informed by theory is specific to the field of couple therapy? And finally, if  
it is the case that systemic couple therapists in Norway are less informed by research and  
 
  
theory in their practice of couple therapy, what then are systemic couple therapists drawing 
on  
when conducting couple therapy?  
 
I then ended up with two particular but related research interests. First, I was interested in  
exploring the different kinds of professional knowledge in use and the intersection of various  
traditions informing couple therapists, and I had the idea of doing a meta-analysis of theory in  
use in systemic couple therapy. Related to this mapping of knowledge in use, I then wanted to  
explore therapists’ own “love images” with a phenomenological approach. However, as the  
research process developed I found that mapping professional knowledge and therapists’ love  
images was too narrow a focus as I became more interested in how couple therapists operate  
in the intersection of therapy theories and images of love. My focus changed then towards a  
study of how various discourses are taken up and used in different contexts of meaning. This  
shift of interest launched me into a different research design but did not require me to leave  
the initial research focus. I account for this shift below and in greater detail in the  
Methodology and Discussion chapters.  
 
The development of the study  
 
Two incidents in the early phase of this research process shaped and reshaped my research  
focus: the first was explication of concepts as a result of “carving out” my research focus  
while the other was my experience with the pilot interviews; I will briefly account for them  
both. In the process of clarifying my research focus I realized that it was not only a question  
of content in couple therapy which engaged me but a particular kind of content in couple  
therapy, which I labelled “at-stake issues in couple therapy ”. By at-stake issues, I mean  
therapeutic issues which arise when a couple therapist is faced with ‘overarching’ questions  
about love and intimacy, questions and themes that by their nature are more philosophical 
and  
existential than primarily psychological or therapeutic. These questions emerge as real  
dilemmas first when couples are in situations where they must or think they must make  
choices regarding a change of direction in their life. An example of such a question is, “can  
one live in a relationship when one feels love has gone?” The process of formulating my  
research interest as one of at-stake issues in couple therapy lead to the realisation that the  
initial phenomenological focus was not optimal, as these at-stake issues as I see them are  
related to ethical and cultural dilemmas and paradoxes more than to a phenomenology of  
ideas and beliefs about love. The second but related incident was my direct experience of the  
 
  
pilot study, which strengthened the more discursive direction my research had taken. In the  
pilot interviews, participants drew on multiple, contradictory and dilemmatic descriptions of  
love to such an extent that I became absorbed in examining the overarching level of interplay  
of discourses and knowledge in use, rather than merely the fine-grained level of beliefs,  
opinions and images of love. Changing my design lead me in turn to literature that displayed a  
more discursive approach to the study of love, intimacy and sexuality (see Literature Review,  
Chapter 3) that then influenced my research focus further.  
 
Guide for the reader  
 
I have organised this thesis 9 chapters including the Introduction. The Introductory Literature  
Review is meant to offer a context for how and why the research questions were initially  
developed, and provides an overview of studies of love and the history of couple therapy, and  
of systemic couple therapy theory in particular. The Main Literature Review (Chapter 3)  
presents sources that have had a bearing on my thinking. This is followed by a Methodology  
chapter in which I provide a description of the design of the study, details of the participants  
and of the method of gathering the data. I then describe the analytic method of discourse  
analysis and make the case for its appropriateness as a research methodology in this study  
(Chapter 4). Following that, I present three chapters that together contain the analytic results  
of the study in detail: ‘Being in love’ (Chapter 6), ‘Love in doubt’ (Chapter 7) and ‘Love in  
danger’ (Chapter 8). The structure of these three chapters is alike, as they start with an  
introduction, go through the findings and conclude with a discussion.  
 
In the last section of the thesis, the Discussion Chapter (Chapter 9), I first summarize the main  
findings of the study. I follow this with an outline of some ideas for further research that  
emerged from the work reported here. Then I explore the implications of the study for  
therapeutic work and conclude with a discussion of the limitations of the research. Finally,  
there is a coda in the form of a little narrative that I have called: “A short meeting with a  
gypsy woman, Rose and her tarot cards.” It may be a relief to the reader to be reminded of yet  
another way of voicing the discourses of love.  
 
It is possible to read the different chapters independently, to a certain extent. If the reader is  
mostly interested in the analysis and the implications for practice, s/he might study the  
analysis and the discussion chapters. If the reader is more academically oriented, the literature  
review and discussion could be most relevant.  
 
  




In this Chapter I present some of the literature I reviewed in planning my research. The aim is  
to contextualise my initial research question; although I changed the initial plan, this  
introductory literature review has relevance in demonstrating how it became problematic to  
go on with the initial research project and how my reading of this literature has premised and  
extended my understanding throughout the process and outcome of the research. In orienting  
myself within the literature to develop my research questions, three areas were particularly  
relevant: literature about love, early research on couples and couple therapy history and  
finally the history and status quo of the Norwegian systemic field of knowledge and practice  
within which my research participants are working. In the subsequent Main Literature review  
I will present literature related more closely to the Analysis, Method and Discussion Chapters.  
I am aware that I am the narrator of the literature presented here with the aim of clarifying my  
research focus.  
 
Studies of love  
 
Research on relationship beliefs and love that asks the question, “What is love?”  
 
One of the dilemmas about “love” is that it is a self-evident, transparent notion and belongs to  
everyday language, and is therefore at once both “empty” and saturated with meaning.  
Initially in planning this thesis I was concerned with exploring a) research that accounts for  
beliefs about love and intimate relationships, since love and lack of it is one of the most  
obvious issues in couple therapy, and b) literature exploring what love is connected to my  
initial research focus on how therapists think about love. In classical literature about love,  
many conceptual/philosophical distinctions between different kinds of love are made - eros,  
agape, storge, and philia, while psychology offers several ways of drawing a typology of love  
(see for instance Sternberg, 1986, Hendrick & Hendrick, 1986, 1989). What these approaches  
have in common is a view of love as a phenomenon that can be explained and explored in  
realist terms. The view of love as something one can frame in substantive terms informs an  
essentialist approach to the study of love, where the word ‘love’ denotes something that  
exists, more or less independent of the observer. An example of such essentialist research in  
psychology on love is a volume of papers edited by Sternberg and Barnes (1988)i. The stated  
aims of this volume are to present love from the perspectives of different contemporary  
 
  
psychologists whose field of expertise is the study of love and close relationship in order to  
establish “just what love is” (ibid:3).  
 
In this task, Sternberg and Barnes have recruited contributors from among social  
psychologists, the fields of infant-parent attachment, cognitive psychology, psychometry,  
evolutionary biology, social network, cultural anthropology and behavioural psychology,  
reflecting manifold approaches to love within psychology as a profession. In the preface to the  
book, Rubin claims that “the science of love is still in its infancy” (ibid:viii) and notes the  
problem that scientists share little common vocabulary. Love means different things to  
different people; some think of love as an attitude, others as an emotion or a set of 
behaviours,  
but, as Rubin asks, “How can we proceed to organize our study of it?” (ibid:viii) This same  
challenge applies also in therapeutic practice, where both clients and therapists draw on  
different linguistic references to love. However, a limitation of such studies for therapeutic  
aims is that although therapists might be enriched by these many accounts of love, in their  
therapeutic work love cannot be mapped out easily or categorized into prototypes as it is also  
denoted in terms of specific practices. “Love as doing” requires further exploration, as 
lovepractices  
are manifold, contradictory and positioned. The dynamics of love must be a focus  
rather than the production of categories, descriptions and typologies that seek to capture love  
as a phenomenon upon which we can all agree.  
 
Another example of research on love that takes an essentialist approach is the article by  
Sprecher & Metts (1999), ‘Romantic beliefs: their influence on relationships and patterns of  
change over time.’ This is a longitudinal study using data collected from a sample of romantic  
couples at Illinois State University. The sample consists of dating couples who had  
completed a self-administered questionnaire during the period 1988 to 1992. What this study  
measures is a) the connection between romantic relationship and love for a partner and b) 
how  
stable romantic relationships remain when challenged by changing experience, e.g. passage of  
time and relationship transitions. iiThe categories described in the article are ‘love finds a  
way’, ‘love at first sight’, ‘one and only’ and ‘idealisation’. These are useful categories for  
further research, as they are recognizable in a common-sense way of speaking about love.  
However, I question research that aims to categorise and measure love. Longitudinal studies  
and scales have relevance up to a point, but an individual’s nuances, reflections, narratives  
and ideas about love might ‘disappear’ within overly broad categories. A potential strength of  
 
  
the research reviewed above is that it presents a rich variety of concepts and ideas about love.  
On the other hand, it might be argued that literature which attempts to describe love in  
essentialist terms turns out to say nothing more than that love is whatever measures of love  
measure. I have come to believe that ideas, beliefs and discourses of love in the end are  
cultural constructions, and research on love should include the cultural and contextual  
premises built into the research. Research on love with the aim of offering a repertoire for  
couple therapy might be helpful in enriching therapeutic reflection over the complex language  
of people’s experiences of love. I argue for the need for love research that can account for  
how and why talk about love changes, both at the level of the individual over the lifespan, and  
also at social and cultural levels. As I see it, the mainstream research and literature about love  
in psychology is too narrow in providing a conceptual framework useful to development of a  
research process taking a more discursive approach to love.  
 
Early research on marriage and couple therapy practice  
 
It was important in planning this thesis to explore why research on marriage was initiated at  
all, since the emergence of marriage as an object for research suggests a research agenda;  
marriage ceased to be a taken-for-granted institution when it became a troubled one, and of  
interest for governments to invest in marriage research. The same applies to couple therapy  
practice: it began with the notion that marriage needed some kind of assistance. In the  
following I explore the parallel development of a dominant research agenda for marriage and  
couple therapy, because I want to show the historical connection between a societal agenda of  
investment in marriage as an institution, and marriage research and therapy; there seems still  
to be a powerful connection between this societal agenda and the practice of contemporary  
couple therapy. The relation between dominant cultural discourses about love and how these  
unfold in therapy is the heart of my research agenda. Another reason for including the history  
of marriage research and therapy here is that although discourses of marriage informing  
marriage therapy have changed continually since 1930 (Gurman & Fraenkel, 2002) it is likely  
that some of these ideas and values are still informing contemporary couple therapy practice:  
how has the history of marriage research affected the practice of contemporary systemic  







The emerging field of marriage research  
 
The historical motivation for making marriage a research object was the increasing rate of  
divorce during the latter half of the 20th century, when divorce replaced death as the end 
point  
of the majority of marriages in Western Europe and the USA (Pinsof, 2002). Within marriage  
research there have been two main traditions: one with a focus on personality and the other  
taking an interactional perspective (Gottman & Notarius, 2002). Both traditions attempt to  
explain how marriages fail, and these explanations influence in turn what marriage and couple  
therapy should be about. The interactional perspective however represents both a conceptual  
breach with the personality-based tradition and is the starting point of the systemic  
perspective. I account for the interactional perspective in the section ‘The advent of systemic  
couple therapy’.  
 
The personality-based research perspective was promoted in a book on marriage research by  
Terman et al. in 1938 (quoted in Gottman & Notarius, 2002) that proposed one main research  
question: “What is fundamentally different about happily and unhappily married couples?”  
(ibid:159). This focus has to be seen in relation to the emphasis of the 1930s on personality  
theories in psychology or human science. Marriage research focused on the identification of  
personality traits ideally suited for successful marriage. The method for the first published  
research required respondents to sit with paper and pencil and report complaints as well as  
satisfactions. The research of Terman et al. (1938) did not find evidence to support a  
personality profile that matched partners in happy marriage iii and is an example of the  
limitations of research on personality traits with a focus on satisfaction in relationships. This  
isolation of relationship satisfaction as something that can be measured and that is “inside” a  
person does not, I would argue, take account of the broader cultural context of expectations,  
gender, economic and work factors. This research attempted to ‘do something’ about the  
divorce statistics by providing an analysis of why marriages fail in many cases, while placing  
the blame for divorce on the individual and emphasizing the value of searching for personality  
characteristics. It is interesting to consider how much this focus on individual responsibility  
for happiness in marriage and couple-hood continues to influence couple therapy today. At  
the same time, marriage became an object of psychotherapeutic intervention with the aim of  
supporting people in preserving and “surviving” their marriage happily. I see a parallel  
between personality-based research and the birth of marriage therapy. It is interesting to  
 
  
recognise that the dominant discourse in personality-based research of individual traits is still  
a significant discourse. A key analytic question for me has been that of how this research still  
influences couple therapy practice.  
 
The emerging field of marriage and couple therapy  
 
The relevance of a historical account of couple therapy is that the predominant ideas and  
methods that have influenced early couple therapy phases still influence the contemporary  
systemic couple therapy field. According to Gurman and Fraenkel (2002) couple therapy is  
“long on history but short on tradition” (ibid: 199) and this provides background for my  
impression of a less theoretically informed systemic couple therapy. Gurman and Fraenkel  
identify fouriv distinct phases of the development of couple therapy. The first two phases have  
particular relevance for this thesis as they describe initial practice of couple therapy and the  
influence of psychoanalytic ideas on the field.  
 
The early period of marriage therapy in the US in the period of 1930-1963 was the  
atheoretical marriage counselling period (ibid) and according to Gurman &Fraenkel, the first  
marriage counsellors were people for whom counselling was a supplementary activity to  
professions such as social worker, clergyman, obstetrician- gynaecologist and so forth, and  
clients were previously married, newlyweds and couples seeking guidance about everyday  
married life (ibid: 205). This interdisciplinary nature of professionals doing couple therapy is  
similar to the contemporary situation in Norway, as family therapy here is an additional  
qualification built on other professions such as social worker, psychologist, priest, nurse and  
sociologist to mention some. The everyday topic of how to manage in marriage as a main  
focus for counselling is also recognisable within contemporary couple therapy practice. One  
difference, though, is that historically the aim was first and foremost to help people endure  
their marriage,v while currently in systemic couple therapy, the issue of whether or not to stay  
in a relationship is equally relevant. At the same time, as early marriage therapy was  
atheoretical, psychoanalytic experimentation (1931-1966) began to influence couple therapy  
(ibid). Psychoanalytic explanations framed marital struggles as a neurotic interaction of the  
partners and as a result of psychopathology in one or both partners (Manus, 1966).  
Psychoanalytic writers were interested in the processes of mate selection, the meaning of  
marriage in family life, and the effects of psychoanalysis on the partner (Meissner, 1978). An  
example of psychoanalytic experimentation with marriage therapy by Mittelman (1948) was a  
 
  
significant development, especially in terms of therapeutic efficiency. Mittelman conducted  
"simultaneous" treatment, in which the same therapist treated both partners individually but  
synchronously (Greene, 1965, quoted in Gurman & Fraenkel, 2002). For Gurman and  
Fraenkel, psychoanalytic and psychodynamic thinking did not become central to the  
development of marriage therapy: I think this claim is debatable.vi I argue that psychoanalytic  
terms are part of our current popular and clinical vocabulary and thereby also present as  
therapeutic discourses among systemic therapists. The grand narrative of psychoanalysis is so  
deeply entrenched in our culture that many practitioners and clients continue to equate a  
psychodynamic conceptual base with the entire project of psychotherapy. To understand this,  
we can reflect on the idea of “looping effects” (Hacking, 1986, 1995), an explanation of how  
people adopt terms from professional, often scientific models, and begin to act in accordance  
with these terms, making them true and “alive.” I think that is what has happened with the  
psychoanalytic narrative; people act as if this grand narrative were true and begin to see their  
symptoms as “real” through such looping effects. The questions for my project are how and  
when are these psychodynamic terms employed by systemic couple therapists, and what are  
the consequences of applying them? Might it be that in the absence of a common theoretical  
base in systemic couple therapy, the systemic therapist aspiring to position herself as a serious  
professional sometimes imports a psychodynamic frame of reference?  
 
The advent of systemic couple therapy  
 
There are various ways to narrate how systemic couple therapy was initiated and developed.  
For the purpose of this thesis I emphasise the interactional perspective and look briefly at the  
relationship between systemic family therapy and systemic couple therapy. I begin with a  
short explication of the term ‘couple therapy’.  
 
‘Couple therapy’  
 
The term couple therapy has come to replace the historical term marriage therapy more  
closely associated with the traditional concept of marriage as an official tie between husband  
and wife, with its attendant conception of the central goal of couple therapyvii as helping the  
marriage to endure (Gurman and Fraenkel, 2002). How then is couple therapy different from,  
for instance, whole-family meetings, individual sessions, pre-emptive intervention, separation  
and divorce therapy? I realise that all these variations can be labelled couple therapy; however  
what I focus upon in my research is couple therapy as conjoint therapy (Jackson, 1959) in  
 
  
which both partners are in therapy with the aim of repair or improvement of their relationship  
(Jackson, 1959 cited in Gurman and Fraenkel, 2002).  
 
The interactional perspective  
 
The classic double-bind study described by Bateson, Haley, Jackson, and Weakland (1956) in  
Towards a theory of Schizophrenia introduced an interactional perspective of family  
relationships that emphasised that personal distress should be understood in a relational  
context and not as a symptom of personal dysfunction, with the aim of identification of  
patterns of dysfunctional communication within families and couples. This interactional  
perspective emerged as a conceptual break with the personality-based tradition and 
represents  
for many the birth of systemic thinking. Fraenkel (1997) claims that; ”systems approaches  
developed in large part as a reaction against the perceived limitations of therapies that  
attributed psychological and social dysfunction to the problems solely within the individual,  
whether these were viewed as biological, psychodynamic or behavioural in nature” (Fraenkel,  
1997:380). Family therapy’s overt rejection of most psychodynamic theories and principles  
(Gurman and Fraenkel, 2002) may explain why there is today a strong division between those  
who subscribe to a psychodynamic approach and those who are systemic in Norway.  
 
There was, however, a conceptual weakness in early systems theory (Gottman & Notarius,  
2002). An example of one shortcoming in systemic theory was the lack of universally defined  
concepts, leading to diverse interpretations by practitioners. Among the many different  
theoretical descriptions of “dysfunctional”, for example, were ‘double-binding messages’  
(Bateson, Jackson, Haley, Weakland, 1962), ‘blocks to differentiation’ (Bowen, 1961), and  
‘schism, skew and symbiosis’ (Lidz, Cornelison, Fleck & Terry, 1957). Olson (1970) noted  
that concepts such as dysfunctional derived from work with families with schizophrenia, and  
therefore had less empirical validity. It is possible that these conceptual weaknesses in early  
systemic research were linked to the fact that the available concepts for research at the time  
were those of ‘functional’ and ‘dysfunctional’. Later systemic approaches reject the value of  
the notions of ‘functional’ and ‘dysfunctional’ concepts as adequate descriptors of  
relationships. It is relevant to note that contemporary systemic therapy is less oriented to  
producing descriptions of clients in objective terms and less concerned with a generalized  
conceptual framework.  
 
  
Systemic couple therapy in relation to systemic family therapy  
 
One aspect that might explain why the theoretical development of couple therapy might be  
less easy to grasp in terms of a unified body of theory, is that couple therapy began a separate  
course to that of the expanding field of family therapy (Nicholas and Schwartz 1998). viiiAn  
argument which supports the unrelatedness of family and marriage therapy was Haley’s view  
that marriage counsellors were more influenced by other therapy traditions, e.g.  
psychodynamic theory, than by the emerging family therapy field (Haley, 1984) because there  
was no single school of systemic family therapy which had its origins in marriage counselling.  
This argument might support my impression of systemic couple therapy as of secondary  
importance compared with the broader family therapy field (Gurman & Fraenkel, 2002).ix  
 
In Norway this relationship between couple therapy and family therapy is reflected in how the  
term “family therapy” is central in the training of family therapists, in the early Norwegian  
literature and in the professional title “family therapist”. “Family therapy” is expected to  
cover all kinds of work done in a systemic perspective, and couple therapy is not visible as an  
independent field referring to a particular kind of formal therapy practice in Norway.  
 
Contemporary systemic couple therapy  
 
 “Mental processes are matters of form rather than substance “(Bateson, xxv 1972).  
 
I want to provide a background for the reader of the theoretical context of systemic couple  
therapy and developments, and thereby of my research context. This account is not explicitly  
about systemic couple therapy since I argue that systemic theory is more a perspective  
applicable to the different types of therapy than a full-scale therapy form. Systemic  
perspectives offer ideas of how to think about and approach therapy more than instructions  
about therapeutic content. I claim that a systemic perspective is less about what one should  
talk to clients about and more about how one should talk in therapy, and I explore it below as  
a formalistic approach. It is relevant here to say something about systemic work within a  
Norwegian context. As the research process progressed, I realised that how systemic thinking  
has been received and developed in Norway is related to the Norwegian pioneers’ way of  
talking about, researching and teaching the systemic perspective over the past 30 years, and  





Formalistic systemic theories  
 
Therapy theories can be divided between those with a primary focus on form, and those  
focusing primarily on content. By a formalistic approach I mean an emphasis on procedures,  
rules or conventions for how to do therapy more than what one should talk about in therapy 
(it  
can be claimed that psychoanalysis tried to be both).  
 
Wittgenstein’s (1953) language game metaphor is useful to demonstrate a formalistic  
approach. The game of Chess consists of pieces and rules. The rules determine how the  
different pieces can be moved and are comparable to a formalistic focus in therapy. A content  
focus on the other hand describes approaches that focus and emphasise the actual chess 
pieces  
themselves. Transferred to therapy, this means a focus on, for instance, emotions or  
childhood narratives as central issues in couple therapy. I will explain, with a presentation of  
the systemic literature, that the systemic perspective is formalistic, with the implication that it  
provides fewer directions for content in couple therapy and thereby more space for cultural  
discourses about love.  
 
 First order formalistic systemic theory: the therapist as an expert  
 
A first order cybernetic is informed by an epistemology that claims that external reality is  
‘knowable’ in neutral terms, whereas the therapist occupies the role of expert and is in a  
position to instruct the client systems in changing processes (Pearce, 1992, Warhuus, 1998, et  
al). Within psychology, concepts from the field of cybernetics were found to be useful in  
describing communication within families (Bateson et al. 1956). Haley (1976) claims that  
every symptom has a function within a family or a couple, with the consequence that if one  
family member shows improvement, other family members “take over” the problem since the  
problem belongs to or is conditioned by the structure and the function of a family system.  
Structure might be seen either as relationship rules or as rules for closeness and power.  
Minuchin (1974) explains problems as caused by a disturbed hierarchy when a child is given  
too much parental power and role. Therapy is then directed toward changing the organisation  
of the family, as the changed structure may then allow each individual the possibility of  
improvement. A focus on rules, hierarchy and structure describes a formalistic approach in  





Second order formalistic systemic theory  
 
A second order formalistic theory is informed by the idea that what is knowable in the  
external world is determined by our innate mental structures (Maturana &Varela, 1984) that  
implies that the therapist should include their own personal or theoretical bias as part of their  
observation (Hoffman, 1987, Warhuus et al., 1998).  
 
Therapy as the construction of solutions  
 
Solution-focused therapy (de Shazer, 1991) emphasises collaboration with clients in finding  
solutions, involving a focus on identifying rules for finding solutions more than on producing  
descriptions of clients’ problems. As a postmodern therapy, the solution-focused mode1 of  
intervention is future oriented, rather than focusing on the past and the complexity of the  
problem. Solution-focused therapy occurs in a manner that respects the clients as the experts  
of their own life (de Shazer, 1993). The metaphor of skeleton keys (de Shazer, 1985 et al,  
1988) is an example of how this approach is occupied with recognising the ‘rules of the game’  
and is thus formalistic.  
 
 Therapy as construction of narratives  
 
White and Epston (1990) claim that knowledge is organised into narratives with a particular  
kind of structure and Epston, White and Murray argue that “a story can be defined as a unit of  
meaning that provides a frame for lived experiences. It is through these stories that lived  
experience is interpreted. We enter stories, we are entered into stories by others, and we live  
our lives through these stories” (Epston, White & Murray, 1992:97). Life problems are  
expressed in terms of people trapped in their own narratives about themselves that do not  
offer space for more preferable stories, or in which there is little connection to important  
aspects of the person’s contemporary experience (White & Epston, 1990: Boscolo &  
Bertrando, 1996). In both narrative and solution-focused approaches, form is prior to content:  
in narrative, how events/episodes are described is more central than the actual content; it is  
however less formalistic than solution-focused therapy, which sees every utterance as a move  







The dialogical/collaborative approach  
 
Anderson and Goolishian (1988) argue against “cybernetic systems theory” as described by  
Minuchin and Haley, which emphasises objective structures, in the form of roles, hierarchy  
and power distribution with control as the organising principle. Instead, Anderson and  
Goolishian understand language as the organising principle; “ [I]n this different direction (or  
conversation) for the field of family therapy, human systems are seen as existing only in the  
domain of meaning or intersubjective linguistic reality” (Anderson and Goolishian 1988:  
377). Language is the reality, not representations of ways of perceiving this reality, and  
“language does not mirror nature […] language creates the nature we know (ibid: 378).  
Language is seen as the constitution of meaning, whereas communication in itself constructs  
the actual “definition” of the family, as the family is the family communications. An emphasis  
on language leads to the idea that it is not systems that create problems but conversations  
about problems that construct systems; problems become “a form of co-evolved meaning that  
exists in ongoing dialogical communication” (Anderson and Goolishian, 1988:70). Problems  
are not solved but dissolved in a dialogical atmosphere that organises a solution. “[t]he  
therapist is ‘in there’ as a learner, cooperating with, attempting to understand and working  
with the client’s meaning system” (ibid: 384) and “the therapist is a master of conversational  
artist, an architect of dialogue whose expertise is creating and maintaining a dialogical  
conversation” (ibid: 384). In 1992, Anderson and Goolishian (1992) describe the not-knowing  
position as a position of “being informed by the client” (ibid: 29). Questions formulated from  
a position of "not knowing" are to be seen as tools the therapist uses to explore meaning and  
affect and facilitate verbal as well as nonverbal communication.  
 
Critical reactions to the not-knowing position from the field were all occupied with how to  
understand this position in relation to therapeutic knowledge and expertise. Boscolo and  
Bertrando (1996) claimed that it was illusory to think that a therapist could act from a not  
knowing position, as it is impossible to completely avoid making hypotheses. Similarly,  
discarding the expert role is an illusion, since the context in which the therapist works  
confirms supports and demonstrates an expert role (Boscolo and Bertrando, 1996). Rober  
(2005) claimed that the idea of not-knowing is a ‘‘disavowal of the therapist’s expertise’’  
(ibid: 480) leading to an ‘‘impoverishing therapy’’ (ibid: 481) which ignores the fact that  
‘‘clients seek more than the liberation of their own subjugated knowledge’’ (Rober, 2005: ibid  
481). Minuchin (1996) argued against the idea of not-knowing as a democratic position and  
 
  
claimed that therapeutic power does not disappear with the development of an intervention  
intended to be “democratic”; power is still operating. Minuchin further criticized the  
collaborative stance for ignoring the individual family’s history and social context, as families  
are also subject to realities of age, illness, economy and ethnicity (ibid).  
 
 In 2005, Anderson argued that not-knowing has been misinterpreted, since not-knowing is a  
concept among others such as the client-as-expert, conversational partnership, uncertainty,  
and therapy as ordinary life which represent the conceptualization of a philosophical stance  
reminding therapists to remember that they have no privileged access to the client’s  
information and will always have more to learn about what the client says and does not say.  
This does not exclude that the therapist knows what s/he knows and is responsible for putting  
that knowledge into use in therapy. Anderson claims that letting the client be the “leader” or  
decide what is to be said and when is not to be understood as the therapist knowing nothing,  
but rather participating with opinions and questions (Anderson, 2005).  
 
Tom Andersen and Norway  
 
One of the most influential Norwegian contributors within the systemic field, Tom Andersen,  
passed away in 2007. Andersen has influenced the Norwegian community in a quite personal  
and particular way. It is difficult to verify or prove his significance, but my impression is that  
he was present at every significant gathering of systemic therapy in both Norway and  
internationally, and he used each opportunity to make his particular mark on the Norwegian  
therapy community. He was both admired and criticized but whatever response he got, he  
continued to develop family therapy thinking. Andersen has influenced the couple therapy  
field particularly by his close association with the work of Anderson and Goolishian, and in  
recent years with Shotter (2007) and his ideas of joint action, chiasma and therapy as  
movement. Influenced by “his friends”, Andersen developed a spiritual philosophy that  
encouraged systemic therapists in Norway to use sensations and intuitions and the practice of  
almost forgetting what therapists think therapy is about. In the Epilogue to his 1991 book, The  
Reflecting Team: Dialogues and Dialogues about the Dialogues, Andersen notes that among  
the things he would have omitted if he had been writing now would have been the words  
‘explain’ and ‘explanation’: "These words belong, as I see it today, to that part of the world  
where the physical sciences exist," he says (ibid: 157); “ If I had written the book today, the  
words ‘explain’ and ‘explanation’ would have been replaced by ‘understand’ and  
 
  
‘understanding’," (ibid:158). I understand this position as a reaction to contributions to the  
field occupied with outcome research and evidence-based knowledge, and his message to the  
student was “forget the books and just look”. This stance was also discussed and debated in  
the Norwegian field in relation to the question of expertise and what kind of professional  
knowledge is necessary for doing therapy. However, in the Norwegian community, Andersen  
had many disciples who followed their master wherever they thought he would be. I include  
Andersen’s quiet revolt against scientific research here to validate the assumption that in  
Norway many couple therapists are less informed by therapy theories in their practice of  
couple therapy.  
 
 The wider couple therapy field  
 
I want to specify and make distinct that the research question and thereby the research 
context  
is Norwegian couple therapy as I experience it. The hypothesis about couple therapy being  
more informed by form than content relates to the Norwegian systemic context, and I am fully  
aware that European and American couple therapy literature is well underpinned by research  
and theory concerning couple therapy methods such as behavioral couple therapy (BCT)  
(Hahlweg and Markman, 1988), emotion-focused couple therapy (EF) (Johnson and  
Greenberg, 1995; Greenberg and Johnson, 1988, Johnson,1996 ), strategic couple therapy  
(Weakland, Fisch, Watzlawick and Bodin, 1974; Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch, 1974;  
Fisch, Weakland and Segal, 1982; Weakland and Fisch, 1992) and insight-oriented couple  
therapy (IOCT) (Snyder and Wills, 1989) and later models of couple therapy grounded in  
attachment theory (e.g., Greenberg and Johnson, 1986, 1988; Johnson, 1996; Clulow (2001).  
So I am highlighting systemic therapy practices that have characterized the field in the Nordic  
countries and leave out relevant literature on couple therapy, which might be said to inform  
particularly USA and Western Europe.  
 
 Summary  
 
I claim that mainstream love research demonstrates some limitations in framing love as  
something that can be talked about independent of a social and cultural context. The history of  
marriage- and couple therapy, I argue, demonstrates that (initially) systemic couple therapy  
stands in a tradition of a-theoretical approaches at the same time as it has been influenced by  
psychoanalytic content. I have also accounted for the advent of the systemic perspective and  
how systemic couple therapy and the broader field of systemic family therapy have had a  
 
  
parallel development, although within the systemic couple therapy field there have been 
fewer  
common theoretical developments. Finally, the distinction between form and content has 
been  
informative in leading to the question: if therapists focus particularly on form, on what are  
they drawing in any concrete session of couple therapy?  
 
  




My aim in this literature review is to take the reader through literature that has influenced the  
production of this thesis, and to demonstrate how various sources at different stages have  
shaped my research focus. I have organized the review in two parts; in the first, literature that  
has been important for the analysis of my material is reviewed. Here I have imported  
literature from mostly outside the field of therapy theory to highlight the connection between  
the personal-psychological level of beliefs, values and theories and the broader level of  
cultural discourse, in order to demonstrate how these two levels interact, overlap and  
influence each other. Part two reflects mainly what represents for me a new acquisition of  
literature, namely poststructuralist theory. Reading poststructuralist writers provided me with  
significant insights into my own research agenda - an agenda that was hard to articulate at the  
start of the project. In addition, poststructural theory has helped shape the final research  
design.  
 
Part l: A conceptual overview of theories of marriage and intimate  
relationships  
 
While I focused in the Introductory Literature Review on mainstream research on love and its  
exclusion of a wider historical and cultural context, I adopt here a position mainly informed  
by Foucault who claims that knowledge must be seen as historically and culturally produced  
(Foucault, 1976/1981). I explore various historical concepts of love relevant for my analysis  
such as passionate and romantic love. Following this brief conceptual overview, I continue  
with a more in-depth look at the cultural models of love of Giddens (1991; 1992) and Beck&  
Beck-Gernsheim (1995) and I expand the review with feminist perspectives on romantic love  
provided by Evans (2003) and lastly the work of Wetherell (1995) which explores a  
discursive approach to the ‘romantic’ different from those of Giddens, Beck and Beck-  
Gernsheim and Evans.  
 
  
Premodern time – passionate love  
 
I am destroyed, against her love I fold  
My fire and ruckle all my torn despair  
Until, surprised by thoughts formed from the air  
I forge the unseen chains of bronze and gold  
 




Accounts of how love was perceived and practised in pre-modern Europe depend on which  
narrator one chooses. I have decided to present a conceptual historical development of love  
with special attention to literature about forms of love, desire and marriage constructed  
differently from the nuclear family model in which love, raising children and marriage  
presuppose one another. I found Giddens’ conceptual accounts informative in contextualising  
an analysis of intimacy as transformed, which is my aim for reviewing a historical approach  
to love. In pre-modern Europe, according to Giddens, passionate love was a central source of  
the ideal of love and marriage, hence literary references were not to romance but to passion:  
“to an all-encompassing sexual attraction for another that was disruptive insofar as it led the  
individual astray from the mundane, generating a break with routine and duty” (Giddens  
1992:38, 40). Passionate love was perceived as sexual attraction and was viewed as something  
one longed for, something most tangible in dreams, unpredictable and with almost  
supernatural connotations. Marriage in pre-modern times was mostly based on practical,  
economic and dynastic concerns, whereby passionate love was viewed as dangerous from the  
point of view of social order and duty as it held no function as a necessary or sufficient basis  
for marriage (Giddens, 1992).  
 
The historical notion of passionate love as depicted above can also be seen in contemporary  
love talk; our ready reference to people as being ‘lovesick’ mirrors the subject’s feeling of  
disruption, divergence from the norm, of being out of control and positions the person in love  
as almost a victim of love. The description of passionate love is not too different from  
contemporary love-talk but one important difference is that courtly or passionate love was not  
expected to result in marriage or a long-lasting relationship. I argue that people in  
contemporary societies are as concerned with passionate love as were our pre-modern  
predecessors, but must choose between passion and a lifelong commitment when the people  
involved - the loved and the in-love - are already in some way committed to another  
 
  
relationship defined as long-lasting and monogamous.xi Such dilemmas and torments are an  
issue commonly brought to the therapy room today.  
 




Some day my prince will come  
Some day we’ll meet again  
And away to his castle we’ll go  




The term “romantic” is used in narratives often accompanied by a sigh, as in “Oh, so  
romantic!” with the underlying association to affectionate emotion. However, it is important  
to distinguish between an ordinary and unreflective use of the word ‘romantic’ and use of the  
term more relevant to this thesis: its application to ‘romantic’ love as a historical frame of  
reference. In this thesis, ‘romantic love’ refers to narratives about finding the right one to live  
with, and the drive to institutionalise these narratives into a long-term relationship/marriage  
(Willig, 2001). Romantic love has historically been traced back to the emergence of  
modernity and the middle class, namely to the 17th and 18th centuries (Giddens, 1992, 
Coontz,  
2005). The project of romantic love was to combine passionate attraction and sexuality within  
the framework of marriage, a marked divergence from the passionate love of pre-modern  
times that was by definition in conflict with marriage, which in turn was itself an institution  
with mainly socio-economic functions (Evans, 2003; Coontz, 2005; Thagaard, 2005).  
 
Interesting for my thesis is the question of from which perspectives one can understand the  
emergence of love as romance. According to Giddens (1992) the first backdrop to romantic  
love can be found in the portrayal of girls in nineteenth century novels as validating their  
identity through the quest for their future husband and their ultimate self-realisation as 
women  
(ibid). Insofar as they saw their lives as based on this endeavour, they could project  
themselves forward in time, to the moment when love finally arrived and was expressed in a  
life-long marriage coupled with parenthood (ibid). One can argue against Giddens that this  
claim that single women experienced themselves as incomplete individuals waiting for  
marriage is a gendered premise, as men and women are socialised to think that marriage  
makes women complete. Women strived for marriage also because it was a requirement for  
economic and material-structural reasons. It is an interesting question whether such an  
experience of being incomplete as a single person is still the case today, as marriage /couple-  
 
  
hood is the dominant discourse for intimacy, and success with intimacy issues is important for  
self esteem and social status. Another backdrop against which romantic love can be seen is  
that of rationalising processes, since marriage viewed through the lens of romantic love was a  
“potential avenue for controlling the future, as well as a form of psychological security in  
principle for those whose lives were touched by it” (ibid: 41). I consider that the attractive  
ideas of enduring as mates and of the couple as a secure base, shed light on the societal  
function and agenda of couple therapy as a support to help couples remain couples, which  
again suggests a reason for why couple therapy in Norway continues to receive economic  
support from political sources. However, this expectation of marriage as a buffer against  
threat places much weight on a small and vulnerable unit, and therefore much responsibility  
for the delivery of material safety and existential meaning.  
 
Giddens argues that romantic love is a step for the individual on the way to freedom but one  
might ask if Giddens’ analysis is too superficial here. Real freedom and self-realisation are  
potentially limited in relation to the actual premises on which traditional marriage is based,  
namely the acceptance of gender differences, roles, and monogamy. Thus, although romantic  
love in Giddens’ account is explored as a step towards an individual’s self-realisation, one  
must take into account that the prevailing living pattern in the 18th century was not the family  
in the modern sense but rather a large household containing an extended family that formed  
an economic unit (Beck &Beck-Gernsheim, 1995).  
 
The advent of the nuclear family  
 
Eight eyes that gaze at one another.  
 
Four mouths around a table.  
 
Four walls encircle a joy:  
 
Princess, Junior, mother, father  
 
Eight hands joined together  
 
in a ring against all danger.  
 
O Lord, if only all the wide world  
 
could be as fortunate.  
 
(Lykke by Einar Skjæraasen, translated by K. Schou)  
 
The nuclear family was the initial object inspiring the birth of family- and couple therapy and  
its ideals have influenced therapy and vice versa. The nuclear family model was the only way  
 
  
of being a family I knew of when growing up. All my friends had a mum and dad and some  
had siblings while others had not. Our everyday nuclear family life was full of rituals and  
codes demonstrating who belonged to whom in which ways. The door sign was a homemade  
ceramic one showing a nest with two birds feeding tiny, screaming bird-mouths. Another  
example of the nest ideal was how holidays meals were celebrated, such as Christmas Day,  
where there were to be absolutely no calls or contact with the outer world (friends),  
demonstrating the family’s privilege of being alone together for a whole long day. As I was  
raised with the ideal of the nuclear family as the best and only way to belong, I find it  
interesting to incorporate the above observations to demonstrate that the nuclear family is 
not  
an a-priori entity independent of time and space, but rather a fixed construction, with clear  
expectations and norms that govern how intimacy, gender roles and parenthood are to be  
lived. When members of a nuclear family experience a break with the nest ideal of how to live  
and be in a family, they may start to verbalise experiences of uneasiness, and sometimes this  
uneasiness materialises as family therapy issues.  
 
According to Shorter (1975/1979) the nuclear family defines itself by an attitude of solidarity,  
as a shelter from the dangerous and threatening world ‘out there’. It is this idea of family as a  
shelter that is at stake when the nuclear family is challenged by internal or external threat. An  
account of the nuclear family as a state of consciousness rather than just a domestic  
arrangement (ibid: 224) is more useful than defining the family by its structure seen from a  
therapy perspective. In the former, the norms, expectations, and functions involved in ideas  
about what a family should be are emphasised, rather than mere description of who is living  
together in practical terms. This emphasis on exploring the mental map of a family is  
recognisable within a systemic approach to family (Bateson, 1972, 1979, Selvini, Cecchin,  
Prata, Boscolo 1978) xiii  
 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (1995) explain the ideals of emotional bonds within a family as a  
process that counteracts and compensates for the gradual loss of other guidelines and social  
certainties as society moves towards its current form. The idea that marriage and family  
should compensate for other traditional ties resonates with the romantic idea of family as a  
protecting nest, a buffer against everything from trivial day-to-day matters to great events in  
world politics (ibid). I argue that in the account of the nuclear family as a nest, one must also  
take into account evidence that the family has been and is an arena for violence, threats,  
 
  
isolation and domination. Family has been for many a double-edged phenomenon, promising  
safety and belonging on the one hand and delivering experiences of insecurity and violence on  
the other. It is the expectation of trust combined with experiences of betrayal that has made  
this private arrangement of family the subject of criticisms such as those raised by novelists  
and researchers in Norway (Faldbakken, 2001, Mühlausen, 2003, 2007).  
 
Democratisation theories of love – contemporary love ideals  
 
I loved you for your beauty  
 
But that doesn’t make a fool of me  
You were in it for your beauty too  
I loved you for your body  
There’s a voice that sounds like God to me  
Declaring that your body’s really you  
I loved you when our love was blessed  
And I love you now there’s nothing left  
But sorrow and a sense of overtime  
And I miss you since the place got wrecked  
By the winds of change and the weeds of sex  
Looks like freedom but it feels like death  
It’s something in between, I guess  
It’s closing time  
 




There have been various attempts to conceptualise late twentieth-century processes of social  
change and transformations of love and intimacy. Altered practices and divorce statistics  
suggest personal struggle with the ideal of landing for good in the nuclear model of intimacy  
and building a family. Giddens (1991, 1992) accounts for changes in love with terms such as  
‘transformation of intimacy’ and ‘reflexivity’ while Beck & Beck–Gernsheim (1995) use  
terms such as the ‘new era’ and ‘the normal chaos of love’ among others. These sociological  
contributions are commonly referred to as ‘the democratisation theories of love’ (Evans,  
2003), a concept intended to cover contemporary trends in which intimacy, intimate relations  
and love are said to be characterised by freedom, equality and reflexivity, involving freedom  
of choice to a greater extent than traditional bonds with their attendant structures, duties and  
traditions. The latter is also referred to as the individualisation thesis, emphasising the  
individual’s powers of choice and negotiation in matters of intimacy. I will explore and  
critique some of the key concepts in the ‘democratisation theories of love’ as theories of  
intimacy are relevant for the practice of systemic couple therapy in that they may suggest  
explanations for how people deal with the various contemporary discourses of intimacy.  
 
  
Giddens and ‘the pure relationship’  
 
While romantic love as an ideal has had a huge impact on how intimacy is organised in late  
modernity, it has at the same time been challenged by what Giddens has called the ‘pure  
relationship’:  
 
[The] “pure relationship […] refers to a situation where a social relation is entered into for its 
own  
sake, for what can be derived by each person from a sustained association with another; and 
which is  
continued only in so far as it is thought by both parties to deliver enough satisfaction for each  
individual to stay within it” (Giddens 1992: 58).  
 
The ideal of a pure relationship tends away from the traditional model of marriage toward a  
post-traditional form in which the relationship is seen as a means to self-development; the  
expectation is rather that, if and when the relationship no longer serves the purpose of 
selfrealisation,  
the relationship can be terminated. This, then, places the relationship in a reflexive  
loop with questions such as: ‘Is everything well in our relationship?’ and ‘How is this  
relationship contributing to my self-development?’ It is this very restructuring of intimacy in  
terms of people having choice in relation to their relationships that Giddens terms the pure  
relationship. The upside of these relationships is that they offer human freedom and  
happiness, but at the same time they are by nature unpredictable and can cause great anxiety.  
Interesting for the field of systemic couple therapy is the observation that these pure  
relationships become increasingly dependent on expert systems as therapeutic practices keep  
pace with the development of the project of self-reflexivity.  
 
Whereas previously marriage therapy aimed above all else to save the marriage, now it is such  
that the almost daily assessment of the status of the relationship and its dynamic forces the  
therapeutic drive to lie in facilitating relationships in which emotional communication and  
reflexive questions play a central role. xv Another key concept in Giddens’ analysis of love in  
late modernity is ‘confluent love’, which he defines as a model which breaches the for-ever  
premise in the constitution of the marriage pact, and introduces premises such as equality in,  
for instance, emotional exchanges (Giddens 1992).  
 
Discussion of Giddens’ concepts  
 
Giddens’ important contribution is his account of how sexuality and love might be connected  
to reflexivity and the drive for self-identity in late modernity.xvi Giddens is helpful in  
illustrating a cultural situation by defining a double-edged phenomenon of freedom and  
psychological self-development and the experience of psychological risk. I also argue that  
Giddens’ concepts of pure relationship and confluent love portray and anticipate ideas about  
 
  
intimacy relatively distinct from those most active couple therapists were brought up with.  
This shift from an emphasis on traditional marriage towards a focus on psychological work  
and reflexivity as the glue in relationships indicates why couple therapy had to adjust its  
theoretical foundation to changing ideas and ideals.  
 
Jamieson (1999) raises a critique of Giddens in her point that (i) “much of personal life  
remains structured by inequalities” and (ii) “that the rhetoric of pure relationship feeds on and  
into a therapeutic discourse that individualises personal problems and down-grades  
sociological explanations” (Jamieson, 1999: 477). With this argument, Jamieson claims that  
Giddens in his proposal of pure relationship creates failure because he does not consider the  
gap between an idealistic description of life and how one should live, and how people really  
experience their lives. Another failure is that, by individualising problems, psychologists and  
experts can speak of freedom of choice, reflexivity, and equality while ignoring structural  
inequalities such as gender differences and power imbalances (Jamieson, 1999). As she  
points out, women have become ‘clientified’ by couple-experts over time as dependent and as  
people who fail to be satisfied relation to the modern demands of self-development and  
reflexivity. Many women remain in bad relationships because of structural conditions; many  
women do not have equal access with their male partners to the work market with equal  
potential to earn money and take proper care of themselves and children if they leave their  
relationships.  
 
In Norway for instance, many couples and families live in rural areas, dependent on social  
support from kin and families. I have heard in my experience doing couple therapy, for  
instance in northern Norway, that it is often not viable to simply leave an intimate relationship  
and start all over again. So when women do not leave abusive and violent relationships, it is  
not necessarily because they are less self-reflexive, or in poor psychological shape without the  
“guts” to make a change, but because of structural conditions. The alternative to a “bad”  
relationship for some women is to be left alone, since the couple and nuclear family is the  
most represented and acceptable model for intimacy. Writers such as Ribbens McCarthy,  
Edwards and Gillies (2003) are also highly critical of the emphasis on individual happiness,  
“creative and plural lifestyle possibilities” and contingent and chosen relationships of Beck  
and Beck-Gernsheim, and Giddens (Roseneil 2007). They draw attention to the lack of  
availability of such practices to women in particular who are embedded in day-to-day  
 
  
practices of familial care for others, such as compromising, cooperating, providing nurturing  
to others, and these practices are often devalued, presumably because they reflect a female  
experience ( Hare-Mustin & Maracek, 1988)  
 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim: The normal chaos of love and the “New Era”  
 
 Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (1995) explore the dilemmas and challenges concerning love that  
arose in late modernity as a consequence of individualisation and secularisationxvii. The  
relevance for my research focus lies in their analysis that conceptualises both changing  
intimacy issues and why couple therapy might play a role as an advice-giving institution  
today. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim explore the gap between Old Era and New Era, where New  
Era refers to “a collision of interests between love, family and personal freedom” (ibid: 1).  
Characteristic of the Old Era was that definitions of roles and functions were clearer; men and  
women of middle-class upbringing anywhere in the Western world desired to marry, and to  
bear and rear children. The New Era refers to a condition in which almost everything is a  
matter of choice: relationships, jobs, and marriage, with the possible consequence of a conflict  
of interests between couple-relationships, family/children and personal freedom.  
 
The authors claim ‘it is no longer possible to pronounce in some binding way what family,  
marriage, parenthood, sexuality or love mean, what they should or could be; rather these vary  
in substance, exceptions, norms and morality from individual to individual and from  
relationship to relationship’ (ibid: 5) It is in this collision of ideals about how to live family  
and intimacy that couple therapy also becomes squeezed between old and new ideals and  
practices. The significance of couple therapy as an actual profession lies in the fact that,  
common to both the old and new eras, it is important to display a good “self -biography” and  
this involves showing off one’s relational status; the picture of what is a good relational status  
to show off is changing in the new era.  
 
Love as the new religion?  
 
‘Beneath the nothingness - between the cracks across the emptiness one can glimpse a new 
kind of  
small-scale paradise quite unconnected with other realms and their rules which gave life its 
meaning, a  
little utopia which does not depend on tradition and therefore cannot be codified or 
institutionalised  







Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (ibid) emphasise above the process of secularisationxviii as  
important in understanding the chaos of love. The fascinating aspect of these authors’ analysis  
is that while they initially identify the secularisation process as the reason we struggle with  
contemporary intimacy, they at the same time return to a religious vocabulary to emphasise  
the importance of love, but in terms of a distinction between a profane addiction to love and  
the god of privacy, and love as a secular religion. I think the conceptualisation of love as a  
religion explains a contemporary paradox seen from a couple therapy perspective; namely that  
although marriage has lost its stability, it still has attractiveness as a means of finding oneself.  
As a process of increased life experience in finding an emotional involvement, love is highly  
central (ibid). As new ideals emerge as a consequence of the break with tradition, one result  
according to Beck and Beck-Gernsheim and Giddens is that love becomes democratised,  
which includes both sexes beginning to long for and expect new ways of friendly coexistence  
as the norm. This claim of democracy in love is a debatable and idealistic argument, as I  
discuss below.  
 
Therapeutic issues  
 
One of the implications of the normal chaos of love, is that “breaking up and dissolving the  
marriage seems less of a threat than giving up oneself and one’s own interests” (Wachinger,  
1986: 80-3 quoted in Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995). This is a strong statement, pointing at  
the implications of how changed the ideals of intimacy are and Beck and Beck-Gernsheim  
indicate that this change must be reflected in therapy. Therapy has to include the social  
structures which frame our lives such as working and living conditions, family ideals, gender  
role stereotypes and values within which personal needs and wishes are organized and  
oriented (ibid: 182). Beck and Beck-Gernsheim suggest concrete challenges for couple  
therapy such as midlife crisis, breach of expectations, high expectations and gender and power  
struggles among others, but these themes do not actually represent anything new for the  
practice field of systemic couple therapy. One aid in extending terminology is the list of  
alternatives that has emerged after the decline of the nuclear family, for instance the  
alternating family, the negotiated family and our past and present families (ibid). These new  
family labels represent more than new names for the traditional family. They represent breaks  
in thinking about sexuality, normality, laws and the matter of children. Incorporation of the  
newly created discourses is a task that demands rethinking the grand narratives of, for  
 
  
instance, romantic love. From the stance of couple therapy, it will be interesting to explore  
what societal function couple therapy should have in this gap between Old and New Era.  
This stance has consequences for professional training and types of profession, just as did the  
earlier idea of family and marriage treatment with its associations to psychology and  
psychiatry; the New Era perhaps claims new kinds of insight and theories such as discursive  
knowledge (see below and the final Discussion chapter).  
 
 Discussion of Beck & Beck-Gernsheim and the democratising theory of  
love  
 
The concepts delivered in Beck and Beck-Gernsheim’s analysis have been useful in  
emphasizing that the reasons people seek couple therapy have to be seen in connection with  
cultural and social expectations, as these influence the individual’s perceptions in evaluating  
their own relationships.xix But, how sound is the analysis, and how relevant in the end are  
these insights for therapy practice? One reservation I have is that Beck & Beck-Gernsheim  
mystify romantic love, declaring it as the ‘new religion’ and continue to personalize love  
issues. Evans in “An unromantic discussion” (2003) raises a critical view of ‘romantic love’  
and builds her analysis upon the idea that the whole concept of romance is a failure as a  
premise for marriage. However, she does not critique marriage as a normative institution in  
itself and therefore her critique takes a different tack than that of Jamieson and Roseneil (see  
above). I briefly explore her arguments below since her ideas expressing doubt about the  
romantic love project are also part of the contemporary discussion of love and intimacy issues  
which informs therapists.  
 
The concept of individualism  
 
Evans (2003) claims that the concept of individualism along with the ideal of romantic love is  
at the root of the difficulties of love since individualism places the individual at the centre of a  
framework of beliefs and values linked to well being. There has been passionate love all  
through history but the expectation that romantic love should be an essential part in the  
construction and continuation of marriage is a new one and worthy of discussion and  
exploration (ibid: 8). Evans employs the ideas of philosophers such as Arendt when arguing  
that love has been too personalised and sexualised, and with the consequence of a negative  
effect on larger communities and public institutions. Where Giddens depicts the pure  
relationship as a model for intimacy in late modernity, Evans attacks this ideal, and regards  
 
  
such a model as a result of ‘alienation’, causing us to turn to love and partnership for  
fulfilment. Evans takes further the argument of Beck & Beck-Gernsheim about individual  
expectations as a reason why the traditional model of marriage is challenged since we demand  
more of love, yet are unable to meet these demands ourselves (ibid). Evans’ position is that it  
is socially disturbing that the disappearance of love means the end of marriage (ibid: 101). In  
Evans’ argument, I see a possible and partly recognisable repertoire for couple therapists: if  
someone claims love has gone, an answer could be that romance is not essential to marriage  
since at the beginning of the twenty-first century neither men nor women have to associate  
love with marriage. The discussion of how important romance is to marriage is a therapeutic  
discussion, since this question is frequently asked in couple therapy. .  
 
A class perspective  
 
From a class analysis perspective, one can argue with Skeggs (2003) in her critique of Beck  
and Beck-Gernsheim that the “recent emphasis on self-agency” (Skeggs 2003:76) normatively  
promotes individualism and individuality “as not only compulsory, but inevitable and  
universal” (ibid: 61). Skeggs argues that choosing is a middle class way of operating in the  
world, and that the reflexive self is “a very specific class formation”, as “the resources and  
techniques necessary to self-formation and self-telling are not equally available” and in that  
ignore ongoing class inequalities (Skeggs, 2003:134, Roseneil, 2007).  
 
Gender critique  
 
Evans (2003) critiques the “democratising of intimacy” account for being “an optimistic male  
rationalisation of a new order of Western gender relations made possible by the economic  
emancipation of women” (ibid: 4). According to Evans, it is too positive an account because  
one then assumes that changes in the private world will bring about corresponding changes in  
the public, and this is to ignore the strength of those institutions and structures that are far  
from democratic (ibid). According to Evans, narratives such as soap operas and other 
massproduced  
romantic love narratives have in common the message that sex does not need love,  
but marriage does; in these scenarios, marriage is highly romanticised. Evans claims that such  
ideas are an exploitation of the female psyche because romanticising marriage this way has a  
negative effect on women and on the societal view of women (ibid). This view holds that  
women are socialised to enter into scripts in which the man is strong and seductive, the one  
 
  
who takes the initiative, while the woman remains passive and restrained. Another more  
concrete consequence possible here of such TV series is that the woman’s life remains less  
exciting if she is not in a relationship with a man who adores her and wants her. At first  
glance, Evans here “steps on a sore toe” since as a culture, we like to take the positive  
position of Giddens that women and men are much more alike. However, that makes Evans’  
critique even more important, I argue, since looking more closely at the premises of media  
representations, one finds gendered discourses that have depicted/represented/constructed  
women as more dependent on men for intimacy, sexuality and love, although on a more subtle  
level.  
 
Commercialised love – the sale of romance  
 
According to Evans, we live in a world where advertisers offer sexual images to satisfy what  
are essentially emotional needs. Evans raises an important ethical issue also for couple  
therapy in pointing out how the combination of capitalism and a romantic discourse produces  
the shadow of commercial exploitation. Commercialised love, according to Evans, offers a  
climate that is “often painful and confusing since individuals can construct relationships  
through the exchange of commercially constructed signs and then discover a paucity of  
mutual affection” (ibid: 78). Whether one completely agrees with Evans or not, it is clear that  
these forces of commercialism influence people in living out their intimacy and that this is an  
issue for therapists revealed in questions about love such as, ‘can love be bought?’ How far  
should therapists advise their clients in questions about attraction raised by many couples in  
terms of “I don’t find my partner attractive anymore”? The question is, should the couple  
therapist work on that issue, as well as on communication problems? Couple therapists do  
pedagogical work, for example on learning to be a more attractive listener, but should they  
also and do they in practice participate in making the individuals more physically attractive?  
Since in our culture we are overwhelmed by the discourses of market forces, commerciality  
and ideals for how to be a happy and successful person, it is reasonable to think that such  
discourses also are discourses on which the couple draws. I raise these questions as therapy in  
particular seems to mirror what clients bring in (Hare-Mustin, 1994) and therapists are placed  
in an expert role regarding questions of “what is love”, and how best to improve one’s  
relationship. In terms of the sale of romance, the questions are which price, and how far  
 
  
would or should one as a citizen support the sale of romance in all its variants? Is there a  
limit, and who should participate in the question of where the borders should be drawn?  
 
Discussion of Evans’ Analysis  
 
Evans’ diagnosis of Western culture is that it lacks moral and cultural substance, an utterance I  
find pessimistic and somewhat moralistic. Evans is engaging philosophers from the  
Enlightenment and classic novelists such as Jane Austen to illumine the path of our culture  
away from unstable sensitivity to trustworthy sense. The love ideal of Austen is recognisable  
as a discourse framed in terms of love as a virtue one has to refine; love means to mature  
together in the shelter of sense, and as a stance in opposition to erotic passion and the 
dangers  
of falling in love. An implicit message in Evans’ analysis is the claim that “it was better  
before than now”, and Evans is therefore important in demonstrating how when facing  
cultural change and new forms of intimacy, an often applied countermovement is to respond  
with a conservative and anxious voice. This countermovement is also a reflex for which  
many individuals seek assistance. Systemic couple therapists operate in this changing  
landscape of intimacy, and it is relevant to question how the position that things were better  
before influences the concrete practice of therapy. Evans could further be criticised for  
overlooking groups of people who do not fit her analysis and who may be in positions where  
they cannot make choices. Evans’ statement that women have economic independence and  
other forms of capital (social and cultural) that lessen the need for male protection ignores  
significant differences in the history and contemporary experience of many different groups  
of women (Skeggs, 2003). However, although Evans is conservative in her claims critiquing  
processes of individualisation, it is worth rethinking the tendency in Western culture to  
privilege private life and personal experience over other kinds of fulfilment, and to reflect  
more on the ability to consider moral, relational and ethical dilemmas of our time. What  
Evans misses is an analysis of contemporary practices beyond the frame of marriage and the  
hetero-couple- as for instance outlines how to live love beyond heteronorm (Roseneil, 2007).  
 
Margaret Wetherell: Romantic Discourse and Feminism  
 
Couples often seek therapy because their romance has become unhappy instead of ‘happy  
ever after’. One might smile reading such fairy-tale expressions, but romantic love premised  
as a promise with a happy ending, protection from problems such as jealousy, material  
worries and sickness is reflected in the couple therapy room, when romantic expectations fail.  
 
  
In her article “Romantic Discourse and Feminism”, Wetherell (1995) approaches a discursive  
psychology of romance and gender. She outlines a traditional, humanist psychological  
interpretation of romantic love that frames love as a primarily emotional experience; an  
experience outside time, culture, and history that has its own authority. Wetherell, by using a  
discursive approach, rejects the model in which love is talked about as something that exists  
and as a true and fixed item within a person, represented in everyday expressions such as “I  
don’t feel love anymore” or therapeutically framed as “you have to really find out whether  
you love her or not”. The limitation with such a vocabulary is that love is seen as something  
personalised and internalised with no reference to how a range of love talk plays a central role  
in shaping, constructing and constituting the identification and thereby our reported  
experiences of love. Wetherell makes the connection between cultures, subjects and  
discourses as distinct from the individual merely referring to experience.xx  
 
A difference between the approaches to romantic love of Evans and Wetherell is that where  
Evans critiques romantic love as illusory and irrational, Wetherell identifies instead important  
qualities of romance; how romance positions us in particular ways (ibid). According to  
Wetherell, romance is “a text which presents an image of redemption, of salvation and  
rescue” (Wetherell, 1995: 132). Romance seems to exclude emotional ambivalence; the  
optimal ending in a romantic narrative is unity, reciprocity and certainty. Wetherell claims  
that the romantic narrative functions often as the meta-story whose “happily ever after”  
conclusion prohibits further narrative development like those in fairytales such as Cinderella  
where there is no continuation of the narrative after the heroine gets her Prince. Therapy  
approaches vary from the more traditional approaches exploring the “substance” in client’s  
love-narratives, to those with a less traditional tack, like looking at how romantic narratives  
embody premises about happy endings that make it difficult to stay in a romantic discourse  




In part one I reviewed literature moving mostly outside the frame of couple therapy theories  
and research. I have imported theories and analysis of marriage and love from a sociological  
stance, looking at the history of intimate relations from pre-modern Europe to the early 21st  
century. I divided this account of intimacy history into two parts; in part I, I discussed  
theories that draw upon and criticize the democratisation theories of love of Giddens, Beck  
 
  
and Beck-Gernsheim, and the feminist critique represented by Evans and a discursive,  
feminist approach by Willig.  
 
Part II: Poststructuralist theories of sexuality and intimacy  
 
In this final part I want to orient the reader to the poststructuralist literature that has  
influenced my choice of methods and my analysis. The poststructuralist perspective, which  
emphasises power and deconstruction of “taken for granted” knowledge, has contributed a  
conceptual vocabulary that has made it possible for me to articulate the preconceptions I had  
prior to starting my academic research. An example of such a preconception is that systemic  
couple therapy can be understood as an occupation that promotes normative knowledge,  
among which are hetero-normative ideas about how love is to be lived. Poststructuralist  
theory such as the work of Foucault has helped me to formulate a critical perspective on  
couple therapy and romantic love, while feminist writers such as Hollway, Butler and  
Roseneil influenced my critical reading of the literature presented in part I. I include 
poststructural  
theory also in the Methodology Chapter I refer to literature with particular relevance  
for the analysis, such as theories of sexuality and gender.  
 
Foucault and the archaeology of sexuality  
 
Foucault’s account of sexuality has been significant for two reasons. One is that Foucault  
shows concretely that theories about sexuality are made and eventually obtain truth status  
because we do not know their archaeology and forget the constructed aspect of sexuality.  
Another reason is that Foucault’s understanding of sexuality provides an example of how  
power and knowledge are tightly bound up with each other and how regimes are developed to  
control and correct persons in particular ways. In the case of sexuality, the control is exercised  
through experts such as doctors, teachers and therapists, who in different ways give meaning  
to how sexuality is to be understood. This again influences the view of what is normal and  
what falls outside the scope of the normal and becomes seen as perverse. Relevant to this  
study is the claim that therapists have considerable power and legitimacy to influence people  
in questions about normality and aberration.  
 
Repression hypothesis  
 
In the History of Sexuality, Foucault (1976/1981) argues against the repression hypothesis,  
viewing as a common but mistaken thesis the idea that sexuality is repressed in Western  
 
  
cultures and is thereby subject to laws, censure and denial. Foucault is critical of the historical  
truth of this hypothesis:  
 
“The question I like to pose is not, Why are we repressed? but rather, Why do we say, with so 
much  
passion and so much resentment against our most recent past, against our present, and 
against  
ourselves, that we are repressed?” (Ibid: 8-9).  
 
Captured in this critique of the repression hypothesis is also a critique of a juridical-discursive  
view of power.xxi Foucault claims that power is primary in upholding sexuality as repressed  
through censure, laws and taboos. An example of this is how sexuality was guarded via  
campaigns against masturbation, where the aim was to control and correct this dangerous  
phenomenon (ibid). So much attention was given to the repression hypothesis, that one might  
suspect that the objective was not the elimination of masturbation; rather, the point was to  
organize the individual’s development, both bodily and mental (Giddens 1992). Sexuality as  
we come to know it in contemporary times is, according to Foucault’s analysis, produced  
through detailed knowledge and power strategies (Foucault, 1988).  
 
“Abnormal sexuality”  
 
Therapy is a curative practice but is also according to Foucault in the tradition of disciplines  
with regulatory and pedagogic aims. Psychiatrists, doctors and teachers have catalogued and  
described sexual behaviour such as masturbation, same-sex activity and women’s desire as  
perversions, and in doing so these professions have had a role in constructing sexuality as an  
issue for therapy. The effect was not to suppress perversions, but to give them an analytical,  
visible, and permanent reality as they were “implanted in bodies, slipped in beneath modes of  
conduct “(ibid). From a couple therapy point of view, it is interesting to question why these  
different groups of professionals engaged in these practices of categorising what have  
historically been labelled perversions, and I think we have to understand the close connection  
between therapy and knowledge regimes here. Questions about sexuality, then, have been  
useful in disciplining and influencing the individual through therapy and telling people about  
normal and abnormal behaviour and thinking. Foucault’s analysis is useful in reminding me  
of how invisible power finds ways into the couple therapy room as therapeutic power is  
shaped by macro processes, including cultural discursive forces (Hare-Mustin, 1994; White &  
Epston, 1990) Because of the dominant discourses of sexuality and confession, the therapy  
room is especially suited for taking control over the individual through construction of  
 
  
categories of right and wrong, normal and abnormal, mainstream and marginal, and this is  
important to bear in mind in reading this thesis.  
 
Foucault’s theory of sexuality as a frontrunner to contemporary couple  
therapy  
 
I include Foucault since he to me narrates the impetus for couple therapy xxii or rather he  
provides one explanation of why couples bring issues such as intimacy and sexuality to a  
public space as in therapy. Foucault (1976/1981) frames sexuality as a discursive  
construction that has become one of the principles by which public life is ordered. While  
many regard sexuality as private, according to Foucault sexuality is public in our culture. One  
example of how sexuality becomes public and also an issue relevant to therapy is, seen in how  
we are publicly exposed to permeating and leaking discourses claiming how important  
sexuality is and accompanied by detailed descriptions of ‘how it should be’. People adjust to  
these exposed expectations, and strive to do it and feel it ‘right’ but some also experience  
uneasiness and guilt because of ‘not getting it right’; therefore it is not unusual to seek help  
for sexual worries in therapy.  
 
Critique of Foucault’s theory of sexuality  
 
“It is difficult, if not impossible, to make sense of these issues if we stay within the overall 
theoretical  
position that Foucault developed, in which the only moving forces are power, discourse and 
the body.  
Power moves in mysterious ways in Foucault’s writings, and history, as the actively made  
achievement of human subjects, scarcely exists.” (Giddens, 1992: 23-24).  
 
Following Giddens’ critique, one could claim that Foucault has a limited orientation towards  
sexuality and does not give an account of sentiments, emotions, habits and narratives of  
romantic love. I include this critique of Foucault to show that his analyses of sexuality are too  
narrow to support a therapeutic practice, although this critique may be irrelevant, as Foucault  
had another focus and aim for his analysis. He was not concerned with the fine-grained  
individual level of phenomena and psychological experience; his intention was to demonstrate  
as a philosopher that the grand narratives and major discourses put weight on the individual  
left to navigate and adjust to these dominant narratives about how life should be, and that this  
might be marginalizing and excluding for those who for many reasons are shut off from the  
grand narratives. Foucault gives methodological access to the deconstruction of knowledge  
shown brilliantly in his historical study of sexuality, but therapy must necessarily do more  
than merely point out the workings of power. It must also help in the processing of traumas,  
 
  
betrayals and disappointments. Power and knowledge are sources of traumas, betrayals and  
disappointments but the latter must also be faced and coped with and therapists are often  
sought out to help with these experiences. Another focus is needed in addition to Foucault,  
one that moves closer to the subject as a psychological subject, with intentions, emotions and  
choices, dealing with dilemmas and paradoxes, searching for meaning in the discursive  
landscape of the grand narratives.  
 
Hollway - gendered subject positions  
 
Hollway (1984, 1989) has provided a comprehensive and influential analysis of talk about  
relationships and heterosexuality from the perspective of psychological research. In her  
analysis of men’s and women’s talk about sex, Hollway identifies three discourses that  
provide gender-differentiated subject positions: the ‘‘male sex drive discourse’’, the  
‘‘have/hold discourse’’ and the ‘‘permissive discourse’’. These differ from the Foucauldian  
analysis of sexuality on an abstract level in the emphasis on understanding how several  
coexisting and potentially contradictory discourses of sexuality make available different  
positions for men and women to take up (Hollway, 1984). Although Hollway makes a rich  
analysis of gendered sexuality, I argue that in her strong focus on gender differences, she  
strengthens these differences in the sense that one gives power to what one identifies. And as  
these discourses are gendered they are also quite hetero-normative in their descriptions.  
 
Hetero-normative or hetero-centrisme are concepts which both refers to assumptions and  
processes embedded in mainstream society and its institutions that imply that human beings  
are naturally heterosexual, and that heterosexual lifestyles are the normal standard against  
which those of sexual minority people should be compared in order to be understood and  
evaluated (Herek,1998). Hollway ties her analysis to a description of the differences between  
men and women and the interplay between the female and the male as if this focus is 
selfexplanatory.  
With this critique of Hollway in mind, I think her analysis is fruitful for  
understand the various discourses at play – culturally, as the key words and dynamics  
described are helpful in understanding how discourses offer gendered positions, and how  







The Male Sex-Drive Discourse  
 
This discourse proposes that men are driven by biological necessity to seek out heterosexual  
sex. It is premised on the view that sex is a natural need and is not mediated socially. This  
discourse positions men as chasers of women or as in a position to observe and objectify  
women, for example to critically evaluate women’s bodies. In this discourse, women’s  
sexuality is sometimes seen as governed more by the need to reproduce than by the need for  
sex (ibid). This in turn regulates what can be said and done sexually between men and  
women, and makes possible men’s exercise of sexual dominance over women, forcing women  
to take up the position of having to have sex against their will, for example. Women are not  
allowed to have their own sexuality independent of the male’s expressed needs and the aim of  
reproduction.  
 
 From the view of couple therapy, this male sex-drive discourse is interesting to follow  
historically, as it is an example of a discourse that has changed from the 1950s to the present.  
If a couple therapist was to say to a woman, “well, you just have to do it, for your husband’s  
sake, to save your marriage”, the therapist would be most probably seen as a conservative  
non-feminist throwback. At the same time, implicit drawings on this discourse are found in  
the commercializing of love and sex (see Evans, 2003).  
 
The Have/Hold Discourse  
 
This discourse is not centrally concerned with sex, but is closely linked with ideas of  
monogamy, partnership and family life. According to this discourse, sex has a taken for  
granted place within the context of a lasting relationship, such as marriage. Principles of  
monogamy and family life are embedded in the vows of the Anglican Church, hence the term  
‘‘have/hold’’, where marriage is seen as a pact between the couple and God. In principle this  
discourse applies to both men and women in the sense of conferring different positions for  
men and women in society, but in practice it applies more stringently to womenxxiii. This  
have/hold discourse is also recognisable in the practice of couple therapy and the deployment  
of such a discourse has the discursive function of appealing to a couple to work for the  







The Permissive Discourse  
 
In this discourse the principle of monogamy is challenged and it is considered the right of  
both men and women to express their sexuality in any way they choose. In assuming that  
sexuality is natural and should not be repressed, the permissive discourse is allied with the  
male sex drive discourse that views sex as a natural drive, but it differs from this discourse in  
that it applies the same assumptions to both men and women (ibid). Despite this, the  
permissive discourse has limitations for the position of women, as Campbell (1980: 1-2)  
indicates:  
 
The permissive era permitted sex for women too. What it did not do was defend women 
against the  
differential aspects of permissiveness of men and women.... It was about the affirmation of 
young  
men’s sexuality and promiscuity; it was indiscriminate and its object was indeterminate (so 
long as  
she was a woman). The very affirmation of sexuality was a celebration of masculine sexuality.  
 
It is interesting to question how this permissive discourse influences couple therapy. As the  
two other discourses emphasise the male drive and to have/hold, both of which retain a grasp  
on the traditional model of marriage and the male’s sexual privileges in marriage, the  
permissive discourse should position men and women in relationship differently, and might be  
said to have the function of encouraging the partner to reflect over the relationship in terms of  
for instance “Am I getting what I need?” or “Do I have the right to do what I want?” as the  
argument in favour of the individual’s rights (I), becomes more central and prior to the  
partnership “We.”  
 
Butler - Gender as a fictive construct  
 
We do things with language, produce effects with language, and we do things to language, but  
language is also the thing that we do. Language is a name for our doing: both ‘what’ we do (the 
name  
for the action that we characteristically perform) and that which we effect, the act and its  
consequences (Butler 1997:7).  
 
Butler (1990, 1999) claims that gender is performative, which means that gender is always a  
question of doing, and that there is no obvious gender identity as man or woman behind the  
expressions of gender. Redefining gender from a natural category to a performative approach  
holds that gender is not what you are, is not a substance or a noun (1999), but what you are  
doing, a verb and performance. This might be a strange and radical thought for some,  
however I think that seen with a social constructionist and systemic lens, this stance is not  
bizarre. The concept of “doing gender” could be recognized within the systemic field, as  
systemic thinkers have been concerned to transform talk about symptoms such as depression  
 
  
as nouns (for instance, in explaining that father is depressed), into talk about showing signs of  
depression, which liberates the individual from being the symptoms observed.  
 
Performativity, heteronormativity and the‘heterosexual matrix’  
 
Heteronormativityxxiv is a term used to designate how heterosexuality is constituted as the  
norm in sexuality. What is perceived as normal also influences what is seen as normal in  
couple therapy given the function of couple therapy as a societal and cultural service. The  
perceived ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ status of heterosexuality is presumed through the process of  
normalisation; it takes on the unquestionable position of being the ‘true’ sexuality, the natural  
order of things, primarily through the way that it is linked to the male–female biological  
binary and procreation (Robinson, 2005). Epstein and Johnson (1994: 198) point out that the  
normalisation of heterosexuality is “encoded in language, in institutional practices and the  
encounters of everyday life”. For example, religious discourses and practices operate as  
significant components of the normalisation process of heterosexuality, particularly in relation  
to parenting and families; gay and lesbian parenting and families are often actively excluded  
from definitions of what is considered a family. Thus, the normalisation of heterosexuality is  
a social phenomenon that is actively negotiated, with its dominant discourses and narratives  
primarily constituted within the socially constructed cultural binary of heterosexual ‘us’  
versus homosexual ‘them’: a powerful hierarchy in which heterosexuality defines and speaks  
with perceived authority about the ‘other’. Institutionalised heterosexuality thus becomes the  
definer of “legitimate and prescriptive socio-sexual arrangements” (Ingraham, 1994, p. 204)  
and the norm by which all other sexualities are defined as different, illegitimate and abnormal.  
 
Butler claims that it is the repetition of the performance of masculinities and femininities that  
constructs and reconstructs the masculine and feminine subject. Children repetitively perform  
their femininity and masculinity, in order to ‘do it right’ in front of their peers and others  
(Butler, 1990) and it is through this repetitive process that the feminine and masculine subject  
becomes defined and constructed. It is crucial to point out that the concept of gender  
‘performance’ is always one enacted within strictly defined cultural boundaries; what counts  
as a performance of masculinity or femininity is rigidly defined and policed by the sociocultural  
context of the particular time. And here it is particularly important to discuss whether  
or not couple therapy is a service that actively contributes to maintaining the hetero-
normative  
script as prior to other kinds of intimacy, because as seen in the history of marriage therapy,  
 
  
sexual- and gender questions have deep roots in the grand institutions of church, school,  
psychoanalysis and medicine. A poststructuralist approach to gender critiques the idea that  
physical gender has a predetermined influence on cultural gender or that physical gender  
remains one of the last ontological categories (Butler, 1990, Mühleisen, 2003). The  
poststructuralist notion that individuals are shifting subjects who are volatile, contradictory  
and changing, rather than rational, unified and static beings, provides a crucial framework in  
understanding the continual complexities of taking up gendered identities and is the  
ontological position within which I place this thesis.  
 
Summary and discussion of the literature Review  
 
The aim of this literature review has been to look at how relevant literature and literature gaps  
legitimise my research agenda and have contributed to shaping and informing my research. I  
have selected literature to focus on the functions of taken for granted concepts of love and  
intimacy, in taking a critical approach to how, for instance, the theories of part I can be  
interpreted and read. Especially useful for the purposes of this research has been the  
poststructuralist research paradigm as it recognizes the constitutive force of discourse and  
discursive practices in both therapist’s and client’s choices of various discursive practices. In  
emphasising poststructuralist theory I also critique the psychological assumption of the  
unitary, rational character of the individual, implying that it is necessary to theorise and  
analyse subjectivity as multiple, not purely rational, and as potentially contradictory. The  
aim of this literature review has been to demonstrate that categories in couple therapy, such 
as  
family, couple, gender, sex and therapy itself, are culturally constructed through the repetition  
of practice, research and citation, and repetition is the dynamic that establishes the 
appearance  
of these categories as essentialist or taken for granted. At the same time, these categories are  
not static but challenged by new practices and loaded with varied meaning. This is a  
continuing discursive struggle and couple therapy is informed both by practices that maintain  
the categories and those that challenge them with new practices.  
 
The literature review has further pointed to gaps in the literature reviewed, and I claim that  
there is a gap between a Foucauldian inspired literature, which frames therapy as a regulative  
practice on the one hand, and the view that therapy also captures, faces and embraces the  
individual fine-grained experiences of psychological realities and a world of phenomena on  
the other. Reading this literature has therefore opened new questions and new themes for  
 
  
discussion: what are the further consequences for couple therapy, what role should couple  
therapy take if personal relationship is viewed through the poststructuralist lens?  
 
I have included Butler’s analysis of gender as a fictive construct, because I think it is relevant  
to my understanding of couple therapy as a social construction informed by and informing  
sociological and cultural discourses of intimacy, gender, sexuality and love. Finally, through  
the process of writing up the thesis I recognized the need for new approaches to systemic  
couple therapy which I called discursive couple therapy - only to discover to my surprise that  
there exists literature on discursive approaches to therapy. A further discussion of discursive  
therapy will be given in the Discussion Chapter in connection with my suggestions for further  
development of the systemic couple therapy field.  
 
  




In this chapter I will expand on the account provided in the former chapters and explain my  
research design in detail. The research process has been a most exciting methodological  
learning experience. I altered the phenomenological focus and approach suggested in the  
proposal to a discursive one. The aim of this chapter is to offer a rationale for my choice of  
methods and to outline the relationship between epistemology and methodology in this thesis,  
the research tradition upon which I have relied and how theoretical perspectives such as  
poststructuralist theory have influenced the research process. I will outline the research  
methods used for sampling, data gathering and production, and analysis. I will also discuss  
and explore issues of ethics and the role of self-reflexivity.  
 
What was learned from the pilot study?  
 
The pilot study turned out to be a watershed for a change of plan regarding methodology and  
the theoretical point of departure initially accounted for in my proposal. This move was from  
an analytical content-oriented approach informed by phenomenological theory to a more  
discursive turn drawn from poststructuralist theory. In the following I want to account for the  
process and assessments triggered by those experiences and reflections that led to the change  
of theoretical and methodological approach. The original planned research question in the  
proposal was: “What ideas are contained, both theoretical and at the level of personal values,  
within systemic couple therapy and how do these ideas appear in therapy?” My initial  
methodological approach was then phenomenological in nature, with the goal of tracing  
therapists’ “images of love” used when doing therapy and the sources of these in beliefs,  
theories, and values. A phenomenological study is inspired by the philosophical perspective  
of phenomenology initially developed by Husserl and Heidegger (Føllesdal 1994) that holds  
that reality consists of objects and events as they are perceived or understood in human  
consciousness and not of anything independent of human consciousness. The epistemological  
stance in phenomenology is therefore that humans conceptualise and recognise the world  
subjectively (Nerheim 1995) and it is the subject’s interpretations of the world that are  
meaningful to explore. The initial plan for analysing the data was to do an Interpretative  
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), developed by Smith (Smith 1996). The guiding idea of  
this method is to explore “the participant’s view on the topic under investigation”  
 
  
(Smith1996, Jarman & Osborn 1999). I considered an IPA approach because of the nature of  
the research questions in their focus on the “inner world” of therapists, and the goal of making  
this “inner world” explicit and “readable” with the help of this method. IPA is intended to  
help the analyst recognise levels of meaning, ideas and constructions arising from the  
“insider’s perspective” (Conrad, 1987).  
 
Initial plan for data collection  
 
My plan was to use Interpersonal Process Recall (Kagan; Elliot, 1989) as a method of data  
gathering in order to obtain in-depth information through the study of selected moments from  
couple’s therapy sessions. Interpersonal Process Recall (IPR) is an interview technique that  
enables therapists and clients to relive the experiences of counselling sessions (Clark, 1996).  
I considered this method to be a compelling and structured way to obtain rich material from  
the research interviews, as my original aim was to get as immediate a response reflecting the  
participant’s thinking about her/his way of doing therapy as possible. I planned to videotape  
two therapy sessions held by each therapist and analyse them using the IPR analytic  
procedure. Essential to the IPR method is the extraction of significant events. In order to  
identify these, the recorded sessions would have to be viewed several times. To qualify as a  
significant event, the selected moments would have to be ones in which the therapist  
communicated or seemed to be communicating relationship beliefs.  
 
The IPR procedure can be described briefly as three-part:  
 
Phase 1 - Free Recall  
 
The participant is asked to recall any moments in which she/he spoke about intimate  
relationship beliefs. The aim of this phase is to stimulate the participant to evaluate his/her  
contribution to the specific therapy session and to generate a rationale for their selection of  
significant events.  
 
Phase 2 - Audio-Visually Triggered Recall  
 
In this phase, the participants review each extracted significant event. Immediately after  
having viewed an event, the participant is asked a series of questions related to the extracted  
event. These questions aim to have them recall, as comprehensively as possible, what they  





Phase 3 - Comments and Question  
 
This phase gives the participants an opportunity to comment on their experience of being  
interviewed.  
 
The experience of the IPR method and the process of interviewing  
 
The first interview was piloted on one informant, a female therapist, who I knew slightly  
beforehand, as we had met occasionally at systemic therapy gatherings. Though we had met  
and discussed the study prior to the interview and she expressed being comfortable with  
participation, the interview was more formal and tense than I had imagined beforehand. When  
the therapist watched the video she became concerned with what she could have done and  
said differently, and I began to actively convince her that truly, her way of doing this therapy  
was ‘more than good enough’. It struck me when reading the transcription subsequently that  
the pilot interview resembled a supervision situation. When I asked, ‘what was your thinking  
behind that question?’ my rationale for asking this question was primarily to grasp the  
associated levels of thinking, but she responded by saying, ‘I don’t usually speak and act like  
this’. I responded, “I understand” and “Of course” whereby she continued to evaluate herself  
with statements like, ‘Look at me, I look almost angry here and ‘You must understand the  
context here, usually I don’t say things like this to couples’. The dynamic that emerged was  
one in which the more I tried to promote in-depth exploration of her thinking and reflections,  
the more the situation resembled a supervision context. Subsequent to the second interview, I  
shared my experiences of the first interview with her and the therapist recognised the same  
experience of stiffness.  
 
I decided finally to abandon IPR. The thinking behind this decision was manifold. The  
therapist’s uneasiness in the interview organised me in such a direction that I became too  
hesitant to pursue my research intentions; I worried that this unintended dynamic could  
prevent me from getting the rich material necessary to illuminate my research question. Two  
other aspects influenced and strengthened my decision to leave IPR as a method for data  
gathering, both of which concern context: the first is my role as a teacher/supervisor in family  
therapy in Norway and the second is the issue of compatibility between a chosen research  







My role as a teacher and supervisor in Norway  
 
Norway is a fairly small country and therefore quite transparent. As I have been working as a  
family therapist at Family Therapy Guidance Centre it is plausible that therapists knew about  
this project and about my formal attachment to Diakonhjemmet College before I started to  
recruit participants to the project. As teachers tend to be seen as having an evaluative 
position,  
it is not that surprising that the participant above became uncomfortable with my watching  
and exploring her way of conducting therapy.  
 
The origins of IPR as a supervision strategy  
 
Another reason for my rejection of IPR is its function as an initial method to increase  
counsellors’ awareness of covert thoughts and feelings about client and self through  
promoting the expression of these thoughts and feelings ‘here and now’ without negative  
consequences in deepening the counsellor/client relationship (Borders & Cashwell, 1995).xxv  
Consider also that my particular interests were with how therapists perform their work in the  
space between the professional and private and how they negotiate between personal and  
professional issues; hence I could not risk that the therapists would be preoccupied with  
presenting themselves first and foremost as competent professionals. My experience with the  
pilot study strengthened the anticipated concern that the participants might be more  
vulnerable if subjected to research that seemed to focus on their skill level in performing their  
work. I do not claim that IPR is an inappropriate research method, but my evaluation of the  
different features discussed above led me to the conclusion that in research on sensitive  
issues, being observed and interviewed about one’s way of doing therapy might be too  
stressful for the therapist’s identity as a professional and that would be inappropriate for my  
research.  
 
‘Content’ or Discourse?  
 
A final but significant experience with doing the pilot interview was the insight into  
subjectivity that caused me to shift my attention from content to discourse in use in couple’s  
therapy. This shift in focus stems from the experience of how the empirical material appeared  
in the pilot study. I expected the material to reveal the inner world of thoughts, beliefs and  




images reflecting how each therapist really thought about love and intimate relationships,  
such as what are therapists’ actual opinions about infidelity?  
 
My “surprise” during the pilot study, was that the therapist did not refer to a layer of more or  
less constant ideas, but positioned herself toward different discourses, and I will present  
extracts to demonstrate how the material reveals incoherence and inconsistency of beliefs,  
producing what I term polyphony of opinions. Polyphony is a concept inspired by Bakhtin  
and his analysis of what he defines as the polyphonic novel. In Problems of Dostoevsky’s  
Poetics, Bakhtin explains how Dostoevsky creates the polyphonic novel by repositioning the  
idea of the novel, its truth, within multiple and various consciousnesses rather than a single  
consciousness and by repositioning the author of the novel alongside the characters as one of  
these consciousnesses, creator of the characters but also their equal (Clark and Holquist 1984;  
Morson and Emerson1989, 1990). Bakhtin claims that this new kind of novel is no longer a  
direct expression of the author’s truth but an active creation of truth in the consciousnesses of  
the author, the characters and the reader, and in which all participate as equals (ibid).  
 
”At any present moment of the dialogue there are great masses of forgotten meanings, but 
these will  
be recalled again at a given moment in the dialogue’s later course when it will be given new 
life. For  
nothing is absolutely dead: every meaning will someday have its homecoming festival” 
(Bakhtin  
quoted in Holquist, 1990, p. 39).  
 
My understanding of Polyphony, then, is that a subject expresses different opinions and  
beliefs in any single dialogue, including incongruent, paradoxical and inconsistent accounts.  
A defence of polyphony is important as attitudes to such inconsistency in a text or a dialogue  
could be interpreted as “messy” and as the result of poor research techniques. Ideals in both  
research and therapy vary from the goal of obtaining consistent and coherent accounts of the  
subject’s meaning and opinions, to viewing polyphony as highly relevant and informative in  
itself. Below is a concrete example of polyphony from the pilot interview. The therapist and I  
had watched a videotape of a session in which infidelity was a central issue. The woman in  
the couple had been unfaithful and the man expressed anger over this. As researcher, I  
regarded this sequence showing the man’s anger as an opportunity to explore the therapist’s  
attitudes towards infidelity. Analysing the data afterwards I located three different themes in  
which the therapist’s utterances could be sorted, within (i) a general opinion about infidelity,  
regardless of any further contextual information; (ii) a therapeutic voice – ‘what do I voice in  
my role as therapist when facing clients’ infidelity experiences in therapy?’; and (iii) speaking  
from personal experiences of infidelity.  
 
  
Theme 1: A general statement about infidelity as an unnatural act  
Therapist: I think being sexually unfaithful is a contradiction, unnatural to human  
nature. Being sexually faithful has something to do with biological stuff. We need to be  
secure, to date and mate.  
 
Theme 2: A statement of infidelity – seen from a therapeutic stance  
Therapist: This woman is struggling a lot; I understand very well why she has been  
unfaithful  
 
This is not the way she is, she has just been hit by this enormous love.  
 
Theme 3: Personal experience with infidelity  
I have personal experience with infidelity, and it expanded my perspective, meaning I  
became a wiser and more tolerant person.  
 
The therapist navigates between a diversity of professional, cultural and personal opinions and  
beliefs about love in contemporary time. In retrospect, I think that the experience of the pilot  
study revealed the heart of my research topic, namely the blurred relation between what is  
theory, what is personal experience and how does such a blurredness influence the therapist’s  
way of conducting therapy? Given these experiences I realised that I needed a conceptual  
frame that captured the appearance of an incoherent and inconsistent account of love.  
 
Self-reflexivity and the pilot study  
 
 Looking back, I see that I could have done more to confirm the therapist in her role as a  
therapist, and even also encouraged her in her inconsistency, had I had an awareness of and  
disposition towards the fruitfulness of researching lack of clarity, breaches and polyphony  
instead of being preoccupied with gaining coherence and certainty .To sum up, the learning  
experiences with the pilot have influenced the methodology in shaping a research focus  
different from that suggested in the Proposal. The decision to give up IPR as the method for  
data collection was taken after the pilot interview, and an open-ended interview was adopted  
instead. The decision to do discourse analysis gradually emerged through reading  
poststructuralist theory that corresponded well with my experience of the pilot. At the same  
time, this decision was demanding in that a poststructuralist reading was new to me and  
provided a new lens onto epistemology, ontology and choice of methodology. The shift from  
a phenomenological approach to a more discursive one represented both relief and new  
tension; relief because it seemed that the unexpected and irregular in the data would be  
captured more adequately by a discursive approach, and tension because this approach was  
new and challenged my initial plan of going in-depth to explore the therapist’s soul.  
 
  
In the subsequent analysis I will account for the methodology and the turn to language as a  




Here I account for how I have taken the decisions about shaping this research and refer to how  
the way my research was conducted. It is important to demonstrate how my research  
paradigms (poststructuralist theory, systemic theory etc) has influenced on, often in pragmatic  
ways, methodological choices such as sampling strategies, data collection, interviews and the  
process of analysing.  
 
Ontological and epistemological stance  
 
In the research project, poststructuralist theory and a systemic angle helped shape my choice  
of research paradigm and therefore my assumptions regarding ontology, epistemology, and  
methodology. At the same time, the paradigmatic assumptions stirred by, for example,  
knowledge acquired through employment as a couple therapist together with my own  
experience of love and intimate relationship, influence my theoretical basis. This circularity  
and interchange will be referred to as a process of emerging design: through the process of  
writing the proposal, conducting a pilot study and reading literature, life-experiences, clinical  
practice, dialogues and supervision, all led to an expanding dynamic of shaping a research  
design. The research questions have as a result of emerging design, been altered from “What  
ideas are contained, both theoretical and at the level of personal values, within systemic  
couple therapy and how do these ideas appear in the therapy?” to “An exploration of  
discourses in use by Norwegian couple therapists engaged in systemic couple therapy”. The  
ontological position which informs this thesis considers reality and knowledge as subjective  
and constructed by words, perceptions, rules and culture and thereby relative in contrast to 
the  
objective and neutral scientific model. This position might easily lead to a ‘pure’ social  
constructionist position, in which knowledge and beliefs are difficult to grasp as stable and  
“true” constructions (Potter, 1996). Such a direction could result in an absurd research  
position. How can it be meaningful to investigate something that is so intangible that it only  
exists for a moment of time and is contingent on context and arbitrary conditions? A  
consistent and literally constructionist model might be too dogmatic in treating knowledge  
categories as if they were only arbitrary social fictions. I recognised this as a dilemmatic  
position throughout the research process.  
 
  
However, my epistemological position holds that it is meaningful to talk about more or less  
firmly held views. A human being is always receptive to context and new ideas and has  
enduring viewpoints and knowledge as well as those in flux. I subscribe to a social  
constructionist view of knowledge that regards knowledge about the lived world as socially  
constructed (Gergen, 1994 b). This perspective emphasizes the impact of the  
clinician/researcher on the system and the consequent need to observe the self when  
conducting theory or research. A social constructionist perspective deals with methodology as  
interpretive in that the researcher interprets possible understandings and possible contexts for  
what is going on and possible consequences and implications these may have. My  
epistemological position inspired me to include poststructuralist theory and the concept of  
discourse as an epistemological concept most relevant to understanding how we know what  
we know. Contained in a poststructuralist framework is the critique of the grand narratives of  
the Enlightenment, the emphasis on language as constitutive of reality rather than merely  
reflective of it and the use of deconstruction as a reading technique to capture language as a  
process of play with and deferral of meaning (Davies 1997). The importance of  
deconstruction, that categories and terms may be critically explored with regard to the  
meanings they may express and the effects they may have (Gergen, 1994 a) is as a concrete  
tool for the realization of the epistemological position described above. A practical question  
of methodology has been how to position myself relative to my adopted epistemological  
perspective such that the research question, process and outcome make sense in the context 
of  
the practice of therapy and professional training.  
 
Qualitative Research  
 
Within a qualitative research paradigm, reality is subjective, multiple and construed by all the  
participants in a particular research study; at the same time, a qualitative research paradigm  
claims that social reality can be known and investigated. I considered a qualitative approach  
because it serves my aim of developing knowledge for application in a context of systemic  
practice and it corresponds well with the paradigmatic assumptions of a systemic approach;  
skills required for conducting a qualitative research interview are similar to those required for  
a therapeutic interview (Burck, 2005).  
 
Although qualitative research is an inductive, circular process, strictures regarding methods of  
data collection were placed by the Research Ethics Committee at Tavistock (Appendix 4) and  
 
  
The National Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities in  
Oslo (Appendix 5), so a decision to interview clients was not feasible.  
 
A systemic perspective  
 
There are many parallels between the thinking of the qualitative researcher and the systemic  
therapist (Burck, 2005). The systemic orientation of this project approaches qualitative  
research as a relational practice with the practical implication that both researcher and  
participants are dependent on each other and play a reciprocally significant role in the  
investigation (ibid). The methodological challenge has been to integrate this aim in the  
research design, the analysis and theoretical discussions; one aspect of this is the dilemma that  
the researcher has the main responsibility for progress, ethics and design and it is not clear  
what co-creation and dependencies mean in practice. Systemic theorizing in the last two  
decades has explored the implications of adopting an epistemological approach which is not  
committed to an idea of social reality as ‘out there’, observable by a detached observer, and  
which accepts no sharp divide between objective and subjective aspects of knowledge (Wren  
2000:21). Systemic therapy and constructionist research have three dimensions in common;  
firstly both involve keeping context in mind; secondly both emphasize meaning as an act of  
co-construction in a dialogue, including multiple perspectives; and thirdly, there is a  
commitment to the significance of reflexivity towards the questions and issues initially raised,  
the problem-solving processes and the role of the researcher/therapist. Familiarity between  
research and therapy is present in an attitude to language and knowledge as constructions and  
narratives, in the methodological approach of conducting interviews as research processes  
informed by curiosity and reflexivity, and in the acknowledgement of multiple perspectives,  
dilemmas and contradictions (Burck, 2005). Finally, a conceptual framework borrowed from  
the field of systemic practice was applied in this study. This framework has informed  
particularly the process of data collection and the analysis. I consider that my application of  
systemic and narrative principles has had a concrete influence on the data collected and my  
approach to the process of analysis.  
 
Sampling strategies and Sampling criteria  
 
The aims of this thesis in outlining what discourses are in use and their interplay in systemic  
couple therapy can be seen as different but related. A methodological challenge has been to  
consider which methods relate most appropriately to these aims. Choice of sampling strategies  
 
  
represented one of the first methodological challenges. It was clear from the start that I  
wanted to interview therapists employed in Family Therapy Guidance Centres and not  
therapists running their own private practice. Two arguments support this decision: the first is  
political-ideological and the other professional-theoretical. The fact that Family Therapy  
Guidance Centres are free of charge to clients, subsidised and administered by the municipal  
government might reflect a politically charged image of importance and priority and carry a  
political message. As an employee in the public domain, one is more or less committed to the  
political messages dominating the domain, or at least implicitly obligated to the norms,  
values, rules, and ideals shaped by governmental direction. Of interest to me was whether the  
political decision to offer this service free of charge influences therapists in their way of doing  
therapy, and whether this influence in the end is more politically governed than therapists are  
perhaps aware. The nature of such influence might be complex; it could be said that the  
political program is to preserve the nuclear family but also to promote a more radical political  
program, as in support for single mothers and partnership within same-sex relationships.  
Whatever such political intentions might be said to be, it seems likely they influence  
therapists in different ways than if there were non-political priorities guiding the service.  
 
A second argument for recruiting therapists from Family Therapy Guidance Centres was  
professionally inspired, namely that in Norway staff in almost every Family Therapy  
Guidance Centre have been trained in systemic thinking and practice. Therapists working at  
Norwegian Family Therapy Guidance Centres are relatively homogenous with respect to  
characteristics such as professional training and clinical practice. Although they vary in age,  
educational background, gender and degree of therapeutic experience, they are relatively  




Besides the criteria that the therapists should be employed in a Family Therapy Guidance  
Centre, I ended up with three specific criteria for participants: being experienced, systemically  
trained and having time and space for involvement. Having time to participate turned out to  
be the most important criterion for the sampling strategy. This strategy of recruiting  
volunteers is called purposeful sampling ‘in which particular settings, persons or events are  
selected deliberately in order to provide important information that can’t be gotten as well  
from other choices’ (Maxwell, 1996 quoted in Eng, 2003).  
 
  
I started recruitment with an open request to several offices with the aim of making  
appointments with some of these to inform about the project and recruit therapists. I visited 6  
offices in total and counted approximately 10 therapists who were interested though half of  
these withdrew their interest. Arguments given for withdrawing from the project spanned  
from time issues, video problems and private issues. However, in the end, the sampling  




I ended up with 5 therapists, two men and three women, all well experienced and with more  
or less the same professional background. All reported living as heterosexual and ranged in  
age from 40-60 years.  
 
Anonymity issues  
 
In order to preserve the anonymity of those who volunteered to be interviewed, all names and 
potential  
identifying information used to refer to the participants has been fictionalised in a “T 
construct.”  
 
This T construct is my radical attempt to neutralise the participants’ demographic facts and  
personal narratives in preventing these from being recognised. In my work with the material, I  
attempted to change for instance gender and city of residence, but as I did this it struck me  
that gender, demography, age and profession had become irrelevant to the analysis and I  
decided to combine the therapists’ voices into one, namely “T”. I have operated with a  
construct of T, comprised of extracts from the material without the traditional “female  
therapist, living in Oslo, age 40” - just T, making it impossible to trace who is speaking.  
Another reason that does not primarily concern anonymity but is more analytic is that the  
discursive focus became more readable without me as the interviewer being overly occupied  
with gender, age and professional identity. I will argue that this choice made me more  
attentive to the discursive orientation in the text when freed from the biographic facts.  
However, it can be argued that there are costs in loss of meaning and understanding in the  
exclusion of such biographic facts as for instance gender, but gender issues appear in any case  
in the analysis as gendered discourses. I think of discourses as gendered to some degree  
independent of whether it is a man or woman speaking and in a poststructuralist reading,  
gendered discourses are not obviously connected to whether a particular man says something  
or a particular woman something else, but to how these discourses are constructed as the  
cultural production of discourses about gender.  
 
  
Data and the data collection process  
 
In the following I will account for how the data were collected, (the interviews, video  
extracts, observation notes) and how the informed consent procedures were employed, to  
explain how the material was gathered and how I approached it in the analysis.  
 
Informed consent  
 
The procedure of informed consent was followed by distribution of an information sheet to  
the potential participants where they were given a summary of key aspects of the process such  
as data gathering, analysis and ethical issues involved (Appendix 2). They were also informed  
of the right to withdraw from the project at any time, with no obligation to me. They were  
also assured of anonymity and of how I planned to use the data in the study and subsequent  
publications. The participants were then asked to give their written consent. For the video  
tapes, the participants followed the standard procedure of written consent for Family Therapy  
Centres when video-taping therapy sessions. All the clients involved, were presented for the  
research project and have had given permission for the research. Some clients withdraw from  
the research since they were not interested in participate in a research which was about  
therapists, and one of the explanation they gave was that the therapist would be too disturbed  




In-depth interviews  
 
There is no common procedure for interview research. Interview research is a craft that if well 
carried  
out can become an art. The varieties of research interviews approach the spectrum of human  
conversations. The forms of interview analysis can differ, as widely as there are ways of 
reading a  
text. The qualitative interview is sometimes called an unstructured or a non-standardised 
interview.  
Because there are few pre-structured or standardised procedures for conducting these forms 
of  
interview, many analyses of the methodological decisions have to be made on the spot, during 
the  
interview. (Kvale 1996:113).  
 
Kvale (1996) categorises the qualitative interview as a type of conversation and he talks about  
a context of basic modes of knowing as a theory of knowledge in which conversation is seen  
as the ultimate context within which knowledge is produced and re-produced. This way of  
thinking about knowledge resonates with important concepts in the systemic family therapy  
literature, such as the not-knowing position (Anderson & Goolishian, 1992).  
 
The period of data collection spanned 6-8 months. I had scheduled it to be approximately 4  
months but it was more time-consuming than expected. The main reason for this delay was  
 
  
the decision that the participants should send me a video before the first research interview so  
I could prepare to interview them about selected extracts from the video. Obtaining videos  
turned out to be problematic, because some couples hesitated to be filmed, others did not  
show up to the session and there were practical problems with the video equipment. The  
procedure of watching a video was followed with all the participants, but a criterion for the  
second interview in my initial plan was for the therapists to bring a new video before the  
second interview. The reason I abandoned this was that I realised the videos were not the  
main source of data, merely supplementary to the interviews. Surprisingly however, when I  
dropped this criterion of the second video, they began to appear quickly during the second  
round of interviewing. The context of the research interviews was usually that I met the  
informants for a short meeting first, to go through information about the project. All the  
interviews took place at the informants’ workplace, with the exception of one participant  
living outside of Oslo who wanted to combine it with a meeting in Oslo. Most of the  
interviews included viewing one or two taped video sequences of the informant doing  
therapy, and the aim of watching these videos together was to get another kind of material  
than that derived from just “talking”. Videos were used as trigger points, recall aids, and as a  




Participant A x 2  
 
Participant B x 4  
 
Participant C x 3  
 
Participant D x 3  
 
Participant E x 2  
 




Each interview lasted a minimum of 11/2 hours up approximately 4hours. One of the  
interviews was held outside Oslo, and because of lengthy travel time, the interviews in this  
case extended to a total of 4 hours. Initially I wanted to have two meetings with each  
informant, but I had to be flexible when I realised that it was worth spending time to ensure  
the informants felt secure enough to talk about both personal and professional aspects of their  
own work. As a consequence of meeting an informant up to four times, I found that the nature  





Every interview was transcribed. I did one of the transcriptions myself while the 13 others  
were done by a paid assistant. I have conflicting thoughts about the strengths and weaknesses  
of transcribing myself. I found that the value of this was that memory and new reflections  
emerged while revisiting the interview during transcription. At the same time, having the text  
transcribed offered a sort of distance to the interview and I was able to focus on the text in  
itself. The transcription system used in the interview extracts here is a simplified version of  
the Jefferson system (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). This version places most weight on semantic  
content. The symbols used are straightforward:  
 
A dot in brackets indicates a pause, e.g.: (.)  
Inaudible material is indicated by ‘xxx’ in round brackets, e.g. (xxx)  
Laughter is indicated by (“laughter”)  
Overlap is indicated by (“overlap”)  




The videos were not transcribed but are to be regarded as part of the material, as I have  
included extracts from them in the analysis. The challenge was to maintain a conversational  
atmosphere so that sensitive information could come up. Talking about informants’  
associations in watching their videos showing them doing therapy was a conflicting  
experience. Following my experiences with piloting, I was interested in a methodological  
approach that could make the interviews less stiff and formal.  
 
Interviewing skilled interviewers  
 
It was an interesting experience to interview colleagues very experienced in the arts of  
interviewing and conversation. What are the benefits and possible traps, when a therapist  
interviews her colleagues in the service of research, if any? It is probably the case that this  
context affects the interviewer most. I was aware of the participants’ reactions, whether they  
evaluated me as an interviewer and how I adapted and adjusted to their implicit  
communications about how to navigate. I did orient actively and variously to the task of small  
talk, making myself less confrontational, less distinct and not performing in an overly  
“professional” manner in dialogues. I positioned myself as an equal in the situation and was  
perhaps too occupied with not revealing a repertoire of communication skills that would have  
been useful in obtaining richer material. Initially I planned to make use of a semi-structured  
 
  
interview guide, and during the process of interviews I constantly altered this in light of the  
experience of interviewing. Examples of issues from the semi-structured interview guide:  
 
• Demographic information  
 
 





• History of working as a therapist  
 
 
o How would the therapist narrate the idea of being a therapist  
 
 





• Own relationship experiences  
 
 





• Beliefs about love and role of sexuality  
 
 
• Preferred working models in couple therapy  
 
 
• Questions about queer issues  
 
 
o How are your experiences with working with other couple-constellations than  
heterosexual couples?  
 
 





• Specific issues I raised and introduced with the aim of obtaining data on more  
discursive issues:  
 
 
o “As a researcher, I think of information and knowledge as part of a dialogue; I  
am not looking for ‘correct’ information and I am aware that we are fellow  
persons in relation to the issues we will now discuss. I am not preoccupied  









” Friendly conversations “  
 
During the interviews I experienced situations similar to friendship/friendly conversation; one  
of the therapists said explicitly that this was “absolutely like talking to a friend” and I  
remember nodding in response and laughing slightly, though I really did not know how to  
respond verbally. Looking back I realise that such utterances informed my management of the  
interviews, in my search for balance in how or whether to bring my own experiences and  
reflections into conversation when the participants approached sensitive information. They  
brought forward quite intimate stories and some of them remarked on this by saying, for  
example: “I have never spoken to others about this” and “Please turn off the tape-recorder,  
because this is very private “. And when I turned the tape recorder off, I felt sometimes that  
the participants wanted me to disclose something about myself in response to their narrative.  
On reflection, I think I could have been more sensitive to this and shared more of my own  
reflections without losing the position of researcher. I also realise that a friendly conversation  
in the interview context could be said to be difficult to manage, for example in making me  
less attentive to obtaining information that could disturb the friendly atmosphere, such as  
critique, disagreement or provocative information. Being friendly in a research context easily  
 
  
might lead to the exclusion of difficult topics that could be relevant data. It is interesting to  
question what the participants perhaps understood the aim of my research project to be, over  
and above the stated aims. I have not asked them, and it might just be speculations, but one  
hypothesis connected to the “friendly” atmosphere is that some participants might have  
thought that my aim was to find answers to questions such as what is love, and how should  
one live love in life on a personal level, and in that context they shared on a very personal  




I employed observation as a supplementary data source in the study. I used a very simple  
observational method, observing the therapist working, either behind a one-way mirror or/and  
watching tapes in which the therapist was doing couple therapy. This was done taking into  
account a definition of language as embodied and communicated through bodily movements.  
Seeing the therapist encounter tensions and difficulties and having the possibility to talk about  
it afterwards provided a means of obtaining another kind of information than that derived  
merely from talking about what the therapist does.  
 
Analysis: Towards a poststructuralist approach  
 
As accounted for earlier, I turned towards a poststructuralist approach as my theoretical 
stance  
in this study. I will present here some of the poststructuralist thinking particularly relevant for  
this methodology section. I find it difficult to entirely summarise in its entirety what 
poststructuralism  
is, but the following issues and claims have been informative for my  
methodology.  
 
The revolt against an essentialist approach to language and research  
 
Previous research on romantic relationship beliefs has investigated beliefs as a matter of  
measurement, and implicitly addressed subjects as capable at any time of giving a coherent  
and consistent view of their beliefs (Øfsti, 2002). The thinking informing that kind of  
research is that beliefs can be selected referentially and then clustered. An essentialist  
approach holds that the phenomenon of expression is a result of an immanent “being” or  
force, which will expose or picture itself independently (Søndergaard, 2000). These ideas can  
be identified in research which aims to explore gender differences as caused by biology,  
where biology is a concrete example of something both immanent and as an essence with  
epistemological and ontological status with precedence over, for instance, a view of gender as  
 
  
performative and culturally constructed. It is this underlying assumption of the phenomenon  
as immanent, stable and with an independent existence that is the focus of the 
poststructuralist  
critique. Within a poststructural frame of reference, an essentialist approach is critiqued for  
its failure to take into consideration that meanings are not singular but multiple, and the  
subject is not seen as rational with a unitary character of subjectivity, but socially and  
historically produced through signification (Hollway, 1984) in terms of the multiplicities of  
self. This claim of the multiplicities of self is raised against a theory of self as embodied in  
pronoun grammar and in which persons understand themselves as historically continuous and  
unitary. So categories in poststructuralist theory are not revelatory of or mirroring the real  
world but are to be seen as existent only through our repetitive statements about them;  
changes in these categories and statements will in turn break with the “reality” these  
categories postulate (Butler, 1990, 1993). This view has consequences for how one frames  
the subject. A post-structuralist understanding of language views language as something that  
shapes rather than reflects reality (Søndergaard, 2002) and thereby questions a theory of self  
embodied in pronoun grammar in which a person understands themselves as historically  
continuous and unitary. This leads to regarding the subject in performative terms rather than  
as a referentially coherent and consistent subject (Butler, 1990, 1993)  
 
Foucault on knowledge and power  
 
Foucault’s analysis of the relationship between power and knowledge is important in  
understanding the aims of poststructuralist research. Foucault has a positive account of power,  
in Foucault’s (1982) words, “power induces, it seduces, it makes easier and more difficult”  
(ibid: 220). A misleading perception of power according to Foucault (1980) is power seen as  
repression or force such that subjects are seen as interfered with and steered by authorities  
such as the government, and that such control can be clearly recognised as power execution  
and as control by those who are its victims/objects. Power in this view is something that  
stands in a negative relation to the objects of power. Foucault argues that one has to avoid this  
definition of power, and instead explore how an analysis of power exposes itself and is  
operant in modern societies. What characterises power execution is the repression of opinions  
and perspectives, and this repressive function is so effective that people do not realise it is  
occurring. In modern societies, power is dispersed through different levels of social structure  
and to different groups of people. Members of the helping professions play an important role  
in this power execution through their implicit function as verifiers and initiators of norms and  
 
  
rules. The advantage of this kind of control is that as control or force is not recognised, people  
cannot really oppose it (Foucault, 1980).  
 
According to Foucault, techniques of knowledge and strategies of power are mutually  
intertwined. Power is based on knowledge and makes use of knowledge essentially 
nonneutral,  
as it determines power relations, as power is not a thing, but a relation. The notion of  
power-knowledge is therefore likely to be employed in critical, normative contexts. Power is  
then to be seen as productive of knowledge, meaning, values, and of certain practices as  
opposed to others (Foucault, 1981).  
 
Foucault’s body of theory has relevance for this thesis, in illuminating the power–knowledge  
relationship; namely the fact that power today is dispersed and tied up with the production 
and  
reproduction of what could be seen as dominant discourses such as those of sexuality, love,  
reproduction and family. This in turn emphasises how therapy as governed by the municipal  
government represents a disciplinary process of opinions, meanings and practices, and is to be  
seen as more than just a “talking cure” but also as a strategy of discursive formation or  
scientific discipline (Foucault 1972,). Below, I will go more in depth in demonstrating how I  
have made use of a Foucauldian conceptual framework in applying a poststructuralist  
discourse analysis.  
 
 Discourse Analysis  
 
According to Burck (2005) “many systemic therapists are concerned with the interweaving of  
discourse, power and subjectivity” (Burk, 2005:251) and my experience with doing a  
discourse analysis is that it has many parallels with conducting couple therapy. Philips and  
Jørgensen (2002), present a well-documented overview of discourse analysis (DA) as research  
method, and according to this overview, DA is developed from different sources. Basically,  
DA draws on theoretical perspectives from discourse theory, among them those of Laclau and  
Mouffe (1985) and from perspectives outlined within discursive psychology, for instance  
those elaborated by Edwards and Potter (Edwards, 1996, Edwards and Potter, 1992, 1996;  
Burman and Parker, 1993; Gill, 1996, 2000 and Wetherell, 2001).  
 
Willig (2001) explains discursive psychology as an approach concerned with psychological  
phenomena such as memory, attribution and identity but where these phenomena are  
conceptualised as discursive actions rather than cognitive processes (Willig, 2001) and this  
 
  
focus, for instance on attribution as discursive practice makes actions such as legitimatising,  
justification, categorising and rationalising important for an analysis of how the participants  
within different contexts, manage their interests and values (ibid). A further consequence of  
viewing psychological phenomena as discursive is that concepts such as identity and beliefs  
become things people do rather than things people have. A discursive psychological analytic  
focus is on how participants use discursive resources and the effects of these practices rather  
than on mapping out participants’ cognitive objects as thoughts, beliefs, prejudices and hopes.  
 
I have not applied one clear and distinct variant of discourse analysis, but borrowed what I  
have found useful from the different descriptions of discourse analysis available. Central to  
my approach is the literature of discursive psychology and a Foucauldian variant of DA.  
Below I will account for the concepts and theory informing my analysis.  
 
A Foucauldian discourse analysis  
 
A Foucauldian discourse analysis is concerned with language and its role in the constitution  
of social and psychological life (Willig, 2001). Discourses are comprised of statements which  
must be spoken from somewhere and by someone, and this speaking entails the bringing into  
being and positioning of a subject and assignment of a subject position (Foucault, 1986, cited  
in Harding 1998: 19-20). An important focus in discourse analysis has been to highlight and  
explore power aspects of discourse, as in Foucault’s analyses of power and knowledge.  
Discourse analysis focuses therefore upon what can be said by whom, where and when  
(Parker, 1992) and examines the discursive resources within a culture with ideas such as the  
discursive economy (Willig, 2001).  
 
The definition of discourses as constructions that make available certain ways of seeing the  
world has consequences for the study of how discourses offer subject positions to take up and  
therefore also for understanding experience. For the aim of my research it is necessary to  
include discourses as practices rather than structures or superstructures that are lived, acted  
out and spoken by individuals (Davies & Harre’, 2001). Discourses operate both as arenas of  
action and as fluid and mobile ‘relations’ and interrelations which produce and transmit  
knowledge and power relations (Foucault, 1980) and this analysis employs the much-cited  
concept of discursive practice. Further, according to Davies and Harré (2001) different  
discourses may exist side by side within a field. They may be mingled and adapted to each  
other, or they may be competing and imply tensions or conflict. People position themselves  
 
  
within different discourses and shift between discourses. Discourses are implicated in the  
exercise of power as for instance dominant discourses privilege those versions of social reality  
that legitimate existing power relations and social structures (Willig, 2001).  
 
The practical discourse analysis that has inspired me is the analysis of the origin or  
archaeology of terms and language in Foucault’s studies of madness (1973) and sexuality  
(1976/1981). It is useful for my research focus to employ a Foucauldian version of discourse  
analysis that addresses the relationship between discourses and institutions. Discourses are  
bound up with institutional practice in that they serve as ways of organizing, regulating and  
administering social life. Therapeutic discourses are concretized in language and take the  
form of questions, interventions, reflections and at times direct advice. Advice is often a  
construction of privileged dominant discourses, and might have the effect of legitimizing and  
reinforcing these same dominant discourses in society. In light of this, institutions in a  
Foucauldian sense have the function of stabilizing and maintaining social practices; these  
institutions are namely informed and formed by the dominant discourses, which through  
discursive practices in turn reinforce these same discourses as dominant and privileged. At the  
same time, there is also a dynamic process of change underway in society, seen not least in  
the field of family therapy. Specifically, practices of intimacy and sexuality have undergone  
changes in the period of modernity and late modernity. These new practices influence our  
ideas and discourses that in turn give rise to still more new practices, as well as alternative  
discourses and counter-discourses. Giving advice in situations of infidelity is one example of  
the complexity and power of the intersection of discourse and practice.  
 
The multiplicities of self and meaning in poststructuralism  
 
The claim of the multiplicities of self is raised against a theory of self embodied in pronoun  
grammar in which a person understands themselves as historically continuous and unitary  
(Davies & Harre’, 2001). The former account views contradiction as an expression of choice  
and the possibility of agency.xxvi Subjects participate in various practices, within which  
meanings are allocated to these categories and story lines through which different subject  
positions are elaborated. The self is positioned in terms of categories and story lines. This  
involves imaginatively positioning oneself as if one belongs in one category and not in  
another and the recognition of oneself as having the characteristics that locate one as a  
member of various subclasses of dichotomous categories and not of others. There is also an  
 
  
emotional commitment to category membership and the development of a moral system  
organized around this belonging (Davies & Harre, 2001). Mouffe (1992) claims that we can  
view the social agent as constituted by an ensemble of ‘subject positions’ and people shift  
from one to another way of speaking about themselves as the discourse shifts and as their  
positions within varying story lines are taken up.  
 
Objects of analysis and how the analysis was conducted  
 
In this section I will demonstrate how a poststructuralist frame of reference employed in  
different modes influenced the methodological process. Søndergaard (2002) claims that  
“poststructuralist inspired analysis is not something that can be learned as a linear procedure  
with concrete steps “(ibid: 61) and the following concepts have guided my analysis in  
deciding how to read the material and the selection of extracts.  
 
Discursive constructions  
 
In the main analysis I considered discourses as “sets of statements that construct objects and  
an array of subject positions” (Parker 1994:245). Discourses make available different ways of  
seeing the world and certain ways of being in the world. In the analysis, I read and re-read the  
transcriptions looking for sections in which discursive objects, such as “infidelity” or  
“intimate relationship” was talked about, and how these were accounted for in the text. As  
discourses also are constructed through what is not explicitly said (Gill, 2000; Willig, 2001) I  
paid particular attention to such possible constructions. Examples of an implicit construction  




A challenge during the task of analysis was to decide what was a discourse and what were  
fragments of a discourse. I have employed four notions of discourse to capture nuances in the  






EXAMPLES FROM THE MATERIAL  
 
Discourse: “a moralistic  
discourse about infidelity”  
 
 A male client asks the therapist whether his wife’s unfaithfulness  
ought to have any consequence in terms of her right to be with their  







a moral right to the children’. I interpret this utterance as an  
implicit reference to an old discourse that if you are unfaithful you  
should be ready to take the moral consequences: because of the  
way the client finds it relevant in a therapy context to ask this  
question and in the therapist’s not questioning why the client raises  
this issue., Instead, the therapist both directly and implicitly takes a  
stance in relation to the question as if it is a moral issue.  
 





The therapist is talking about the man’s reaction in terms that  
suggest he has no right to judge her because of her infidelity. The  
therapist explains to the client: Your wife is a person who can’t help  
falling in love, and you have to understand that you must stop your  
striving for support from everybody by telling the bad story about  
her repeatedly. You are the one who will lose in the long run by  
doing that.  
 
By positioning the wife as a victim of her own feelings and by  
explaining to the client that he will lose by doing what he finds  
legitimate reason to do, the therapist draws on a sub-discourse of  
‘wiser wise’, which is a sub-discourse of the moralistic discourse,  
in one way legitimating the moralistic aspect but trying as well to  
deal with what is the best (most wise) thing to do in light of the  
reality of the infidelity.  
 
‘Echoed discourse’: “whore  




An implicit discourse here could be said to address gender and  
motherhood, as conveyed by how the husband speaks about his  
wife. He questions whether she is in a mid-life crisis, perhaps even  
‘psychotic’ while still asking whether her absent-mindedness when  
with the children –as exemplified in her telephone conversations  
with the other man when the children are in bed – are acceptable. It  
is possible to hear an echoed discourse here of ”Madonna-whore”  
underpinning and influencing the gender discourse in the man’s  
questioning of the trustworthiness of a mother having an affair.  





outside the home. The echoed discourse emphasizes a historical  
discourse that legitimates men’s construction of women as wives,  
with an emphasis on key words such as protection, care and love, or  
as prostitutes, with key words such as temptation, taboo and  
sexuality.  
 
‘Counter discourse’: infidelity  




The therapist constructs infidelity (see above in this schema) as the  
person in love being ‘out of control’. In such a discourse, the  
unfaithful person is framed in a context free of blame that favours a  
permissive discourse over a moral one. What makes her not  
blameable is the fact that she is in love: it is more acceptable to be  
unfaithful if you are a serious person who has truly fallen in love  
rather than someone who is just fooling around. Here being  
‘serious’ feeds into another discourse - that of helplessness in the  
face of love. This notion of falling in love is in contrast to that of an  






Action orientation  
 
With action orientation I refer to “the context within which an account is produced providing  
the analyst with information about the organization and the function of the account” (Willig,  
2001: 110). A focus on subject positions makes it possible to view the subject - in this case  
the therapist - as an agent and a doer in the world, as opposed to an isolated entity such as in  
many psychological theories, or as a person determined by structures such as in a traditional  
sociological framework. The subject, rather, becomes active and creative, in-between  
different discourses, actively shaping new knowledge in the communicative space between  
different/various discourses and lived experience. For example, when the therapist encounters  
what she might perceive as moralistic attitudes he or she might in turn engage a subdiscourse  
in response to her perceived role as a serious person, the one whose responsibility it  
is to take a wider perspective. What she performs is a ‘wiser wise’ when she challenges the  
client’s opinions about his wife’s infidelity, and in her opposition to merely being morally  







A subject position within a discourse identifies “a location for persons within the structure of  
rights and duties for those who use the repertoire” (Davies and Harre, 1999:35). Discourses  
construct subjects by making available networks of meaning that speakers can take up. For  
example a moralistic discourse of infidelity contains the subject position of the blamer but  
also that of the socialised, moralistic responsible one. Positioning is the discursive process  
whereby selves are located in conversations as observably and subjectively coherent  
participants in jointly produced story lines (ibid). Subject positions are different from social  
roles, in that they offer discursive locations from which to speak and act, rather than introduce  
or prescribe a particular meaning to be acted out (Willig, 2001). Central to understanding  
subjectivity is the role of choice, or agency:  
 
The subject as a maker is thus able to make choices, but only under the regime of available 
discourses;  
choices are understood as more akin to ‘forced choices’ since the subject’s positioning within  
particular discourses makes an attempt to go beyond an understanding of the subject as fully  
determined by the working discourses when she claims that the identifactory processes 
through which  
norms are materialized enables the formation of the subject who is capable of resisting those 
norms.”  






Discourses open up or close down possibilities for practice. With the notion of practice I mean 
the kinds  
of actions available given the differing constraints of discourses. Therapy is a context in which 
clients  
often seek advice about how to live and deal with various situations, for instance losing one’s 
partner to  
another. A construction of infidelity as an immoral act makes possible for instance a practice of 
securing  
social support. An analysis of practices is also presented in the Analysis Chapter where I look at 
how  






In exploring subjectivity one is concerned with what can be felt (Willig, 2001). In the  
material I searched for what kinds of subjective experience for the therapist and the client  
might be said to be made available by different constructions of, for instance, infidelity as an  
immoral act accompanied by emotions such as guilt, on the one hand, and being “unable to  
help it” on the other. A helpful guide throughout the analysis was to think about discourses as  
deployed by people to manage relational pain, and therefore I searched for what could be said  
to be moralistic, religious or existential discourses in my material, as they offer a repertoire  
 
  
for how to find meaning in life faced with experiences that seem to be meaningless. Another  
guiding thought has been the idea of subject positions that allow subjects to position  
themselves differently in relation to problems, challenges and difficult situations, making  




Interpretative repertoires  
 
Interpretative repertoires can be understood as ‘broadly discernible clusters of terms,  
descriptions, and figures of speech often assembled around metaphors or vivid images”  
(Potter & Wetherell, 1995: 89) and as “available resources for making evaluations,  
constructing factual versions and performing particular actions” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992:  
90). The notion of interpretative repertoires usefully mediates between the enabling and  
constraining effects of Foucauldian ‘discourses’ on the one hand (Parker, 1992) and the  
contextualised discursive flexibility that characterises conversation analysis on the other  
(Sacks, 1992; Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974). Billig (1991) states that social  
psychologists have too often assumed that “an ‘attitude’ is a mental reality, and that in  
speaking their attitude people are giving outward expression to an inner mental state. It is the  
inner state that is presumed to constitute the reality of the matter. For the discursive social  
psychologist, this assumption needs to be theoretically inverted; the giving of the attitude –  
the use of attitudinal language - is the reality which needs to be studied.” (Ibid: 15).  
 
In the analysis I searched for how the participants drew upon categories and terms which in  
themselves needed to be analysed and deconstructed - such as “being in love”, “infidelity”  
and “romantic”- because these carry much implicit meaning when conveyed in the therapy  
context as professional insight and in accordance with guidelines. The presence of tensions  
and contradictions among the interpretative repertoires used by speakers demonstrates that 
the  
discursive resources upon which people draw are inherently dilemmatic (Billig et al. 1988;  
Billig 1991). Chapter 7 on Love presents examples of 3 interpretative repertoires of romantic  
love: ’love hurts’, ‘the virtue of love’ and ‘heart of hearts’.  
 
Choice of extracts  
 
The research interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed for analysis. My overall intent  
when reading the material was to explore the ways in which a social reality such as therapy  
considered a ‘talking cure’ is constructed through language within the particular context of  
 
  
couple therapy. What has guided my selection of excerpts has primarily been my curiosity  
when reading the material, as for instance when during transcription I noticed the passage  
quoted below, as a narrative that exposes something I have heard a lot in various contexts,  
namely regret and evaluation in the aftermath of infidelity. I employed this extract to the  
analysis of a discourse of first being in love and then regretting with the evaluation of the  
subject included:  
 
T: Once upon a time I fell in love… after I got married. It is a long time ago now. I had a 
relationship  
with another person. We lived at the time in a small town on the west coast. It was a 
Wednesday, and  
my lover and I were walking along the beach. Then I saw my spouse and child driving by, with a  
Christmas tree on the roof of the car, and they passed us. They didn’t see me, but I felt so 
guilty and  
ugly. I had had a wonderful time with the other person, but at what price? Looking back, I 
could have  
done without that experience… .My goodness, think what I was risking for such a jerk!  
 
Secondly, informed by the choice of doing discourse analysis I started more systematically to  
select extracts which served the discursive aim of the research and that were suitable to  
demonstrate discursive dynamics in the analysis. Criteria for the selection of texts were their  
ability to demonstrate how discourses are produced, stabilised and constructed, and also  
instances in which the participants constructed what can be seen as potential solutions to  
problems (Gill 2002 in Bauer & Gaskell, 2000). The example below demonstrates how a  
statement is constructed as an answer to a debate in the culture about whether there were  
better ideals and norms “before”, and as an answer to what many would call the  
postmodernist tendency to fragmentation and disintegration:  
 
T: I think nowadays young people … they go out separately. They have different needs. So she 
goes  
with her friends and he gets jealous and then he goes to a pub with his friends […] Instead of in 
my  
time, when they either went together or stayed at home [together]. [Going out] separately to 
the pub...  
It’s become very common. I don’t think it’s healthy.  
 
Thirdly, looking for implicit constructions (MacNaughten quoted in Willig, 2001) of love  
were important selections, such as therapists’ statements such as “this relationship is  
unhealthy”. I coded this and similar categories as breaches with the systemic attitude  
exemplified by, for instance, the Milan approach, which strives for neutrality, circularity and  
hypothesising (Selvini, Cecchin, Prata, Boscolo, 1978, Cecchin, 1987) in order to realize the  
practical outcome of not evaluating others’ relationships in terms of good and bad, healthy  
and unhealthy. I have not aimed for these excerpts to be seen as representative of how the  
participants talk and argue.  
 
  
For instance, I wondered during the process what to do with extracts that do not necessarily at  
first glance fit into a discourse analysis but which still awaken curiosity in me in reading  
them, like this excerpt:  
 
T: And I’ve longed a lot for that real love. To be… what kids long for… and that you maybe long 
for  
your whole life. That someone loves you just the way you are, without any make-up on and 
with all  
your grime and everything else. And loves you maybe not just in spite of your flaws, but maybe  
because of them, that you can for example love a scar, and think that the scar is beautiful 
because  




Experiences with reading text in a performative manner  
 
The concept of interpretative repertoire and the procedure of discourse analysis presented  
above were of practical use in helping me to keep in mind the discursive project of how text  
seems to be “doing” more than merely “saying”. This represented a new exercise for me, as I  
am trained as a therapist to look attentively at content in a phenomenological mode rather 
than  
for what a text is doing. The latter involves looking out for interpretative repertoires or  
discourses that organize text, signalled by repetitive idioms or metaphors. Speakers use  
discursive consistency and variability to carry out such interaction projects as explaining,  
justifying, warranting and managing their own accountability (Billig, 1988, 1991; Willig,  
2001; Søndergaard, 2000). One of the helpful questions for me in keeping an awareness of a  
discursive reading of the data was, ‘why am I reading this passage in this way?’ A discursive  
method pays close attention to the constructive and functional dimensions of discourse. To  
facilitate a systematic and sustained exploration of these dimensions, context, variability and  
construction of discursive accounts need to be attended to (Potter&Wetherell, 1987). An  
example of how to read text in a performative manner is when a therapist says, “it was much  
better before than now” when the therapist talks about couples’ ability to maintain their  
relationship, and I analysed this kind of utterance as doing nostalgia. Nostalgia has the effect  
of idealizing the past, and this effect could be read in attempts to stabilise attitudes and  
practices in contrast to aiming for change. Informed by a discursive approach I questioned  
what is at stake when speaking in nostalgic terms in a context of couple therapy. In this case,  
the therapists blamed the generation of 68 for having disrupted people’s ability to stay  
together, and particularly their claims about free sex, which in turn disturb the romantic model  
of the nuclear family. So in this context, what nostalgia could do, is ‘to do’ stabilising the  
romantic discourse, and maintain the heteronomy ideal of a couple.  
 
  
Examples of the researcher’s active co-construction of the conversation  
 
The data that forms the basis of this study were collected through open-ended, individual  
interviews. Such interviews permit the researcher to participate fully in a relatively informal  
conversational exchange. This is important because from a Discourse Analysis point of view,  
the whole interaction is to be analysed – not just the half of the conversation that is supplied  
by the interviewee. Because of this analytic focus, it is not desirable for the researcher to  
remain neutral or passively approving of the interviewee’s contributions throughout the  
discussion. It has been interesting to explore my own use of language in the material as I was  
much more active than I thought I would be, not only in terms of volume, but in exposing  
meanings, delivering metaphors and in constructing images, contrasts, paradoxes and  
hypotheses.  
 
In the following I will exemplify my contributions in the interviews. The first example shows  
how I participated with concepts and categories loaded with implicit meaning about infidelity:  
 
 A: Well, if for instance, have you’ve thought of the situation if your partner was unfaithful or if 
you were  
unfaithful, would it then be ok, no problem or would it be more catastrophic, do you think?  
 
T: Well, one has been through different phases, you know. Phases that we have worked 
through, but I don’t  
know how it will be if it happens again? It depends on different circumstances.  
 
A: But was it catastrophic for you or you two, or was it more like; not that kind of shocking and 
difficult. Less  
than you imagined? Or not so difficult and terrible  
 
T: Well, the case was that we both had an affair, at the same time.  
 
A: Well, then it was kind of equality, fair, in a way? Not just one of you...?  
 
T: No I wonder about that, how would that have been?  
 
A: That’s different?  
 
T: Yes… but well I have… (pause) well it happens that one of us gets fascinated by someone 
else. Sometimes it  
comes up…. yes and then it can cause reactions.  
 




When I examine this excerpt it seems to me that I construct infidelity as more difficult and  
emotional than the participant. My terms are exaggerations and extreme, while the therapist  
seems to be calmer. The terms I use correspond with a common perception of infidelity as  
something that impacts enormously on a relationship, in the terms “catastrophic” and  
“shocking”, and that infidelity is something that someone does to you, harms you, seen in the  
notions of “inflicted” and “ultimate betrayal.” By using these terms, I can be said to promote  
a view of infidelity from an exclusively critical perspective, taking for granted a discourse of  
 
  
infidelity as harmful and destructive to a couple and as an emotional crisis for the party  
experiencing the infidelity. Applying notions like “catastrophic” offers little space for  
different associations and in this use of concepts I do not explore infidelity from the  
participant’s point of view, but instead dramatise the situation of infidelity with my choice of  
words.  
 
In retrospect, I am not sure why I actively constructed infidelity with so constrained a frame  
of reference, as I also draw on various discourses of infidelity. It might be that I was too  
informed by a dominant discourse of infidelity as something truly hurtful, and from a  
therapeutic position was eager to demonstrate empathy when talking about infidelity; I could  
also have been informed by an earlier interview with another participant who was somewhat  
provoked by my rational deconstruction of infidelity. The informant said to me  
straightforwardly that infidelity destroys a couple. I realise now that the participant might  
have held back alternative versions of infidelity since I was so clearly drawing on a discourse  
of infidelity as injurious to a couple.  
 
 Billig claims that the speaker is simultaneously in charge of language and captured in it  
(Billig, 1991: 8). Below is an example of my application of the notion “deep-seated”,  
indicating a desire to really grasp the inner core of an opinion. This is particularly interesting  
as I subscribe ontologically to a social constructionist research model and conception of  
knowledge and “reject” the psychodynamic idea of identity. However, my language discloses  
echoes of language that I have tried to change:  
 
A: Do you have some deep-seated - or any ideas about intimate relationships or…something 
about an  
idea that there might be people that fit better together than others or not…? Ehh …you’re 
talking a lot  
about emotions and feelings. You‘re talking a lot about feelings here. It seems like you have an 
idea  
about feelings as something you can’t just switch on and off.  
 
Looking back, I am not sure why I, so to say, delved for a deep-seated meaning of love, but I  
can imagine some reasons. I might be said here to be connecting myself to the language I  
notice the therapist used, as the informant drew several times on an essentialist language of  
love. Another reason might be that I here reveal one repertoire of beliefs, namely that some  
beliefs are more deep-rooted, and I really wanted to get in touch with the most important idea  
of love, as if I had said, point blank, what is love about for you. I think that the effect on the  
therapist was again that I constrained the therapist’s repertoire signalling that it is the one  
main idea that is of interest and not the complex and manifold ways of thinking about love.  
 
  
Ethical considerations  
 
The project was granted ethical approval by the Research Ethics Committee of the Tavistock  
and Portman NHS Trust and the Norwegian research ethics committee, The National  
Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities in Oslo (Appendix  
5). The participants were offered information about the study in the initial letter. This was  
verbally reiterated at the start of the interview to give the participants, as far as possible, a  
sense of protection and control. Although the formal aspects about ethical issues were dealt  
with I will in the following share some ethical considerations that emerged through the  
research process.  
 
An important consideration at the start of the project was how the research process would  
affect the participants, both their interests and identities (Denscombe, 2002). However, I  
found that ethical dilemmas emerged throughout the research process. Anonymity issues have  
been important to consider. The smallness of the community of family therapists working in  
this context in Norway made securing anonymity difficult. I realised early in the research  
process that the informants told ‘everybody’ that they were participating, in their enthusiasm  
for the project. But I also realised that they and I were not attentive enough to the effects of  
such enthusiasm, resulting in reduction of their anonymity as informants. I thought that the  
more people knew about the participants, the easier it could be to trace a particular  
informant’s voice and narratives in the written thesis.  
 
Doing research on sensitive topics  
 
Interviewing the therapists reminded me of the necessity of being aware of context when  
using such methods as in-depth interviews that have much in common with therapy and with  
comfortable friend-to-friend conversations. Love, sexuality and intimacy are sensitive topics;  
in the case of this study highly sensitive, because these issues affect both the therapists’ lives  
and their identities as professionals. Engagement in research always has the potential to feed  
back into the life experience of researcher and interviewee, with the possibility of triggering  
personal change (Wren, 2000). To have one’s understanding of love and sexuality disturbed  
through answering social constructionist-oriented research questions might be both  
professionally and personally confusing and perhaps lead to some form of disillusionment,  
and this could lead to loss of power, faith and courage, thereby potentially influencing  
professional self-esteem.  
 
  
 At least for me, these feelings are recognizable, as I have been in touch with them all during  
the research process; also experience of these feelings in the first place prompted my interest  
in doing the research.  
 
I could have been more aware of this research as possibly interfering in the therapist’s life. I  
realise now that I should have been much more concerned about how the participants reacted  
in the interviews and not only acknowledged but actively encouraged the expression of their  
discomfort, stress and doubts when these were voiced. In my defence, I can only say that I  
was too preoccupied with tackling my own doubt about the deconstruction method and was  
probably not open enough to actively opening up for participants’ doubts and discomfort.  
 
Another ethical aspect of posing research questions to participants in the interviews is the risk  
of unwelcome recall of memories of unpleasant events in their lives. Infidelity, lost love,  
unsuccessful relationships and violence are issues the participants shared in the interviews  
which had significant value for me, but I did not pay enough attention to how disclosing these  
narratives was experienced by the participants. I do not intend to dramatise the therapists’  
situation, but rather recognise these reflections as ethical issues of which I could have been  
more aware than I was. Though none of the participants have expressed feeling discomfort in  
their participation, the possibility is present and I was responsible for giving such possible  
experiences space. The participants have reported that the experience of participation in this  
research has stimulated them in their work and also delivered many perspectives and  
reflections related to their private lives.  
 
My findings could ultimately be viewed as a criticism of the family therapy profession and  
thereby of my participants in particular. An awareness of my intentions has been required,  
coupled with sincerity and respectful presentation during and following the research. This has  
been a significant challenge; I have applied a critical method, and the value of the research  
lies in the critical lenses it has produced; at the same time, I have an ethical responsibility to  
my participants in not denigrating them in any way during presentation.  
 
To sum up; ethical issues are important to highlight and I realise most of all that the ethical  
dilemmas in this project are many. I have been attentive to ethical research but it has at the  
same time been difficult to consider all the various ethical angles, since they are not easy to  
map beforehand, and are not fixed. Looking back, I could have been more in dialogue with  
 
  
the participants about ethical issues instead of trying to manage the ethical challenges alone  
during the process. When this is said, I also have a clear opinion that it has been ethically  
important to do this research particularly in relation to issues of professional power and its  
potential exertion on clients. I have also gotten in touch with my own ethical models for being  
a moral person, and one of them is my trust in the professional ethical conventions that  




During the research process, reflexivity has necessitated awareness at different levels as I  
encountered questions about my intentions and prejudices, how I approach them in my choice  
of methodology, how to write up my research and how later to report my findings to the  
family therapy field in Norway. Steier (1995) claims that reflexivity in research should  
examine how we as researchers are reflexively part of those systems we study, and reflexivity  
is one way we can contextually recognise the various mutual relationships in which our  
knowing activities are embedded (1995:163). I aim to make my research intentions,  
prejudices and opinions transparent and accessible for the reader. One clear intention in doing  
this research has been to explore in depth what is regarded or should be regarded as  
knowledge-in-use for the field of couple therapy. The issue raised throughout the work with  
respect to both methodology and analysis is, what is theory and what is ‘everyday’ knowledge  
when therapists conduct couple therapy?  
 
My presumption was that everyday knowledge was knowledge-in-use, and would be more  
common than references to theoretical frameworks or research. Looking back, I have to  
examine why this research intention was so important to me, and how I have influenced the  
study through the various choices I have made. It was of interest to examine the relationship  
between professional knowledge and common sense in couple therapy because I am  
concerned with training in family therapy and have an interest in how this training programme  
can be improved. I was not, as far as I can see my own motives, out to prove that my hunch  
was correct, but I have had an interest in the consequences my analysis would have, if  
accurate, for further practice and research. This is related to my research position viewing  
therapy as a construct and couple therapy as another construct, more akin in practice to the  
work of priests, philosophers, and counsellors than that of traditional psychologists working  
with individual disorders.  
 
  
Taking this stance toward consequences even further, I could be said to have positioned  
myself in a professional debate (in Norway) over which professions should be represented  
at Family Therapy Guidance Centres, and which professions should occupy management  
positions I am aware that there is subdebate over the issue of which professional groups are  
most suitable for training family therapists as well as an even more critical conflict over  
which profession can manage such a centre. I am aware that this study can be used to inform  
arguments in the context of such professional-political discussions.  
 
The theories of Foucault and poststructuralist thinking emphasise the roles of power and  
knowledge and disallow the notion of the ‘innocent’ helper. This stance has shaped my  
research intentions, and the application of discourse analysis has captured the notion of  
knowledge-in-use as discourses and not as theory or “common sense”. The results show in  
part that in couple therapy, therapists draw on discourses, and discourses of love are shared in  
a larger cultural context than is professional knowledge like medicine. In the process of data  
gathering, one of the dilemmas was that the participants often disclosed private issues many  
of which were too private to remain part of the data, such as cases in which they asked me to  
turn off the tape-recorder. I think the dilemma between what was too private to disclose and  
what was professional enough to share, mirrors the research question. Hence my conclusion is  




One perspective important for my research interest is the possibility of change and its impact  
on therapists, and ultimately on clients. Rubin (Rubin in Sternberg &Barnes, 1988) claims  
about the impact of research that “studies of love may have their most direct effects on the  
individuals and couples who serve as research subjects”. He refers to his 1976 research in  
which he found that participating in the research itself had an impact on many of the couples’  
relationships (Rubin & Mitchell, 1976). It cemented relationships in some cases while in  
others it hastened their demise. The effect of being ‘forced’ to look at themselves and their  
relationships was experienced by subjects as similar to a kind of ‘couple’s counselling’.  
Circularity can be seen as a loop of knowledge and change; the effect of participation in and  
developing familiarity with the findings of research might produce new perspectives and  
knowledge for the family therapy field, which again may have an outcome in providing  
knowledge useful for couples seeking therapy.  
 
  
Related to this circularity is Rubin’s claim that in research on love, played out on a larger  
stage, love researchers will find themselves cast as couple counsellors to society at large. The  
approaches and results of research on love heralded in mass media will undoubtedly shape  
people’s expectations of love. For instance, if scientists focus on the companionate nature of  
love, couples will become preoccupied with their own companionship; if scientists turn their  
attention to passionate love, couples will be concerned with their own passion. The research  
may increase both the quality and the durability of intimate relationship.  
 
Considering this perspective in a wider context, researchers and therapists hold a powerful  
position and they also have a direct impact on people’s lives and emotional well being  
according to Rubin (Rubin in Sternberg & Barnes, 1988). How will the idea of love as a  
construction influence both therapists and couples? My aim is that research will offer  
polyphony and multiplicity, as well as acceptance for and promotion of a professional  
language that mirrors this complexity. My concern is that these findings might end up  
affecting the field of family therapists in ways that instead promote professional  
disillusionment. But for me the most dominant impact of the research is the potential to offer  
multiplicity and enrich views of professional knowledge in use.  
 
A corresponding dilemma  
 
Flatebø (2006) quotes Kitzinger and Wilkinson (1996) in their examination of how one  
constructs “others”, such as when clients are constructed as “others” who have problems  
qualitatively different from those of the professionals who for their part have the solutions to  
these problems. Flatebø writes, “I may be read to do the same in my report. I make my  
participants “others” and I then identify the problems attached to their practice and talk, 
whilst  
I myself may be heard to be in possession of a superior view, able to suggest solutions to the  
problems with which they strive.” This observation made me reflect on how I have  
positioned myself in relation to my participants.  
 
My dilemma has been that as a practitioner at heart, I am familiar with the information the  
participants have shared and disclosed in the interviews - nothing has been strange or bizarre.  
At the same time, being acquainted with their accounts and perspectives and fully claiming  
my research interests in my choice of discourse analysis, I could be said to be in an obvious  
position of critique. This combination of “being one of them” and at the same time taking a  
 
  
critical stance in research might be said to position me both as superior and as someone at a  
remove from her own community who can claim a meta-perspective.  
 
The research question and the process of research  
 
The research question unfolded throughout the investigation in a way that made me see it 
with  
new eyes. The interviews revealed the ‘blurred’ divisions between personal and professional  
ideas and the essence of my research topic, namely the relation between theory, the therapist  
and the personal self of the therapist. As an example, one of my hypotheses was that the  
therapist in couple’s therapy meets some compelling challenges. The first is lack of theory,  
and because there is little theory developed, therapists are to use their own ideas, beliefs and  
values. These ideas are connected to different and to a certain degree conflicting discourses in  
society integrated into the therapist’s life, as well as those of the couples. To a certain extent,  
they are very private ideas, but in terms of therapy and other meaning-making processes we  
all draw on them, negotiate, repeat, define, shape, renew, play out and position ourselves  




During the process, I have examined what my personal and professional agenda with doing  
this research has been. The main focus for this examination includes questions of how critical  
I am, and what the critique is about. I have earlier mentioned having experiences as a  
researcher in a field to which I am professionally committed, and wanting to combine being  
loyal and supportive with taking a critical stance to the field. I have tried hard to be critical  
enough, to pull myself into a deconstructive mood, with the instruction that it is important to  
investigate how knowledge is constructed and dealt with when people seek help and support  
for their love lives. The problem with being critical is connected to the transition from being a  
non-critical therapist to becoming a critical researcher, as in the role of therapist I have been  
trained to understand that as a professional I must maintain an analytical and critical attitude  
to what has been said. The confusing part is that as a therapist I have one position, critical of  
the lack of reflexivity in the field, but when I experience myself doing research, I struggle  
with doing critique.  
 
Although I have struggled with being critically analytic enough on the one hand, I have been  
aware of having reactions such as scepticism and indignation towards attitudes and opinions I  
interpret as conservative, stabilising, exclusive and conventional. Take as an example the  
 
  
extract in which a therapist speaks, as I read it, dogmatically and negatively about the 68-  
generation, where I respond in the analysis by writing quite indignantly about the therapist’s  
leaving out the positive side of this generations’ contribution. I do recognise my motive in  
writing this thesis to trouble therapists in their potentially conservative and stabilising way of  
reproducing normative discourses of love, sex and intimacy.  
 
King claims that “an understanding of the experiences not only of the participants, but also of  
the researchers constitutes a fundamental part of the research process” (King, 2000 quoted in  
Flatebø). She applies the term self-reflexivity to highlight such aspects of a research process  
and states that researchers, “to the extent of their ability, are required to analyse and display  
their history, values and assumptions, as well as their interrelationship with their participants”  
(ibid). As researchers are not isolated from the phenomena they study (Denscombe, 2002) I  




I am a member of the community I study, I have managed two Norwegian Family Therapy  
Guidance Centres, worked as a family therapist at several others, know many of the  
professionals personally and I will be involved fulltime with training individuals to become  
couple therapists in addition to being an editor for the Nordic Journal of Family Therapy. All  
these different employments and positions are connected to significant professional influence  
and power. These experiences and knowledge have influenced the research, both in enriching  
the research but also in limiting it. I have several times during this research process asked  
myself, what is my research agenda? Am I interested in criticising the current practise of  
couple’s therapists? In order to avoid being “biased”, I have attempted to identify my biases  
and explore how they inform my analyses. One of the dilemmas has been how to make use of  
the knowledge I think I have and at the same time to be detached from the same knowledge.  
What has been helpful in achieving detachment has been the acquisition of a poststructuralist  
framework because this was new and thereby involved greater difficulty in access to  
methodology and theory, as well as writing in another language.  
 
Taking the role of “stranger” was unnatural for me, but the new framework and second  
language made me a stranger in one sense. I have searched for methodological assistance,  
such as supervisors, research diary and dialogues with colleagues, to approach the research in  
 
  
as trustworthy a manner as possible, to be aware of my own personal values, knowledge,  




Validity, reliability and trustworthiness  
 
What are or should be consensus and sound practice regarding validation in qualitative  
research? Smith (Smith in Richardson, 1996) states that there is no common agreement about  
questions of validity in the research field. Quantitative research has conventions and standards  
for what should yield truth that are distinct from those for qualitative research. Qualitative  
research should be seen as an attempt to gain a more complex understanding of a situation by  
including additional or multiple viewpoints, instead of aiming to define the results of analyses  
as objective and universal.  
 
Discourse analysts have also, according to Gill (2000) been critical of many existing methods  
for ensuring reliability and validity within psychology and need to produce new and  
appropriate checks for ensuring validity and reliability. Gill quotes Potter who argues that  
discourse analysis can make use of four reflections to weigh up the reliability and validity of  
analysis: deviant case analysis, participants’ understanding, coherence and readers’  
evaluation. I have not systemically followed these considerations as a structure but find them  
useful as a perspective when I account for and discuss issues of reliability and validity.  
 
First of all, I have followed Smith’s advice (Smith, 2000) in making a distinction in the text  
between the material and the analysis. I have also aimed to present the context of the raw 
data  
in my presentation of the analysis, as in, “this is an interview where T and I have watched a  
taped video session and we talk about so and so”. Further, I have made efforts to include in  
the analysis as much of the original material as possible, to allow the reader to follow the  
interpretations that I have made. Efforts taken to increase the validity of this research have  
been to present the material in different contexts, to allow readers to make their own  
evaluations of it and to actively inspire alternative readings of it. Reference groups involved  
here have been seminar student groups, television audiences, an audit reader, my colleagues,  
students and the participants, although I have not had systematic exchanges about the written  
material. Despite being convinced of the epistemological position of not claiming a realist  
position, I have still been confused about what should be regarded as insights and knowledge  
 
  
worth bringing forward as “findings” and not “just arbitrary opinions and meanings”. One  
solution to this dilemma has been reading theory and methodology and continuously adjusting  
and comparing my analysis with previous published research. This approach corresponds with  
Potter’s claim of coherence and the value of checks on the adequacy of earlier studies (Potter,  
1996b). It has been especially important to guard myself against the temptation of producing  
truths and “proofs” while at the same time disclosing why and how the insight and hindsight  
have continuously developed. Finally, regarding trustworthiness I can site Flatebø (2006) and  
Sloman (1976), who state that even if something is done only by one or a few participants its  
occurrence shows that it is possible and may therefore be important as a focus for further  
research studies.  
 
Limitations of the method  
 
“Postmodernism, in its infinitely sceptical and subversive attitude toward normative claims,  
institutional justice and political struggles, is certainly refreshing. Yet, it is also debilitating”.  




Gill (1995) claims that there are dilemmas raised by the conceptions of subjectivity and power  
which underpin discourse analysis, and these dilemmas have their origins in problems in part  
of the understanding of relativism adopted by some discourse analysts (ibid: 165).  
 
During the analysis one of my main concerns was that I found I elaborated themes that were  
relevant for the practice of therapy, such as therapists talking about their own private  
experiences and longings for real love, and narratives from their own professional life, which  
were difficult to connect to an analysis of power and knowledge. This experience corresponds  
with limitations of the method as described by Figueroa and López (1991 in Burman & Parker  
1993). They claim that one tension approaching discourse analysis is “between the use of  
conceptions of power/knowledge and a range of other approaches that are simply descriptive  
. In some cases, the processes of power that are being referred to in the analysis may even be  
explicitly referring to Foucauldian or feminist perspectives, while the actual ‘analysis’ does  
no more than redescribe what the interviewee (or other text) is saying“ (ibid:8). In other  
words, the field of therapy exposes implicit, here-and-now, fluid themes that are descriptions  
of inner life, not relevant to analysis in terms of power and knowledge concepts. Another  
tension within discourse analysis related to this is how far the researcher can allow herself to  
go from context to interpretation. On the one hand, I wanted to deploy a critical view when  
reading my material while I experienced times when I wondered whether this was merely an  
 
  
academic exercise. In other words, how to deal with relativist issues (Gill, 1995) as a  
researcher? I really enjoyed the freedom of discourse analysis left to the researcher, to decide  
what a discourse is here, how does it position the subject and how is this again related to  
wider aspects of symbols, signs and institutions but I also experienced being insecure in  
dealing with what is ‘just me’ and my elaborations and what is valid to claim as a research  
product. I found myself struggling with the tension of on the one side, being constructionist  
and easily slide into relativism and on the other side, realising that I during all the process of  
writing up, had a lot of power to define reality and taking a lot of value statements (ethic) and  
really in the end influence upon the final product. During the analysis, I asked myself; are my  
findings and how to validate my analysis? Although one could argue that discourse analysis  
less interested in the issue of representativeness (Gill, 2000) I think it is a shortcoming of the  
method, that it is not more discussion and reflections on how issues as representativeness and  
validity, especially for the case of psychological research could be elaborated further. A final  
limitation, is the question of whether subjectivity can be theorised on the basis of discourse  
alone (Willig, 2001: 118, Gill 1995) and in psychotherapy research this is related to a question  
of how we account for emotions, and how discourse analysts account for individual  
differences within the position for instance of being a therapist. What I find particularly  
relevant for further discussion is to what extent positioning is entirely context dependent and  
intentional, and, whether it is or not, how to account for individual choice and tendencies.  
 
Summary of Methodology  
 
What has been an inspiring learning experience through the choice of methodology is the  
experience with discourse analysis as a different way of doing research, which provides for  
inconsistency in data instead of regarding this inconsistency as unexpected and problematic.  
 
It has also been important to respond to the material in a way that corresponds with my  
epistemological stance, emphasising flexibility and multiplicities as the constructive drive in  
meaning-shaping activity when talking about love, intimacy, sex Doing this research with a  
discursive approach has not been dramatically different from doing therapy, in that breaches,  
paradoxes and dilemmas have been responded to as equally important or, if anything, more  
important than patterns, coherence and representativeness of the material.  
 
  




The research question I address in this analysis relates to therapists’ talk about love. Couple  
therapists are seen as “experts on love” and I am interested in the language they use to speak  
about love and the implications this has for the couple seeking therapy. In addition to having  
an effect on the actual couple in therapy, professional talk about love also plays a constitutive  
societal role in social and psychological life. My analytic approach is discourse analysis  
because of the potential of this method to make distinct the relationship between discourse  
and how people think and feel and what they in fact do (Willig, 2001). A further advantage of  
a discursive approach lies in the opportunity to focus on how discourses change over time.  
The fluid and dynamic process of discourse makes it possible to consider how therapists draw  
on dominant discourses about love and at the same time construct alternative and 
counterdiscourses  
in a therapy context. Finally, such an analysis can direct attention to the  
relationship between discourses and institutions, namely how discourses legitimate and  
reinforce existing social and institutional structures, and how these same structures in turn  
support and validate dominant discourses (Willig, 2001)  
 
In the literature review I have identified three concepts from the literature on intimate  
relationships in Western culture: the couple as romantic, the couple as a unit for the nuclear  
family and as a pure relationship (see Chapter 3). These three prevailing concepts could serve  
as an organisational framework for the following analysis, guiding the selection and shaping  
of the data, and thereby validating the currency of these discourses in contemporary couple  
therapy. This could have functioned within a top-down analysis, selecting the data to fit these  
well-documented and critical concepts. However, when focusing on the obvious, one does not  
look as closely at the shadows. The potential cost of such an approach lies in overlooking  
discourses in the material that do not fit these prominent, acknowledged discursive trends in  
the literature. Therefore, I have chosen an approach in which, while I have been informed by  
the discourses of romantic love, social arrangement and pure relationship, I have also kept  
watch for emerging marginal, sub- or counter discourses. My rationale for this choice is that  
while broad terms and categories function well, for example, for sociologists in their aim of  
charting the wide-ranging relevance of dominant ideas and perspectives, therapists have to  
deal with the deployment of these positions in discourse in a far more complex context: that  
 
  
of a particular couple and family which represent a more manifold and inconsistent drawing  
on the major discourses. Therefore the outcome of this analysis will focus upon how dominant  
discourses about love organise, challenge, regulate and construct therapeutic talk about love.  
 
The T-construct  
 
The material for the analysis consists mainly of interviews conducted with couple therapists. I 
have  
constructed a collective voice representing the therapists labelled T, for two reasons. One is so 
that the  
therapists’ identities cannot be recognised in the material (see Chapter 4). A second reason is 
that the  
discursive voice comes more clearly to the fore without preoccupation with gender, age and 
profession. I  
argue that this choice has made me more attentive to the discursive orientation in the text, 
freed from the  
biographical details of the different therapists interviewed. However, it can be argued that 
there are costs  
in loss of meaning and understanding by excluding biographical facts, as for instance gender; 
however,  
these issues surface in my analysis in relation to gendered discourses. I take a poststructuralist 
stance in  
regarding discourses as gendered to some degree independently of whether it is a man or 
woman who  
speaks. What matters for instance is how talk is constructed in the cultural production of 
discourses  
about gender. Therefore the construct of “T” represents the collected and collective 
reflections of my  
group of informants, a sampling of heterogeneous therapists, varying in age and gender, social 
status,  
and professional background. While it can be argued that these differences have relevance, all 
of the  
therapists interviewed are white, middle class and share the professional and social status that 
their title  
of therapist affords; in other words, the faces behind T can be said in Bourdieu’s terms (1986) 
to carry  




The organisation of the material  
 
A methodological challenge when analyzing the data collected during my meetings with T,  
involved how and when discourses about love would be identified. Talking about discourses  
of love with the therapists is not a simple matter, as these individuals are subject to the same  
discourses both as professionals and private persons. Insofar as love as a phenomenon is  
considered ‘private’ by nature, even when professional advice about it is sought, it is difficult  
to describe in analytic terms; this is also true of the discursivity of love. So when we talk  
about love, such talk constructs and is constructed by a multiplicity of emotions, signs,  
analogies and myths. A central challenge for me as researcher lies in the very impetus for  
such a discursive analysis: discourses about love are so entrenched that they are equally  
 
  
unclear for me as they are for others, couples and therapists included. This raises an  
epistemological question of how to differentiate between dominant cultural discourses,  
professional discourses and those we casually refer to as ‘common sense’, discourses of  
personal experience heavily constructed by the former two.  
 
Reading through my material, three experiential contexts emerged in which talk of love could  
be identified and through which discourses of love could be talked into reality. The first  
context is when one is overwhelmed and truly convinced that love has arrived, as in cases of  
being in love. The second is when insecurity arises regarding whether or not love is still  
present, inspiring questions about whether the relationship should continue – love in doubt.  
The third is when love is disturbed or threatened by infidelity: what might be called love in  
danger. So, discourses about love, then, emerge both in situations defined by the almost  
overpowering presence of love and by its apparent absence.  
 
The analysis is organised as three chapters: Being in love, Love in doubt, and Love in danger.  
Each of these chapters will be briefly introduced, followed by a presentation of the analysis  
with excerpts taken primarily from interview sequences between the informants and me. My  
presentation of the material will be divided into sub-sections tracking and elaborating the  
various discourses, counter-discourses and sub-discourses that the analysis has yielded. At  
the end of each chapter, there will be an extended discussion of the analysis with a particular  
focus on relevance for therapeutic practice in the presentation of questions, dilemmas,  
paradoxes or insights for practitioner readers to explore further. A more overarching  
discussion of the analytic insights and implications will then follow in the subsequent  
Discussion chapter.  
 
  




In this chapter I will focus on therapists’ statements and discourses of falling and being in  
love. I preface the analysis with a brief overview of being in love in late modernity, and an  
equally condensed review of Giddens’ (1992) analysis of intimacy. The analysis of the  
interview material will follow, organized around the central themes of ‘Love as destiny’ and  
‘The At-stake’, with the various discursive features comprising these described and discussed  
in independent thematic sub-sections. To conclude the presentation of being in love I will  
discuss some of its discursive implications for late modernity on the basis of this analysis.  
 
Introduction: The discursive function of being in love in late modernity  
 
The phrase ‘being in love’ has come to refer to a state that is portrayed virtually as a natural  
human inevitability with the expectation that everybody will experience love at least once in  
his or her lifetime. Nowadays even girls and boys in primary school say ‘I’m in love’ as if  
referring to a universally accepted state, just as their parents and grandparents might do. In  
everyday talk one is not expected to have to explain what ‘being in love’ means, as the phrase  
has a shorthand communicative function. It is not like having a mental or physical illness, and  
having to explain to others the nature, implications, and prognosis of your condition; on the  
other hand, it is not the case that one can Google one’s way to any hard facts or concrete  
information on being in love. Despite the lack of scientific definitions it is my impression that  
‘being in love’ is commonly described as a natural phenomenon, with depictions ranging from  
the quasi-religious to those suggesting impoverishment or impairment when referring to those  
apparently unable to achieve the state of ‘being in love’, as if its absence is noteworthy or  
questionable. “What’s wrong with that person who hasn’t been in love?” we think, and  
discreetly discuss them amongst ourselves. Worse still is the haunting worry “What’s wrong  
with me?” The emergence of such existential anxiety points to the power of this being in love  
discourse, permeating as it does all layers of our society - from casual presence in popular  
literature, music, and everyday small talk, to its construction as a client’s motivation to seek  
help in the form of personal therapy.  
 
The terms ‘being in love’ and ‘falling in love’ are used to emphasise different nuances of a  
phenomenon we usually assume we know and understand, the meaning of which we all take  
 
  
for granted. The challenge we face with an experience we all recognize so well consists in  
making explicit the implicit constructions encoded in the experience. In order to deconstruct  
these terms, an analysis is needed to reveal the implicit associations embedded in the  
language. The language we use about love reveals constructions of knowledge, such as moral  
and existential aspects of life, and has in turn practical implications for therapy and thereby  
for life and living. I will apply the term ‘being in love’ in this thesis to carry the connotation  
of a state of mind, while ‘falling in love’ will point to the understanding that something has  
happened to a person, with the connotation of a condition or event beyond the person’s  
control, as suggested in utterances of the sort, “I can’t help falling in love”. When analysing  
the interviews in this chapter, these phrases were applied more flexibly as I alternated  
between the two, appealing more to the reader’s intuition for the sake of analytic clarity.  
 
A conceptual account of being in love in late modernity  
 
Having taken a theoretical stance that conceptualises language as constitutive of experience  
rather than representative or reflective of experience (Willig, 1999), the next challenge  
consists of speaking discursively about being in love. My approach to the analysis was to pose  
questions about how being in love is talked about by therapists, in what contexts, and what  
social interpersonal objectives might be achieved through its deployment (ibid).  
 
Being in love: a ’must’ for justifying the beginning and/or end of a relationship  
 
If we consider the repertoires people draw on when positioning themselves as being in love,  
we can identify the influence of this discourse on late-modern relationships in at least two  
ways. Firstly, it has the function of legitimating the start of an intimate relationship. The  
evidence and significance of the discourse reveals itself in the language people use when in  
love; almost without exception, they talk about how much they are in love, quantifying this  
and as such validating the extent of their ‘in-loveness’ as if in answer to an invisible if  
anticipated critic. In this legitimising function, the discourse also serves to organize the  
listener’s task, namely to trust that the person is truly in love. Possible challenges to a  
quantitative in-love narrative will most often be both raised and expressed with reference to  
language, in such remarks as, ‘but you don’t sound like you’re in love’. To rule out any doubt  
as to whether one is in love or even enough in love is also essential for the couple in question,  
as they navigate their way towards or away from further pursuing an intimate relationship. In  
such terms, being in love is talked about in quantitative, scale-like terms, measured and  
 
  
applied almost as a litmus test, and referred to in the end as a prerequisite for true love, itself 
a  
persuasive determinant as to whether or not one should enter into a committed relationship.  
The discourse of being in love readily minimizes and overrides other potential reasons  
articulated for contracting a relationship, such as practical, economic, or religious  
motivations, as will be further discussed later in this thesis.  
 
Secondly, the influence of being in love as legitimating entry into an intimate relationship  
provides at the same time a valid reason to separate; if the state of mind – ‘being in love’ – is  
said to disappear or one or both of the partners fall in love with someone else, the decision to  
terminate the relationship is more readily accepted. Here, then, the discourse of being in love  
– which includes the presence of the state and its absence or evaporation - exposes a  
repertoire with huge argumentative power for the couple involved. Historically, to have and to  
hold was the dominant discourse for intimate relationships, with marriage as the only valid  
model further explicitly defined by the authorized officiating agent in the marriage ceremony,  
be it priest, minister, rabbi, or judge. Being in love currently competes with the formerly  
unchallenged and even unrivalled to have and to hold. Now it is acceptable to simply point to  
the absence of being in love as valid grounds for terminating a relationship or, coming full  
circle, for entering into a new one.  
 
Giddens: the pure and the confluent  
 
Such a conceptual account of being in love can be supported by Giddens’ analysis of intimacy  
in late modernity. His account of a new definition of self and of reflexivity (see Literature  
Review), describes a kind of relationship that has emerged during the post-war period, namely  
the ‘pure relationship’:  
 
[The] “pure relationship […] refers to a situation where a social relation is entered into for its 
own  
sake, for what can be derived by each person from a sustained association with another; and 
which is  
continued only in so far as it is thought by both parties to deliver enough satisfaction for each  
individual to stay within it” (Giddens 1992, p. 58).  
 
Such a relation is pure because it is focused, established and continued only on the basis of  
the relationship itself, not for reasons imposed by marriage, children, or economy. A  
relationship is then not justified on the basis of its very existence but by reason of the pleasure  
and satisfaction it can provide (Giddens 1992). The ultimate premise in a pure relationship is  
‘we can stay together, but we don’t have to, it depends on what the relationship has to offer’.  
This conscious openness underlying the relationship makes the individuals free to choose, but  
 
  
at the same time vulnerable to being left. Giddens also introduces another concept crucial to  
understanding the repertoire of a discourse such as being in love, namely, confluent love,  
wherein love’s confluence is held up in contrast to permanence.  
 
[O]pening oneself to the other, the condition of what I shall call confluent love, is in some ways 
the  
opposite of projective identification, even if such identifications sometimes set up a pathway 
to it.  
Confluent love is active, contingent love, and therefore jars with the ¨for-ever¨, and ¨one and 
only¨  
qualities of the romantic love complex. […] Confluent love presumes equality in emotional give 
and  
take, the more so the more any particular love tie approximates closely to the prototype of the 
pure  




How, then, can Giddens’ concepts of pure relationships and confluent love also account for  
the discursive repertoire of being in love within late modernity as outlined above? In my view,  
the pure relationship and the confluent aspect of love as representations of intimate  
relationships correlate with a contemporary development I will refer to as “a call for  
emotional peak experiences”. This development focuses on the individual’s need to be  
entertained and to maximise fulfilmentxxvii.  
 
Philosophically speaking, we could say that the individual orients herself relationally toward  
pleasure and satisfaction more than duty and virtuexxviii; in this new love trend, the couple’s  
compass points toward frequent and rapid emotional events rather than lasting and cyclical  









Wise men say only fools rush in, but I can’t help falling in love with you.  
 
Shall I stay?  
 
Would it be a sin if I can’t help falling in love with you?  
 
As a rivers flows  
 
Surely to the sea  
 
Darling so it goes. Something’s are meant to be.  
 
Take my hand take my whole life too.  
 











A River Runs Through It  
 
In this song made famous by Elvis, falling in love is constructed as an event in which the  
person experiencing it cannot stop him/herself from feeling the way s/he does. Three features  
of a falling in love discourse are mirrored in the song. First, it gives the impression of falling  
in love as an involuntary event. The river metaphor, “like a river flows surely to the sea”,  
conjures associations to the irrepressible natural force of water rushing towards the ocean,  
suggesting the untameable forces of nature. Second, falling in love is here coupled  
suggestively with the power of destiny, something meant to be, that itself signals a discourse  
of romantic love. With romantic love and destiny as the foundation, falling in love is  
elsewhere further constructed as a birth process to real love, as in Alberoni (1979), who talks  
about falling in love as, in essence, the nascent state - or "ignition state" - of a collective  
movement made up exclusively of two people. This love ideal can be further conceptualised  
as the emergence of the romantic nuclear family in the 1950’s where the woman’s 
selfrealisation  
and fulfilment were thought to come to life through her success in the marriage  
market, the purchase of a house in the suburbs, and the ultimate production of children to fill  
it. Being in love, here, is seen as an implicit guarantee for a good marriage and vice versa  
(Evans, 2003).  
 
These two love metaphors - the forces of nature and the belief in destiny - construct an idea of  
falling in love as something that happens, an unintentional event. The third aspect of falling  
in love represented in this song, finally, is the unconditional readiness to give oneself up to  
the experience, inviting the beloved to “take my hand”, and, were that not enough, “take my  
whole life too”. These constructions make falling in love a dramatic event, with a flavour of  
helplessness on the one hand and strength of will on the other, the merging of which results in  
the promise of real love. This can’t help it discourse is dominant and pervasive, floating as it  
does through all layers of society, and coming to the surface in everyday speech in phrases  
like ‘I have fallen in love’ or ‘I am helplessly in love’. What these statements have in  
common is that they mirror loss of control, both in mind and body. These speech acts position  
the speaker as a person in love and as a victim - of love. A potential complicating  
consequence of this discourse may first arise when either of the persons involved are already  
in one way or another committed to a relationship expected to be exclusive, monogamous or  
long-lasting, as discussed later in this chapter.  
 
  
As for therapists, being in love is no doubt a familiar phenomenon, encountered in both their  
personal and professional lives. Talk of being in love in couple therapy often occurs, but I am  
curious about the strategic rationale behind engaging in this talk on the part of the therapist.  
Take for instance a question I have often asked, and observed other therapists pose as well:  
“Please tell me about the first time you two met. Were you very much in love back then?” This  
choice of emphasis on being in love invites several compelling questions. Why for instance do  
therapists hone in on the couple’s narrative about having once been in love? What do  
therapists want to achieve by initiating therapy with a focus on this theme, placing it on the  
agenda as it were, and what is their thinking about being in love and the meaning of it in  
intimate relationships? By raising the theme, they seem to be setting parameters for the  
therapeutic dialogue and reference points for exploration of the couple’s identity, whether the  
experience of being in love has been lost and is waiting to be retrieved, or has in fact never  
raised its head.  
 
In the following I investigate whether it is possible to recognise a kind of a typically  
therapeutic discourse of being in love, represented in my material or if the individual  
therapists in the field operate out of a more arbitrary or personally constructed notion of 
being  
in love. If the latter is indeed the case, how do these various and possibly divergent discourses  
adjust to and reveal themselves in different contexts?  
 
Platonic Kindred Souls  
 
In the following interview I had not made explicit what I was interested in when I asked about  
the importance of being in love for a relationship. But I recognise in T’s response that T both  
interpreted my question as one about how important being in love is as a valid reason for  
entering into an intimate relationship, and in turn constructed being in love as a state of mind  
that opens one up for a relationship:  
 
A: Do you think of being in love as important for a relationship?  
 
T: Yes, well, yes, it is important. I think so. Because you get a …I think you get a…what could we  
call it, an entry point, direct access to people in a way. If people let it happen of course. I think 
people  
open up their feelings. One communicates emotions that open up, kind of…you open up who 
you are  
and your personality and I think it opens up a psychological exchange on several levels, kind of. 
On  
many levels. So I think it is a kind of entrance, kind of.  
 
Which discourses of being in love are being played out here? First of all, I would argue that 
some  
premises about being in love unfold in this sequence, such as the assumption that we as 
humans seem to  
 
  
be predisposed to being a couple. T creates an image of two separate people who are 
searching to  
become a unit, anchored in an emotional connection. Through a process of acknowledgement 
of each  
other as emotionally open and accessible, a couple can come into being. This could be seen as 
a weak  
mould taken from Plato, who talks about twin souls searching for each other to be reunited:  
 
“ […] and when one of them meets the other half, the actual half of himself, the pair are lost in 
an  
amazement of love and friendship and intimacy and one will not be out of the other's sight 
even for a  
moment” (The Symposium, Plato)  
 
As mentioned above, this discourse is echoed in Giddens’ notion of confluent love, in his use  
of the same words as T about what happens when one is in love, namely “opening oneself up  
to” the other. It would then seem that here at this point in the interview, T subscribes to the  
discourse claiming the necessity of being in love as an important legitimate reason for  
entering into a relationship; in this vein, children, finances, and religion are outweighed by the  
importance of being emotionally connected. The critical premise for and essence of such  
relationships are defined by the quality of their emotional character. T thereby prioritizes in  
practice a focus on emotions even over talk of sex or eroticism as the most crucial aspect to  
the state of being in love, a manoeuvre in turn corresponding with a classic discursive  
repertoire in the construction of an either/or position towards intimate relationships, in that  
one has either good sex or good communication. It is however interesting to note that these  
notions - good communication, opening oneself up, and psychological exchange - are all  
imported from the language of psychology. T constructs an image here of being in love  
surprisingly similar in character to the traditional therapist-client relationship.  
 
“Narcissus and Freud”  
 
Why do we fall in love – seen from a therapeutic stance? What explains the irrational appeal  
of desire?  
 
In this next extract, I challenge T on the way T would account for the way people talk about  
being in love as a transformative state of body and mind – and how the language might  




A: How can it be, in your opinion, that two people of all those possible find each other and get 
so  
fascinated by each other that they lose sleep, appetite, and their ‘head’? What is it? How can 
one  
explain it? If I ask you as a psychologist, please explain it to me. (Laughter)  
 
  
T: No, well, uhh… what is it? Well, no… I think it’s sometimes lovely to see, to rest in another’s  
gaze.  
 
A: You think it’s mostly unconscious?  
 
T Yes, it is. But also consciously in love. People say, ‘We are so alike and think alike … and…’  
 
I am first struck upon careful reading of the transcript by T’s “No well, ehh… no well”, which  
I in this analysis understand as part of a resistance to engage with a  
psychological/professional approach to being in love. This ‘no’ can be said to point towards a  
“twilight zone”, representing a common language-free zone in couple therapy, a zone devoid  
of words. It seems as if the therapist must here move either into a more intimate sphere - the  
language of love – or a professional one, where the prevailing language tradition seeks, values  
and tries to maintain objectivity and neutrality. The therapist shows doubt here over which of  
these two domains s/he will locate him/herself within: the experiential and subjective one of  
private life, or the neutral and unambiguous one of the aware professional.  
 
 T: It is wonderful to be admired. And perhaps when it comes down to it, that’s what it is you 
really  
fall in love with.  
 
A: A kind of projection?  
 
T: Yes, and it can be that I see qualities in the other that I want for myself. Yes, that I get so  
fascinated and…and, as if I lose touch with myself.  
 
A: So if a person becomes very self-confident and secure, would then the chance of falling in 
love  
decrease? Because you’re talking about irrational traits here.  
 
T: Yes, that it perhaps could be more… (Laughter). Yes, perhaps.  
 
T: … Or one falls in love with someone because he or she resembles one of their parents. Such  




Above, T constructs being in love as a process of being seen and admired, and hints that  
perhaps, when it all comes down to it, this is what being in love is all about. Such a  
construction connects us with associations of being in love as manifested in another discourse  
in our culture, namely falling in love as an illusion that has blinded the subject. This  
corresponds with a schema in Norwegian culture that distinguishes between and contrasts 
true  
love with being in love, whereby the former is real and the latter only illusory. Real love  
connotes notions about what is real, genuine, stable, and seen with one’s eyes wide open;  
being in love, meanwhile, carries connotations of illusion, the out-of-the-ordinary, seduction  
and lack of authenticity. It is the subject, moreover, who carries the burden, being constructed  
 
  
as authentic in a true love discourse and as questionable or psychologically unreliable when in  
love.  
 
Further, T draws attention to a narcissistic aspect whereby being in love is a form of falling in  
love with ‘being seen’. T then reinforces the image of being in love as a narcissistic and  
illusory process to draw on a psychological framework, claiming that being in love is a  
process whereby we unconsciously seek an image of our parent - a familiar construction in  
attachment theory and psychodynamic language. In Norway, a couple’s therapy model known  
as Imago-therapyxxix has been developed on the premise that we unconsciously seek a  
relationship that on some level echoes our unresolved relational dilemmas. This discourse  
feeds into a psychological repertoire, where falling in love is explained within a framework of  
emotional processes of attachment and self-development, with a focus on two vulnerable  
souls searching each other out in order to achieve therapeutic healing. Finally, the  
construction closely connecting therapy and being in love also manifests itself in phrases that  
give the impression of a subject out of control, such as “I’ve lost touch with who I am”. Here  
we get an impression of the one in love as inauthentic. This focus on the unconscious as a  
reality informing one’s choice of partner represents a break with systemic theory, with its  
focus on ‘here-and-now’ processes: how does a construction of the unconscious play a role  
when we talk about being in love? This is more apparent in the interview segments on being  
in love with someone other than your partner, as seen below.  
 
The “At-stake”  
 
Falling in love with someone other than your partner is what I characterize as an “at-stake”  
experience for some (see Introduction). What these experiences have in common, as I have  
understood them for research purposes, is that something is actually at stake - existentially,  
ethically or relationally. These situations all raise fundamental life issues or dilemmas, which,  
by their very reflexive and non-linear nature, are neither easy nor straightforward to resolve.  
Falling in love under complicated circumstances, as in cases of a prior commitment, is an  
event posing just such existential, ethical and relational dilemmas. Such ‘at-stake’ experiences  
put life into relief, committing the person/s in question to look at the good, the bad and the  
scary in their lives; what they have, what they want, what they cannot live without - what is in  
fact ‘at stake’. When facing such experiences, one has at some point or other to navigate one’s  
way through an often contentious process of recognising and questioning the discursive  
 
  
repertoires and positions dominating one’s thinking, as well as identifying others that are also  
available. Such a process requires that one achieve a meta-perspective on the discursive  
powers that have been guiding values, choices, and life to date, in order to then be in a  
position to either further accept their dominance and currency, or attempt to exchange them  
for others that better fit the new existential challenge we face.  
 
Please Do Not Disturb  
 
In this vein, it is of particular interest for me to get a clearer picture of the different ways in  
which T constructs being/falling in love when reflecting upon his/her own personal  
experiences of having been in love with someone other than T’s actual partner. What is  
interesting here is whether and/or to what extent the therapist’s personal repertoire of  
available discursive positions in his/her own life might be brought to bear on similar in-love  
dilemmas in the therapy room.xxx  
 
T: It can of course happen … you fall in love and then sex is a real magnet, when you’re in love. 
And  
it’s impossible to talk about it at home because then there is no possibility of living it out, if 
you really  
find it interesting. Or…if you want to just enjoy it... particularly if you have children. Or if you 
first  
want to find out if it’s something to pursue…in such cases the other person says, “The worst 
thing  
about it is that you went behind my back, that you didn’t tell me”. But I think that’s the nature 
of it all,  
you just don’t rush home and say that you’ve fallen in love.  
 
In this quotation, T draws on a discourse of falling in love that I identify as the right to be  
undisturbed and private in her/his own experiences, and thereby freed from loyalty to the  
already-contracted couple. The repertoire such a discourse offers is to buy oneself time, to be  
given space to simply be in this state of mind. T emphasises two critical rights as secured  
within this discursive construction, namely time to ‘just enjoy it’ and time to ‘find out if it’s  
something to pursue’. Such a construction makes possible a form of immunity for a while  
against having to deal with the complexities of the situation either practically, morally or  
relationally – a sort of time-out, offering space to enjoy the emotional and erotic nature of  
being in love, while escaping some of the challenges of revealing yourself whilst living it out.  
Interestingly, this discourse does not uphold the committed couple as the privileged entity to  
protect, but rather the individual ‘hit’ by love. While the original couple’s form may, to all  
intents and purposes, remain intact, the person who has fallen in love with another becomes  







Was it Worth It?  
 
It is not unusual, in the afterglow of an affair, to observe people evaluating their experience in  
terms of whether it was ‘worth it’. This might happen when the infatuation ends in a  
destructive or painful relationship or just fades out. It is not unusual then to hear people  
wonder, what was it that made me fall in love with this person? This question is also a path  
into a more overall professional question investigated and framed as why we fall in love with  
those we fall in love with (Pines, 2005). As it seems in the case below, this depends on  
something more than the person, namely the circumstances for the event and in the end, the  
outcome of the infatuation.  
 
T: Once upon a time I fell in love… after I got married. It is a long time ago now. I had a 
relationship  
with another person. We lived at the time in a small town on the west coast. It was a 
Wednesday, and  
my lover and I were walking along the beach. Then I saw my spouse and child driving by, with a  
Christmas tree on the roof of the car, and they passed us. They didn’t see me, but I felt so 
guilty and  
ugly. I had had a wonderful time with the other person, but at what price? Looking back, I 
could have  
done without that experience….My goodness, think what I was risking for such a jerk!  
 
T: But I have another experience with someone which I could …we had such an incredibly good  
relationship…well, that one, I could have left my marriage for that one, back then… It was a 
very  
powerful experience, one I will never regret.  
 
The sequences above point to an objectifying construction of being in love, describing 
‘inloveness’  
not as an experience but rather as a thing, thereby attributing to being in love its  
own existence and reality as an object. The only concern raised, then, regards the subject hit  
by love, and how to navigate around or through it. This in-love construction, imbuing as it  
does being in love with an ‘it’-ness, remains intact, unchallenged in its objectifying function.  
In the absence of such a construction, one might have reflected on love as an illusion, as seen  
above, or the individual as irresponsible or immature, as mentioned in the previous discussion  
on constructing love as an unconscious process. Rather, this objectifying in-love construction  
further forces critical choices to be made, where the clue is to find out whether or not the  
candidate is worth the risk involved.  
 
Consider the following:  
 
a) ”My goodness, think what I was risking for such a jerk?” (points at the person involved)  
 
b) ”My goodness, think what I was risking by being unfaithful!” (points at the actual action of  
infidelity)  
 
The first sentence (a), as uttered by T, is a consequence of the objectifying discourse outlined  
above, in which the possible outcome of the ‘in loveness’ for the speaker is significant for  
 
  
how the narrative of the person-in-love can be told afterwards. In an alternative discourse,  
however, where in-loveness is not given its own objective status, the subject has wider  
positioning alternatives, such as in example (b), which opens for personal reflections on  
whether being in love is indeed even an option if you are already in a committed relationship.  
In (b), the awareness is not directed towards the candidate involved, but solely towards the act  
of being unfaithful. Being in love, here, provides neither explanatory power nor grounds for  
acting on your feelings.  
 
Window Shopping  
 
A discourse about love as a natural phenomenon plays with the person in love as a victim,  
helpless in love. One question which emerges when working with the analysis, is whether or  
not therapists talk about being in love as something one chooses, both with respect to whom  
and when we fall in love (Pines 2005:28):  
 
T: Yes, well, you can become fascinated with others and in a way sort of fall in love/get 
infatuated,  
after many years of marriage, at [business] meetings, where you are very fascinated. I’d call it  
fascination really, rather than being in love, to try to draw a bit of a line. And sure, of course 
I’ve  
experienced that, and surely [my spouse] has too. But I don’t say too much about it if I get 
such a….  
 
We haven’t spoken about it, and it’s not like, I mean, but we’ve had a nice time together 
sometimes  
and stuff … But then I thought, “Now I draw a line, ‘cause this could quickly develop into  
something”. This will not be allowed to unfold. And there I think, […] that some people have 
clear  
boundaries for this kind of thing, and therefore kind of hold back. And others I imagine just let 
things  
happen. And once in a way you can slip because just once, if... someone like... But I think I’m 
very  
afraid of doing something to…  
 
Here T differentiates between ‘fascination’ and being in love, another alternative construction  
with two central functions. Firstly, in choosing the word ‘fascination’ over being in love to  
describe these experiences, T disarms the phenomenon of its threatening or dangerous 
nature.  
Secondly, within and based on this approach, T reduces ‘fascination’ to a commonplace  
occurrence with the further distinguishing implication that it is something one can choose and  
control. In this way, T constructs ‘in-loveness’ as a condition you can more or less step into,  
wearing it for inspiration as needed, almost like make-up or fancy clothes, but not something  
you have to commit to or make real. This discourse has nonetheless one important feature in  
common with the “was it worth it?” namely the discourse about the right to privacy. Here it is  
up to the person involved, the in-love or the fascinated, to take sole responsibility for how to  
deal with the situation in the manner appropriate for them, freed from the couple contract.  
 
  
Discussion of Being in Love  
 
Two main questions underpin my discussion: first, what are the discursive functions of being  
in love in late modernity and second, how are these functions relevant to further exploration  
within a therapeutic context? In the analysis I have traced implicit and encoded therapeutic  
knowledge about being in love and how this knowledge offers various subject positions. My  
initial impression when analysing the material was that the therapists were unified in  
upholding a discourse of being in love as a must for a couple as a common point of reference.  
This can be seen, as in the analysis, in an often applied therapeutic method whereby therapists  
ask for their couples’ love story with invitations such as, “Were you very much in love, back  
then?” In assuming that a couple’s history began with falling in love, therapists at the same  
time feed into and uphold a discourse of being in love, with all the potential connotations of it  
as a seductive and illusory state of mind. I further claim that being in love is taken for granted  
in our culture, with nearly the ontological status of a natural phenomenon. However, being in  
love when it is inappropriate often bears the connotation in everyday talk of “being crazy”  
and, for instance in psychoanalytic terms, as an idealisation, a fantasy or an illusion (Mitchell,  
2002). Therefore, being in love has multiple meanings dependent on the various  
communicative contexts in which it is talked about.  
 
When not in love anymore  
 
One of the main and obvious discursive functions or implications of being in love as seen in  
the analysis is the function of legitimising entrance into an intimate relationship. Another  
related function of being in love is that it affords entitlement to exit a relationship, with such a  
statement as, I am not in love anymore. While the entrance function is almost a must in late  
modernity the exit function varies in degrees of legitimacy. The validity and weight of the  
legitimatising function of not in-love anymore depends in turn on which discourses about love  
one draws upon and how important themes of monogamy, will, rationality and social  
arrangement are emphasised, in contrast to those of emotions, romance, self-reflexivity and  
destiny. Interesting from a therapeutic point of view, is that this commonly shared  
understanding is not entirely unified or unproblematic after all; what distinguishes the  
consensual from the complicated is the critical distinction of whether the person is in love  
with someone other than their steady partner, or with someone who is not available. So, this  
legitimising function for embarking on a new relationship can be perceived as a one-way  
 
  
ticket only, valid only when one is free and available. The legitimacy of exiting or ending a  
relationship with reference to I am not in love anymore has discursive backing in two  
premises; (i) being in love seen as virtually a natural phenomenon and (ii) the individual’s  
right and even obligation to live out his/her emotions. I suggest that the first premise about  
being in love is a folk theory of mental illness recorded in myths, poems, fiction, Hollywood,  
media and in the reproduction of personal narratives. The second premise is interesting to  
look at more closely from a therapeutic perspective since claiming the individual’s right to  
live out emotions is not just a socio-cultural idea but also a psychological-professional one  
stemming from the heritage of psychoanalysis and linked now to the contemporary idea of  
self-scrutiny as the route to authenticity (Swidler, 2003).  
 
The psychological premise about living out one’s emotions  
 
This premise about living out one’s emotion I recognise as an inheritance from  
psychoanalysis and, further, from the encounter group movement of the 1960’s (Rogers,  
1970), and gestalt therapy traditions among others. Swidler (2003) refers to the overall  
process in the encounter groups movement as an emphasis on heart before head, emotions  
prior to thoughts. The psychological discourse about living out one’s emotions in becoming a  
‘true and whole’ person combined with being in love talked about in terms of ‘a natural  
phenomenon’ might offer a dynamic which constructs being in love as something that  
happens outside the individual’s control, more as something that we cannot really explain but  
merely happens and with which one is expected to “go with the flow”. The language used in  
therapeutic activity is often organised around correctly identifying emotions, selecting them  
and then discussing what to do with them. When clients state that they are helplessly in love,  
this could be seen as a statement of fact, but possibly also as an expression that may serve to  
initiate action in relation to those to whom such an utterance is addressed. Such an action  
could be the legitimating of uncertain entrance into an intimate relationship or justification of  
an exit from a committed relationship. In a therapeutic context it is interesting to question the  
implications of such psychological professional discourses that treat emotions as ‘real’ and as  
something that should be lived out. One implication is the ontological one of terms labelling  
such internal, mental items as emotions, here termed “in-love”, as something about which one  
can have factual knowledge and which exists in describable and concrete modes. The possible  
conflict inherent when working from the premise of following one’s emotions in becoming an  
 
  
authentic person is that this construction might conflict with another established ideal, also  
within the field of therapy, namely monogamy. These two cultural discourses are dominant in  
late modernity: the right to follow one’s emotions when in love, and the ideal of monogamy.  
For some people the weight placed on the right to live out one’s emotions is stronger than the  
ideal of monogamy and they then choose unfaithfulness.  
 
The related vocabulary of accounts of therapist-client relations and accounts of being in love  
 
Another influence of psychological discourse when talking about being in love is recognisable  
in my analysis as well, namely the close linguistic kinship between notions imported from a  
traditional language of psychotherapy and therapists’ accounts of being in love. These being  
in love accounts are surprisingly similar in character to an ideal therapist-client relationship,  
emphasizing opening oneself up, trust, and good communication (Giddens: Platonic twinsouls).  
With the ideal of empathic communication, or “the talkative love” (“Den snakkende  
kjærligheten”, Thagaard, 2005 ref: A Norwegian expression frequently applied in media,  
means communication is the glue of love) of modern relationships, one constructs emotions as  
natural phenomena and upholds similar ideals for beginning intimate relationships as the  
emphasis in good therapeutic relationships on emotional and psychological qualities:  
exclusiveness, privacy, understanding, and emotions. Is it sound to speak here about an  
implicit normative ideal upheld in the culture and by therapists: that the best and perhaps 
right  
way to enter into a relationship is to follow one’s emotions? If so, this observation makes it  
valid to question whether therapists may be predisposed to giving priority to being in love as  
the most valid reason for entering and leaving a relationship, and are less attentive to  
alternative discourses for entering into a relationship, such as sexual attraction, alliances,  
practical benefits, shared religion or merely the arbitrary occasion of coincidence. A further  
discussion might explore whether therapists position themselves as upholding the search for  
true emotions and talkative love because that is their framework of professional values and  
knowledge. And if this is the case, what implications does this view have for the couples in  
therapy in terms of existential, moral and love-related implications? xxxi  
 
Summary: Being in love  
 
With an introductory section on love in late modernity and Giddens’ theory of the pure and  
the confluent, this analysis of being in love as a therapeutic context for talk about love has  
yielded several interesting discursive twists. Partial discourses of love as destiny and as at  
 
  
stake have served as organising principles for the analysis and address the nature and varying  
degrees of discursive positioning of both therapists and clients when facing existential  
questions surrounding the essence/nature of being in love. My conclusion is that implicit  
knowledge about being in love has many layers of meaning when conflicting discourses  
unfold, because practices within our culture are manifold. This cultural divergence, treating  
being in love as, on the one hand, the most natural event initiating entering an intimate  
relationship and, on the other, as something that may happen several times in an individual’s  
life, calls for reflective and nuanced talk about how one positions oneself as a therapist. In this  
conceptual confusion, clients need guidance on how to manoeuvre within the different  
discourses and positions made available in our culture.  
 
Questions and reflections for practitioners to work further with  
 
Why do we fall in love? Answers to this question might also provide various perspectives on 
love.  
 
There is a lack of explanation in systemic therapy of why we fall in love and why we fall in  
love with those we fall in love with. What kinds of answers are already in circulation? Are  
there any advantages in developing new answers? What are the implications of these different  
vocabularies of being in love for couple therapy practice?  
 
  




The analytic focus of this chapter is on therapy sequences in which the theme of doubt has  
arisen, a thematic context I call love in doubt. This is set against a background of the  
dominant discursive weight of romantic love. The thematic context of love in doubt is seen in  
my material in talk and questions about what kinds of scripts about love are available when i)  
exploring the reasons that underpin being in a relationship, ii) facing the experience of a  
breach in expectations in a relationship, and iii) when going into therapy, and the expectations  
of what may be achieved there. In short, this chapter addresses what occurs when couples’  
experiences are no longer in harmony with the normative discourses in play. Of particular  
interest for me is what occurs when doubt creates a breach, and whether there is an opening 
in  
the resulting discursive gap for the development of alternative, sub- or counter discourses.  
 
The structure of this chapter is: I begin the analysis with a conceptualisation of romantic love  
as the dominant discourse of love in late modernity. I then continue with an analysis of four  
sub-discourses: i) virtuous love, ii) natural gender differences, iii) heart of hearts, and iv) the  
good ol’days. They might be more correctly discussed as four themes, but I see them as 
subdiscourses  
as they have a similar moral weight and meaning to the original term “romance”.  
They play on the virtuous aspect of love and the achievement of home and family as the  
highest goal in the pursuit of being a whole person. I continue the analysis with two more 
subdiscourses:  
v) labour of love, and vi) love hurts. These two bear the imprint of a slightly  
different vocabulary for love from those of the period of late modernity and postmodernism.  
They are different in tone from the three first-mentioned sub-discourses that are closer to the  
romantic myth. Gender issues and aspects of the pure relationship discourse will also be  
briefly outlined within these two sub-discourses.  
 
Romantic love  
 
Two birds within one nest:  
 
Two hearts within one breast;  
 
Two souls within one fair  
 
Firm league of love and prayer.  
 





A romantic discourse encompasses marriage, monogamy and love; invoking one invokes  
them all (Willig, 2001). Romantic love is expressed in the following terms: ‘if you love me,  
you will want to marry me and remain faithful forever’. Marriage and monogamy are here  
necessary conditions for talk about love. As outlined in the historical overview of love in the  
Literature Review (p 26), the normative idea of romantic love emerged in the eighteenth  
century, and involves the idea that marriage is based on mutual attraction rather than on  
economic and practical considerations. The romantic love discourse takes much of its force  
from the expectation of harmony and stability, as seen in the happy and unthreatened  
couple/family structure, captured in the poem “Two Birds within one nest” above. Coontz  
(2005) claims that the emergence of romantic love in the eighteenth century was more related  
to the meaning of love-marriage than sexual-marriage, with a focus on ‘the home’ as an oasis,  
a source of protection for the couple and family from exterior storms. Romantic love is,  
further, a prelude to but also in tension with, the idea of a pure relationship (Giddens, 1992).  
While romantic love has its foundation in household, economy, gender differences, children  
and for some, moral and religious commitment, the pure relationship refers rather to a  
relationship based on sexual and emotional equality, embarked upon solely for its own sake  
and the partners’ mutual satisfaction.  
 
A possible tension within a romantic discourse lies in this very premise of love, monogamy,  
and happy-ever-after as necessarily inseparable. Given the statistic of the high incidence of  
unfaithfulness, one can ask what happens to love in marriage in the case of infidelity and/or  
wonder if love has faded. Couples infatuated with the prospect of living happily ever after  
indeed risk encountering life challenges with the potential to threaten the couple’s romantic  
ideal. Family life cycle theory addresses common challenges couples and families might face  
in their process of adjustment to change, both internal and external (Carter & Goldrick, 1980).  
In addition to life’s major transitions such as becoming a couple, giving birth, and raising  
children, families have to deal with sickness, pain, and stress. How couples and families meet  
such changes depends on family scripts, norms, expectations and dominant discourses  
influencing coupledom and family. Some couples split up as a way of dealing with change,  
while others seek therapy for guidance and consultation; both coping alternatives stem from  
the discursive repertoires available. Those asking ‘What do we do now?’ in the therapy room,  
are for example implicitly trusting in therapeutic discourses guiding their expectations of how  
to face life crises and pain. If for instance such a couple in crises moves within and is  
 
  
committed to a traditional romantic discourse emphasising the marriage promise “to have and  
to hold in sickness and health”, they will have to adjust by widening their discursive  
repertoire in a way that can both support the forever-intention and accommodate their new  
experience of pain and doubt.  
 
Virtuous love  
 
One of the research interests I had before doing this research was how a significant worldview  
or an overarching ideology, as for instance Christianity, influences discourses about love in  
couple’s therapy. This question is based on the observation that many in crisis seek answers,  
help, support and meaning in ideology and religion. That such overarching perspectives  
function as anchor and compass is deeply rooted in our culture perhaps because of the  
formulations they provide declaring norms and rules for conduct, such as for instance, “You  
shall not break the marriage bond” (The Bible).  
 
In my material, I found examples of constructions of a sub-discourse that I call virtuous love.  
The notion of virtue is relevant in a couple’s therapy context for many reasons; first because it  
values spirituality and thereby permits a connection between ideological perspectives and life  
crises; second, because virtue is a well known and inherited concept in traditional marriage  
counselling as the first therapists were often priests; and, third, virtue also reflects use of a  
practice or a methodxxxii: being virtuous is doing virtuous acts. Virtuous love then fits well as  
a discourse when narrative friction is experienced, because it reconciles the discursive needs  
of the romantic pull, as for instance in monogamy, and the pain and doubt that can b  
encountered and that can challenge faith in and motivation for continuing love.  
 
In the interviews I asked about how T as a therapist reflects on cases in which serious illness  
occurs and a partner must tend to or nurse the sick one:  
 
T: You have to be in a process kind of, with this. And process demands time. And that is a lack 
in our  
time - people don’t want to live in process. They just ask for positive results, and efficiency. Oh, 
yes,  
that’s very good, there is nothing wrong with that, but I think our life would be…kind of…  
richer…but now we’re talking about what I believe in as a human being. That’s a kind of credo, 
one  
should work with things. Struggle, kind of…  
 
T introduces the metaphor of St. Birgitta who “puts her clothes into the waves to get them  
pure and white, even more pure and white, but [who] is very concerned about not letting 
them  
sink” and comments that “This is very nice and beautiful”.  
 
  
What is of most interest here is that T avoids reflecting on the possibility of there being a  
dilemma here, on whether there is a real choice to address regarding whether love has 
become  
too difficult or demanding, but uses instead a religious vocabulary, referring to Saint Birgitta  
and the act of becoming pure to illustrate love as commitment, sacrifice, and as selfless in  
nature. This can be contextualised within a philosophical/religious tradition, in which the  
rhetoric defines virtue’s relational opposite, vice, in the seven deadly sins that all play into  
human weakness in the face of temptations of the body, among them greed, lust and envy.  
This rhetoric constructs ideals according to which it is taken for granted that the vices are to  
be avoided and overcome, and it is only through virtue that one can resist such temptation. A  
discourse constructing love as a virtue, then, arises in a context in which the act of love  
demands an active effort and sacrifice from the partner/s.  
 
T: I think…well some have it easier than others with their relationship, that’s clear enough… 
but I  
think to overcome all the changes in life…it’s not just to understand the constitution and what 
people  
stand for in the beginning, but you have all these changes along the way. And then it’s a 
matter of  
adjusting, isn’t it? […] We have so many demands about quality these days …everything has to 
be so  
fantastic, or else we don’t want it… It’s the post-modernistic whip, sort of… Therefore, 
development  
through pain…and an ability to live with distance for a period while waiting, changing, bear to 
wait…  




Talk of active effort and sacrifice in a context in which one is speaking about sickness and  
caring for a partner I read as a subtle answer to a patriarchal biological discourse of sex in  
which men need sex (Hollway1984). Sacrifice in this context is to relinquish this sexual  
desire for a higher good – a virtuous love. This further resembles some clients’ talk of  
sexuality in terms of it being less important than the act of love, wherein temptation of the  
flesh/body is subordinated to the virtue of love – in other words, to an asexual or platonic  
love. In couple therapy this is often recognised in statements such as “Sex is not that  
important anymore in our relationship, what matters is that we love each other”, “our  
relationship is about more than sex”, or, quite simply, “love is more than sex”.  
 
In the romantic sub-discourse of virtuous love, one can see a persuasive discursive orientation  
wherein 1) absolute commitment in marriage is the highest achievable good; 2) pain and  
crises can even strengthen love when one lives by such a credo and sees the bearing of pain as  
a virtuous act; 3) it is not meaningful to place individual needs (“I”) before the demands of the  
marriage (“We”), i.e. sex, career and personal interests are secondary to the commitment to  
the quality of endurance in marriage in times of critical change. This position makes it  
 
  
possible for partners to remain committed even when sex has faded or disappeared and still  
frame their marriage within a context of love – perhaps even a higher love, due to the duty,  
sacrifice, and virtue they choose to embrace.  
 
There is further a clear and direct echo of such sentiments in the therapeutic voice:  
 
T: And I think deep down, you need to bear, support, adjust…So I think it is important that I as 
a  
therapist care and support. It is important. Because those who seek therapy look at therapists 
as a head  
above, kind of…a kind of authority… and I have faith in therapy, as a process to live by 
differences.  
And in fact it is very useful in love, if your love is to endure.  
 
What does this mean for the practice of couple’s therapy? In a therapeutic context this 
subdiscourse  
gives therapists the possibility to acknowledge the difficulties a couple is facing, to  
encourage the partners to stay together, and to uphold a romantic discourse that not only  
accommodates unforeseen pain but offers the potential for love to mature by virtue of its  
endurance.  
 
Natural gender differences  
 
Within a traditional and old-fashioned romantic discourse, gender differences regarding men  
and women’s different roles were taken for granted (see Literature Review, p.) We recognize  
this as a theme from childhood fairytales, through teenage girls’ magazines, as well as in  
myths, novels, films, and commercials all playing on the Hollywood ideal and illusion. It can  
be therapeutically fruitful in times of doubt to ask whether this theme of the scripted prince  
who both seduces and rescues the princess still embodies our expectations regarding gender  
scripts and gender differences. These expectations include an image of menxxxiii as strong and  
courageous as in everyday talk about what is sexy and in the categorical distinctions women  
make; what is at stake is what attracts, what makes a man a best friend rather than a lover, 
and  
where the critical difference lies in what ultimately separates ‘the men from the boys’.  
 
So, the taken for granted premise about gender differences manifests both as a romantic script  
for gender roles as in fairytales, narratives, movies, and novels (Swidler, 2003) and as  
psychological discourses about heterosexual desire which frame desire and attraction as  
premised on gender differences (Hollway, 1995 in Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 1995). A gender  
script, as in that of romantic love, offers on the one hand models and norms for how couples  
may work out gender issues related to love, while on the other, this script may also represent 
a  
source of conflict, disappointment and insecurity for couples trying to fit into it.  
 
  
This process of figuring out how to deal with gender scripts provides a challenge independent  
of whether one draws on traditional gender expectations or whether one declines a normative  
gendered script. Breaches of gendered expectations are played out as tensions to be 
negotiated  
by the couple and are often a theme that couples bring to therapy.  
 
When love in doubt is manifested in dissatisfaction with one’s partner and in terms of waning  
feelings, it is a therapeutic challenge to understand and perhaps reframe it. In which ways do  
therapists talk about gender differences? In the following, I will look more closely at how a  
romantic love discourse offers a therapeutic repertoire for a couple where one or both 
partners  
is/are very dissatisfied. The interview was conducted after T and I had watched a video clip of  
T talking to a couple and might serve as an example of T drawing on a gendered romantic  
sub-discourse in therapy:  
 
T: Helpless is what I would have written in capital letters above him. He does not know how 
he’s  
supposed to do this, and doesn’t know what he’s doing, and he doesn’t know how to satisfy 
this lady,  
who he is, who he is involved with[…]. He feels that she will never be satisfied with him, so it  
becomes an interaction. And I think it won’t take much to make him blossom again.  
 
What does a therapist do with such an impression of helplessness in a man, a man who cannot  
“satisfy [his] lady”?  
 
T: First, I was thinking. ”Gosh - what a boring chap. I couldn’t have lived with him ever”. I had 
to  
work on that emotion in the therapy… And at the same time, I felt this goodness towards him. 
[He is]  
kind and tries as well as he can […] I tried to put ... her ideas about him into another context so 
that  
she could see things in another way and maybe adjust her expectations. This I think is the main 
project  
in the first appointment, which leads to ... where I try to lift him, which leads to her at the end 
of the  
appointment saying that she thinks he had begun to lift himself, the picture of himself, and 
was afraid  
that I had got too good a picture of him.  
 
T’s presentation of the husband centres on the juxtaposition of his perceived boringness and  
his goodness. Talk about boring men is noteworthy with respect to a gendered romantic 
subdiscourse,  
as sexual attraction is not commonly associated with boredom. T’s therapeutic  
manoeuvre, then, is to reframe his helplessness, to enable the wife to see her husband 
through  
a new lens: “[He is]…kind and tries as well as he can, so somehow my project is to redefine  
and reframe her picture of him”.  
 
Therapy here is from a discursive point of view less psychologically based and closer to  
socially and culturally informed cosmetic enhancement. The therapist is in effect applying  
make-up when attempting to render the man more attractive for the woman, an endeavour  
both based on and perpetuating a deep-rooted gender discourse, rather than for instance  
 
  
discursively exploring her expectations, by perhaps asking “The idea that your man should in  
your eyes be strong – where does such an idea stem from – and how does such an idea inform  
your emotions and your level of satisfaction in your relationship?” Such an exercise in  
reframing can nonetheless be futile, if sense takes second place to sensibility. What can the  
therapist really achieve if T fundamentally believes, “She has really broken up with him in her  
heart”.  
 
T: But I have been thinking about it, a thought I had was ”How much does she want this?” She 
wants  
it on an ideological level, as in ”We have two children, so we should stick together”...or wants 
... as I  
said, she has really broken up with him in her heart, that’s something I’m sitting here 
wondering. And  




Heart of hearts  
 
The above sentence “She has really broken up with him in her heart” - stemming from a  
discourse of love as a complete, magnificent emotion, something that fills one’s heart – is an  
integral part of a romantic discourse. In this utterance T talks about love not in quantifiable  
terms, but as an all or nothing proposition. Romantic love is further associated with notions of  
“deep inside the heart”, as T puts it, where love has less to do with liking or disliking the  
husband. Here T can be seen as reinforcing an either/or romantic discursive positioning: you  
either feel love or you don’t. Staying in a marriage for practical, economic and social benefits  
resides, then, in a different discursive orientation than being in the marriage for “love”. Of  
analytic interest here is to what extent a social arrangement discourse and a ‘heart of hearts’  
romantic love discourse provide opportunities for different therapeutic stances.  
 
T: They cooperate if they communicate or can have a more pleasant time than before when 
they go to  
parties together and when they eat dinner together. She said, ”I love him very much”, she said 
that.  
No, I don’t think it can be like before. I don’t think it can be complete ... and I don’t know if it 
ever  
has been complete, from her side.  
 
This sequence, in particular the last clause, offers a Pandora’s box of discursive possibilities.  
Within a romantic love position, love is, as we saw earlier, objectified as a complete entity,  





When it is not considered present, talk of its absence reinforces the either-or essentialist  
dynamic; this in turn constructs an almost mystical discourse based on the near impossibility  
of ever achieving true love:  
 
T: And I’ve longed a lot for that real love. To be… what kids long for… and that you maybe long 
for  
your whole life. That someone loves you just the way you are, without any make-up on and 
with all  
your grime and everything else. And loves you maybe not just in spite of your flaws, but 
because of  
them […] That you can for example love a scar, and think that the scar is beautiful because 
you’re in  




Such a mystical discursive positioning has by definition powerful implications when the  
therapist him/herself constructs a therapeutic narrative based on such an essentialist view of  
love as either there or not, and further places the therapist in a more knowing position with  
respect to the couple at hand. In the above sequence, the therapeutic glitch for T - firmly  
planted as T appears to be in a romantic either/or discursive position - is that liking is simply  
not good enough: only true, complete love will do. Viewing love as mythical in terms of  
something you maybe long for your whole life corresponds with what Swidler terms as movie  
picture love (Swidler 2003: 111).  
 
The good ol’ days  
 
 “Oh, so romantic” is an exclamation that immediately invites us into a framework of love in  
which roses, champagne and candlelight are natural symbols of an appealing, old-fashioned  
style of courtship. In the sequence below, T is contrasting contemporary couples’ social  
behaviour with how things were when T was young:  
 
T: I think nowadays young people….they go out separately. They have different needs. So she 
goes  
with her friends and he gets jealous and then he goes to a pub with his friends […] Instead of in 
my  
time, when they either went together or stayed at home [together]. [Going out] separately to 
the pub...  
It’s become very common. I don’t think it’s healthy.  
 
In T’s position as therapist, T is clearly ill at ease with the course of developments in  
contemporary couple’s culture. T’s rhetoric draws on an underlying element of nostalgia, a  
state of mind we can easily associate with romantic sentimentality. Nostalgia can be construed  
as well as a linguistic sigh, having the strategic function of a speech act in the same way as a  
comment like “It’s God’s will”. Nostalgic commentary acts as a kind of silencing authority  
and can as such serve to effectively end a dialogue.  
 
  
In holding up the nostalgic sub-discourse, T can be read as trying to stabilise the romantic  
discourse. From such a position, T claims more legitimacy for criticizing what T experiences  
as the dissolution of norms and the resulting disturbance of the traditional nuclear family  
model. T’s criticism comes with a scapegoat attached:  
 
T: You know, those kids of the ‘68 generation, they’re like, I don’t know if I should say this  
but…well they have no boundaries, and behave very permissively… this sounds old-fashioned 
but the  
spectrum of diagnoses changes, and now one can see that selfishness and a bit of, kind of 
borderline  
[diagnosis] is increasing…. Parents… you see… are going out, drinking, having fun… So it’s this  
thought, ¨Well I don’t have the right feeling for him anymore, so…” But you can’t just leave? 
Yes, I  
can…you see? I think this phenomenon occurs more nowadays than before.  
 
All the words T attributes to this group are negatively laden, as in “selfishness” and  
“borderline” emphasised further through the concept of “diagnoses” and work in this analysis  
as a positioning that stabilises the romantic discourse by pointing at the threat of other types  
of life forms, represented by the influence of ‘the 68 generation’ - such as more equality  
between the genders, sexual liberation and new ways of living out intimacy, as seen in greater  
tolerance for and inclusive attitudes towards new family constellations such as gay unions and  
single parents.  
 
I have so far in this chapter addressed the dominant discourse of romantic love, as well as the  
emergence of conciliatory sub-discourses which all have in common that they are closer to the  
original concept of the term romance. I will continue to analyse sub-discourses within the  
overall dominant romantic discourse, but these sub-discourses embody a slightly different  
vocabulary of love than the romantic myth derived from the period of late modernism and  
postmodernism. In the analysis I label these sub-discourses labour of love and love hurts.  
Gender issues and aspects of the pure relationship discourse will be outlined within these two  
sub-discourses.  
 
Labour of love  
 
What happens with the idea of love when the roses wilt, the champagne goes flat, and the  
candles burn down? Friction commonly surfaces at some point in a relationship. From a  
therapeutic standpoint, it is interesting to consider various accounts of couples’ friction,  
quarrelling and struggle as such narratives inform therapists’ repertoires of action or  
intervention. The literature about love offers various categories of love (see p. 12). Swidler  
 
  
(2003), in one example, differentiates a mythic and a prosaic-realism view as virtual  
opposites. She refers to her research where, in prosaic- realist terms, love is talked about as  
something that grows slowly, where one can love many people in many ways, where love that  
leads to marriage depends on compatibility and on practical traits, and where, finally, love  
does not last forever (Swidler, 2003: 114). In my material I recognized this vocabulary as  
indicating the construction of love as something that requires hard work, compromise and the  
will to adjust and change. This view of love is also recognisable as love as social arrangement  
wherein the overarching vocabulary can be placed within an economic discourse of love  
(Willig, 2001) with love as a project and the couple as partners who invest, the costs and risks  
evaluated continually.  
 
In the extract below, T accounts for why many couples struggle by pointing to the conflicts of  
interest between ‘I and We’:  
 
T: Both of them need their own stuff. Especially those interests they don’t necessarily share (as 
glue).  
… the woman, it could be the man also, but usually the one party, most often the woman is 
more  
oriented toward relational things, and wants this relationship to work And the day she feels 
that the  
two of them share, and that this we-relationship has got what it needs then suddenly it is 
much more  
acceptable for him to do his thing. So it has to do with timing. First comes ‘the we’, and 
when…I (as a  
therapist) feel that when one in a couple is seen and acknowledged, and they feel that we 
have  
something in common, then I (as a therapist) say to the man, ‘Now you can go play football or  
whatever you want’.  
 
Here, T’s rhetoric is underscored by a sub-text pointing to traditional gender roles wherein  
masculinity is characterized by independence: the man wants to be free from domestic and  
relational issues and to do his own thing. T’s therapeutic position confirms this male script,  
but at the same time introduces a competing sub-discourse promoting fellowship and  
relational intimacy before indulging the ‘I’. T’s confidence and competence in this emotional  
work arena also chimes with the typical female script in issues of emotional labour and is an  
interesting observation in terms of discourses of therapy and gender. This is similar to a  
feminist account of gender differences claiming that women are supposed to do the romantic  
work and men supposed to do sex (Wetherell, 1995 in Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 1995).  
 
Further, talk of the couple’s potential conflict of interest can be associated with a framework  
viewing human beings as first and foremost utilitarian happiness-maximising individuals.  
xxxivOne therapeutic repertoire is to make the couple aware of this conflict of interest and to  
strategically help them adjust and negotiate. T implicitly talks about intimate relationships as  
social arrangements within an economic discourse (Willig, 2001) whereby benefits can only  
 
  
be enjoyed if and when one solves the potential conflict of interest. Such challenges revolving  
around I/We interests can be associated with the idea of love as hard work. As Kipnis (2003)  
phrases it, “the labour of love” resonates in T’s vocabulary when demonstrating how  
important it is to do the task of emotional work before enjoying the privileges of leisure time.  
T is drawing on the well-established distinction between hard work and leisure time  
established during the industrial revolution. When facing love in doubt, real love is  
constructed within a discourse about hard work and investment, here manifested as a belief in  
psychological work and in growth as involving understanding and adjustment.  
 
 T: I believe in psychological growth and development and psychological work. I believe, 
indeed,  
there is no easy, fast way to get a relationship to work. If so I think one has been very lucky…I  
think…well, some have it easier than others with their relationship, that is clear enough...but I 
think to  
overcome all changes in life…it’s not just about understanding … what people stand for in the  
beginning, but you have all these changes along the way. And then it’s a matter of adjusting, 
isn’t it?  
As a metaphor of this I think of a picture of living pieces of a puzzle that change all the time, 
that you  
can match, fit into or not. But it is hard work…  
 
The conception here of love as emotional labour suggests a compelling paradox, one  
challenging our general understanding of both emotions and labour, and based on an intuitive  
tension between these concepts. We usually think of emotions as ‘natural’, something that 
you  
cannot dictate, decide or regulate; the idea of labour in the realm of love disturbs the romantic  
ideal of feeling right. What T achieves with such a discursive orientation is a therapeutic  
stance that makes effort in communication worth the effort, and offers a different repertoire 
to  
play with than is available in a mystical, essentialist love discourse. In short, faith in therapy  
makes it meaningful to work on love so that it can endure.  
 
T: Take for instance a traditional man-woman issue, like…uh it creates a lot of frustrations. So I 
think  
that to communicate about these difficulties helps us to be better. And I think it’s, deep down, 
you  
need to bear, support, adjust…So I think it is important that I as a therapist care and support. It 
is  
important. Because those who seek therapy look at the therapist as a head above, kind of…a 
kind of  
authority… and I have faith in therapy, as a process to live with differences. And in fact it is 
very  




Pure relationship and therapeutic evaluations of love  
 
So far in this chapter, I have addressed discourses in which the enduring relationship is both  
an ideal and a central axis of therapeutic orientation but enduring love discourses do not  
however draw a complete picture of the discursive orientations revealed in my material.  
 
  
Tension manifests around the therapists’ subjectivity - wanting for example to not be seen as  
old-fashioned or conventional - and their discursive positioning whereby they simultaneously  
engage strategies to maintain couple stability. I nonetheless see traces of late-modernistic  
discourses, such as for instance Giddens’ pure relationship (Giddens 1992), emphasising that  
a good relationship is one between equals, where each party has equal rights and obligations.  
When informed by a pure relationship discourse, a couple’s continuity is not taken for granted  




Going to therapy is one way to uphold such an evaluative intention within a relationship  
through therapy’s reflexive process.  
 
T: I am really quick and clear when I am faced with a relationship that doesn’t work. My 
colleagues  
say about me, ‘If you go to [T], you’ll be divorced by the middle of the session.’ I’m more active 
and  
very clear in my message: ‘Try to explain to me why you two should live together, because It’s  
difficult for me to understand. For me it seems like the two of you are exhausting each other. I 
can’t  
see the glue, so please tell me why…what is it that ties you two together?’ I am very direct on 
this.  
 
What, then, serve as viable criteria for evaluating whether a relationship is delivering  
sufficient satisfaction? And how decisive is the therapist’s influence in this process? I find it  
interesting how T expresses T’s view on such questions by legitimating T’s positioning by the  
sentence; ‘When I see a relationship that …’, a statement that enables T to adopt an expert  
observer position. Such a positioning towards relationships plays on a diagnostic discourse in  
speaking as if a relationship ‘that doesn’t work’ is a category unto itself. Such diagnostic  
perceptions can interfere with an appreciation of the complexity of both individual relational  
narratives and the cultural context informing such a therapeutic stance. In this extract, T’s  
references to the ideal that a relationship should give satisfaction and pleasure clearly  
corresponds with the nature of the pure relationship, wherein satisfaction is essential and the  
“I” is set before the “We”. Expectations of pleasure and joy as the glue in a relationship  
contrast sharply with the more dysfunctional behaviour highlighted in statements such as ‘You  
two are exhausting each other” - in other words, “this is not healthy”. So T’s meeting with a  
couple that seems to be ‘exhausting each other’ does not fit with the idea of mutual  
satisfaction, prompting T to ask for an explanation. The sentence ‘Tell me why the two of you  
are together?’ chimes with a pure relationship discourse, wherein participation is voluntary  
and the ‘glue’ validating the relationship is found in the couple’s own evaluation of  
satisfaction, emotional support and communication.  
 
  
A second thought  
 
The sequence cited was in response to the question of when is it legitimate to reflect and  
comment on a relationship’s quality. As quality is a relative term, it can be determined or  
evaluated in other terms than simply degrees of satisfaction. If one were to read T’s  
challenges to the couple as rooted in a construction of a relationship as a mutually beneficial  
social arrangement, it could be argued that there is in addition to the presence of a pure  
relationship discourse in these sequences, resonance with an economic discourse, appealing to  
notions of investment of resources in return for long-term security. In such a view, it is a pity  
and a waste to not invest properly. The therapist’s questions could finally be seen as advice  
given with an economic discursive spin, as if to say, ‘If you two do this to each other, you are  
not investing your resources properly. It is pointless to exhaust each other because then you  
don’t fulfil the aim of a long-term relationship’.  
 
Yes, but Love Hurts  
 
When reading my material I was concerned with finding text extracts that underpinned the  
idea that therapists rely on the different discourses outlined in the literature review. I was also  
looking for alternative influences with particular impact for therapists or informing  
therapeutic practice as implicit constructions that have an impact but are not articulated to 
the  
same extent as discourses that are common and easily recognizable, as for instance the  
romantic. The role of subjectivity must also be accounted for when exploring the sources of  
inspiration and motivation for therapists and the therapeutic drive; it is on this level that  
images and intuitions – what I like to call pre-discursive spinal cord knowledge – plays out,  
although some might see it is as highly discursive. I therefore asked in the interviews for  
personal inspiration found in poems, music, novels, and other non-professional sources and  
accounts accessible in the public sphere.  
 
One of the poems T referred to was the song Love Hurts.xxxv ”Love hurts” has also become a  
common saying, often employed as a ready concluding comment after hearing about  
someone’s troubled relationship. What are the implicit discourses underpinning references to  
the pain of love? How does such a construction influence therapists’ ways of doing therapy?  
One aspect of love here is couched in terms of what a heart needs to be able to endure,  
expressed in this text as the need to endure pain. In other words, love costs - or, in a more  
contemporary turn of phrase, love is a “high-risk sport”.xxxvi This fits with post- and late  
 
  
modernism’s construction of love as represented by a passion/pain trend in novels (Prozac  
Nation), music (Gray: Still)xxxvii, and movies (Wild at Heart, Betty Blue), all of which, in  
different ways present love as an emotional cocktail of despair, pain, fear, attraction, and lust -  
possibly in response to the idyllic romantic love ideals of harmony, male protection and  
purity. So where romantic love upholds gender roles, expectations of reproduction and child  
care (see Literature Review), this ‘love hurts’ image is characterized by individual peak  
experiences and the breaking of boundaries in the pursuit of powerful emotional experiences.  
This image of love carrying expectations of pain commonly produces multiple references to  
individuals as lonely, desperately seeking passion, often accompanied by substance abuse.  
The experience of love may well be closer to that of addiction – with all the associations  
therein from ecstasy to death. Another aspect of a pain-informed love can be more concretely  
understood from a therapeutic perspective. I have heard clients talk ambivalently about  
domestic violence, about the emotional pain caused by threats, harassment, bullying, cheating  
and unyielding patterns of cruel communication. Sometimes therapists hear from clients,  
“Yes, but it’s real love, and real love hurts”. Such declarations can at times be difficult to  
understand; they seem easier to grasp in terms of mythical thinking – the stronger the pain, 
the  
deeper the love must be. The myth lies in the conception that the more we sacrifice and  
withstand and tolerate, the more we prove the love. This has resonance in religious traditions  
and rituals.  
 
Finally, one can see a common rationale in love hurts and virtuous love. Both discourses  
present pain as part of love and neither emphasise the value of working to achieve a pain-free  
relationship. However, while virtuous love holds up virtue(s) - seeking the Middle Way,  
nobility, and self-sacrificing love - the love hurts discourse searches for a selfless love  
through experiencing what a philosophy of virtue paradoxically deems capital sins – or, in a  
modern turn of phrase, “sex, drugs, and rock and roll” - and where love resides in the  
experience of meeting temptation head-on.  
 
Discussion of love in doubt  
 
In this chapter I have focused my analysis on what occurs in the face of doubt when a couple  
and/or therapist lean/s on a romantic discourse. Virtuous love is a central organizing theme,  
under which natural gender differences, essentialist heart of hearts talk, and nostalgia have all  
been discussed as discursive manoeuvres when facing love in doubt. Labour of love and love  
 
  
hurts further offer an array of discursive positions prominent in late modernity when the  
romantic love ideal meets narrative friction after the love story credits have rolled off the  
screen. The aim for the presentation of the analysis of love in doubt was to reveal some of the  
taken for granted, implicit constructions and ideals about love in couple therapy contexts. This  
analysis looked closely at how therapists’ discourses about love become more distinct and  
accessible when the ideals of love are challenged or in doubt, as is the case within couple  
therapy context. My analysis, in sum, demonstrates therapists’ responses, paradoxes and  
attempts to negotiate, disturb and persevere with the discourses that emerge when faced with  
love in doubt.  
 
My aim for this discussion is to summarise the discursive subject positions available to  
therapists, and the possible dilemmas, paradoxes and challenges inherent in these therapeutic  
responses. One of the main questions for me in the analysis was to elaborate how therapists  
talk about romantic love when “romantic” is challenged by unromantic events. The romantic  
myth permeates the Norwegian culture in a way that influences therapists in seeing it as a  
natural and ideologically preferable foundation for marriage and long term relationships. At  
the same time, discourses other than romance are available as rationales for choice of partner,  
for instance in arranged marriages. Various kinds of rationales emphasise key words such as  
“religious”, “practical”, “economic”, “suitable” and “accidental” reasons. These discourses  
challenge the romantic one, but how unprejudiced are therapists when they encounter these  
alternative discourses? Is it the case for example, that romantic love as a foundation for  
marriage among young immigrants is almost a litmus test for successful integration? Or do  
therapists wrinkle their therapeutic noses when couples offer such in-love narratives as; “well  
it just happens to be us, I don’t know why, but in-love, no”?  
 
In my work with this chapter, I am struck by how present the romantic discourse is when  
therapists talk about love. The presence is not explicit, as in statements such as I believe truly  
in romantic love, but I recognize its occurrence in a dynamic in which a romantic love  
discourse organises therapeutic talk about love, upholding the discursive functions of  
romantic love - seen, for example, in nostalgic talk about the ‘good ol’ days’. I interpret such  
attempts as activities aimed at stabilising discourses of love, particularly in therapy, because  
in a therapeutic context these discourses are in tension with some more challenging discourses  
 
  
about how to live love in one’s life. An example of this is when monogamy competes with the  
individual’s right to “follow her/his own path through life”.  
 
The stabilising effect of virtuous love  
 
In the analysis I argued that virtuous love might be seen as a solution to narrative friction, as  
when couples experience sickness and the need for permanent care. The solution lies in the  
potential for preserving the promise of “to have and to hold, in sickness and health” within a  
frame in which one could argue that one upheld the marriage promise of duty before love.  
What makes this position possible is the combination of three organising premises in this  
discourse – namely: commitment to marriage, the belief that pain and crises faced in the  
relationship can strengthen love, and the “We before I ” - that together offer a conceptual  
frame within which the couple can reorient themselves when experiences of pain challenge  
their harmony. Virtuous love has a function justifying the continuation of a relationship during  
crises and combines it with a romantic reference: I do it for love, only. This is an interesting  
position seen from a therapeutic stance; hence this position also sits well with some  
significant couple therapy traditions. One of the first professions conducting couple therapy  
was that of priests, and the aim originally was to support couples to stay within their marriage,  
with the institutional backing of the Church in claiming the ideal of monogamy. Within a  
therapeutic context then, this association of Church, virtue and priests makes virtuous love a  
strong and vital discourse applied in couple therapy. A challenge however is that this  
discourse might silence alternative discourses for managing pain in love which, as mentioned  
earlier, emphasise the individual’s right to choose to leave a relationship when faced with  
unexpected and demanding changes - similar to the argument that the individual has a  
responsibility to follow his/her own needs over the needs of the couple, in terms of you are  
only responsible for your own life. Sickness and the need for permanent care might, within  
this discourse, be too challenging for the survival of love. From a virtuous love perspective,  
such a stance might be seen as selfish and utilitarian.  
 
A final reflection then: when talking about virtuous love, one of the premises for contracting a  
long-term relationship, as seen in the chapter ‘Being in Love’, is the report of sexual and  
emotional attraction (Giddens, 1992). How does one navigate when one finds that what was  
the initial premise for contracting the relationship has gone, and one does not feel confident  
with the discourse of virtuous love, but still wants to give an account of oneself as a  
 
  
responsible and respectable person with integrity? Do we in late modernity operate with  
mutually exclusive discourses that position actors as either selfish or virtuous?  
 
The stabilising effect of romantic love on gender categories  
 
Romantic discourse is almost always gendered (Willig 1995:133), with two complementary  
subject positions made available: the male hero who has agency, and the female heroine or  
princess who relies on her prince to save her from whatever fate has done to her (Brownstein,  
1984). How romance is gendered can be seen from different perspectives; for example, Pines  
debates the different approaches to gender differences and attraction within social  
constructionist theory and evolutionary theory (Pines 2005:122). In the subsequent discussion  
I take a social constructionist stance, seeing gender differences as constructions with  
discursive functions.  
 
A traditional romantic gendered discourse is debated and challenged by both feminism and  
queer theory. The persistence of romantic discourse and the emergence of new practices  
represent cultural discursive tensions, and links with fundamental themes in couple therapy,  
such as how gender expectations should inform the allocation of domestic work, and how to  
deal with unclear gendered scripts regarding identity, attraction and sexuality. What is the role  
and mandate for therapists according to the gendered discourses faced in therapy? Should  
therapists work on the same level as gender scripts suggest and help couples to adjust their  
behaviour, expectations and perception to fit discourses, or should they in some way move to  
a level beyond adjustment and challenge gender scripts in themselves? One of the examples  
in the analysis illustrates how persistent the romantic myth is when it comes to gender and  
attraction (see page 112). Even more fascinating is the way this aspect of the analysis shows  
how an implicit construction about gender difference mobilizes a therapist to work in a  
stabilizing way in ‘adjusting’ the couple to reframe themselves within a romantic gendered  
script. From a feminist stance one can ask if therapists in some way are actively reproducing  
gender inequalities when helping clients to adjust to gender expectations, or when offering  
popular gender insights as truths. In other words, if people are unhappy and dissatisfied with  
their lives because of discourses carrying expectations of how gender roles and differences are  
to be understood, should therapy then assist couples to adjust to these expectation and  
attitudes, or should therapists move to a discursive level, exploring the meaning of the  
different discourses?  
 
  
An even more critical thought: if the democratisation of love and intimacy is taken for granted  
as Giddens suggests, might one overlook gendered power in general and abuse and violence  
in particular? Evans (2003: 125) quotes Langford, a feminist writer, on this point: “Acting  
habitually upon the basis of unconscious fantasies, the lover reconstructs their ego defences,  
reconstitutes their gender identities and reproduces dynamics of domination and submission.”  
How are such structural inequalities in the relations between genders considered in couple  
therapy? Is it the case that the ideology of love and romance is so taken for granted that  




The romantic discourse and same-sex relationship  
 
An important ingredient in the romantic discourse is gender differences; how then are  
romantic discourse practices and expectations for how same-sex couples want to live love  
influenced? And one can ask how the romantic discourse influences same-sex couples and  
vice versa. Since gender differences are an important issue for the heterosexual couple, it is  
interesting to look at how romantic love may have hegemony in such a way that it also affects  
same-sex couples. One way in which we can see that the romantic discourse functions as a  
norm that influences same-sex couples is in the passing of the Civil Partnerships Act in  
Norway in 1993, and by an increasing tendency for same-sex couples to have children within  
a somewhat stereotypical middle class heterosexual model - what in Norway is referred to as  
the Volvo-woof-woof (dog)-townhouse family - the ultimate nuclear family practice.  
 
In Norway legal and political strategies enabling same-sex couples to marry and to adopt  
children are progressing rapidly (Arnøy and Hansen, 2008). There is the recognisable  
application of traditional family terminology among my same-sex coupled friends (both  
lesbian and gay) who refer to their partners as „my wife“, „my husband“ or „my family“ more  
frequently than do my married heterosexual friends, instead of inventing new and alternative  
terms for intimate relationships.  
 
On the other hand, lesbians and gay men are forging new paths for heterosexuals as well as  
xxxviiifor themselves (Giddens, 1992). Take for instance the subcultural practice within some  
of the gay communities in which sexual relationships are framed within an ethic of friendshi  
and the practice of shared and open non-monogamy is not seen as problematic, or as a sign of  
 
  
a troubled relationship but rather as preferable: “one finds this practice among heterosexual  
couples as in for instance ‘polyamory’, loosely translated as ‘many loves’.” (Anapol, 1997).  
 
We might claim then that there is a tendency towards the de-centring of hetero-relations, 
both  
socially and at the level of the individual. The heterosexual couple, and particularly the  
married, co-resident heterosexual couple with children cannot be taken for granted as the only  
basic unit in Western society (Roseneil, 2007). Research on the tendency toward heteronorms  
being influenced and challenged by other practices of intimacy than that of the  
traditional romantic couple has been labelled "queering of the family" (Stacey,1996 in  
Roseneil, 2007). Meanings of ‚family’ are undergoing radical challenge as more kinship  
groups must come to terms with the diverse sexual practices and living arrangements chosen  
by their own family members (Roseneil, 2007). Stacey (in Roseneil, 2007) suggests that there  
can now be few families which do not include at least some members who diverge from  
traditional, normative hetero-relational practice, whether as divorcees, unmarried mothers 
and  
fathers, lesbians, gay men, or bisexuals.  
 
There are many approaches to the issue of romantic discourse and same-sex couples. One  
approach is to look at how same-sex couples are in a situation marginal to the heteronorm,  
and at equal rights for same sex couples to do the romantic script fully. Another perspective  
for further research is to look at how new practices of intimacy such as those expressed by  
same-sex couples among others, in fact influence and perform queering the heteronormative  
romantic script.  
 
The stabilizing implications of a mystical essentialist discourse in therapy  
 
In the analysis I identify a mythical-essentialist sub-discourse which indicates that it is  
possible to think of love as ‘real’ and this real love to be further objectified in terms of  
whether it ‘exists’ or not: she loves me or she loves me not. In addition to a search for real  
love, the language hints at real love as something that has an existence inside the body, with  
the use of such words as “heart”, “soul” and the feelings of love “deep inside”. In this  
discussion I ask what the implications are of such essentialist talk of love, in two different  
contexts, namely when i) the therapist as a professional says: I don’t think love exists in this  
relationship and ii) when the therapist speaking as a private person says I have love deep in  
my heart. It is not unlikely that a therapist uses the same vocabulary about a client’s  
relationship and her/his own relationship, but the connotations might be quite different when  
 
  
talking about love in objectifying terms within a professional context. The discursive  
functions of an essentialist framework of love might work rather like a diagnostic language,  
offering an observer position and giving the impression that a professional has privileged  
access to information about the person’s ‘inner’ state. The dilemma raised is not whether as a  
private person the therapist uses essentialist talk about romantic love, but if such talk, because  
of its taken for granted status, frames various love scripts as either right or wrong, and love as  
something that is either there or not.  
 
Implications of terming love as hard work  
 
When working with the excerpt in which T applied terms from the sphere of work, such as  
“investment”, “hard work” and “commitment”, I question whether such talk refers to love or  
not. I claim that it does, and this talk is even possible to locate within a romantic love  
discourse, because of its references to falling in love as a way in to intimate relationship and  
its emphasis on choices made by independent actors, on emotions as reasons, and on the goal  
of monogamy. The difference from mythical-essentialist talk about love appears when  
narrative friction emerges in a relationship and the vocabulary then slides into an appeal for  
commitment and hard work to sustain the social arrangement and the couples’ alliance. A  
discursive function of love as labour corresponds with another important premise in therapy,  
namely faith in couples’ abilities to manage their relational challenges.  
 
What I find exciting is a discursive shift from mystic-essentialist love talk accepting and  
expecting the emotions-based way in to a relationship, to a ‘prosaic realism’ vocabulary  
(Swidler 2003) referring to love as hard work; the first emphasises emotions while the second  
draws on rationality. This shift reveals topics for further exploration, namely what is the  
relation between emotions, thought and narratives of love? Is it possible within a romantic  
vocabulary to work to achieve romantic emotions when people report them as weak or  
absent? In couple therapy this becomes a particularly complicated and knotty issue when the  
couple diverge in their talk about the importance of emotions, where the one who reports the  
presence of such emotions wants to persuade the other to work hard and continue in the  
relationship. Therapists might in such cases find themselves actively engaged with the  
couple’s dilemma: should the one in doubt be encouraged to put work into the relationship, or  
should the one who argues for continuity be told that emotions are difficult to work at once  
they are gone? A strong belief in emotional work might put the therapist in an ethical  
 
  
predicament: is it right to implicitly support one of the partners into persuading the other to  
stay and to work? Taking the stance that language is never a neutral bearer of unified meaning  
one can wonder what alternative meanings about a relationship a therapist is bringing when  
importing terms from an economic worldview, such as “negotiation”, “balanced accounts”,  
“conflicts of interest” and “work-ethic”?  
 
Kipnis (2003) criticises this love as labour constellation and argues against it in the phrase  
“Are you never ever off the clock?” and claims that the message is that even in your intimate  
relationship, you have to work harder on yourself.  
 
Satisfaction as a criterion for a relationship to endure  
 
Love or its absence is seen in the analysis as an acceptable motive for individual action, and,  
to quote Evans, “we take it as a form of socially sanctioned and accepted individual  
entitlement that the presence or absence of love legitimates the establishment or the ending 
of  
a personal relationship” (Evans 2003: 6). It is easy to recognise this legitimate function of  
love but at the same time, a question that is important for further consideration arises: with  
various discourses of love available, what should then be the criteria for ending or continuing  
a relationship when one is in doubt? In the analysis, I give an example in which T declares a  
professional stance, a legitimate right to be quite direct towards a couple when T perceives  
that a relationship (in T’s view) is not good enough to continue: tell me why you two are  
together? This legitimate right to be direct and to confront corresponds well with the premise  
of the pure relationship (Giddens 1992) that a relationship should deliver enough mutual  
satisfaction and pleasure if it is to be worth sustaining.  
 
Pain and satisfaction  
 
The ideal of the pure relationship might be seen as a desire and a longing for the phase of  
being in love to extend, a golden phase of satisfaction and pleasure - in the same way as a  
notion of ‘labour’ carries implicit meaning in terms of satisfaction and self-development.  
 
These terms suggest a criterion of subjective experiences of satisfaction detectable through  
introspection, and that such satisfaction is unstable and insecure as the ‘glue’ for securing  
endurance of a relationship. Another issue is what position a therapist takes when he/she  
suggests breaking up a relationship if the couple is not satisfying each other. Taking this  
“satisfaction” criterion further and pairing it with images of pain in love, one gets a powerful  
 
  
but subtle postmodern, cultural and psychological mix expressed in the sub-discourse of pain  
and satisfaction, yes, but love hurts. In this sub-discourse I perceive a crossroads, where 
pulpfiction  
xxxix meets the psychological credo of “emotions make you real” with the last  
sentimental traces of romantic love, in a never –give- up-attitude: love will find a way. Such a  
construction of love situates therapists in different ways from fascination to recognition to a  
refusal of the whole construct with the clear statement pain has nothing to do with love. A  
therapeutic ethic however should question how this construction positions therapists with  
respect to pain, abuse, power misuse and physical and emotional violence. What do therapists  
think about pain and love, hate and love, abuse and love?  
 
Summary: Love in Doubt  
 
The analysis of love in doubt reveals many dilemmas inherent in the romantic discourse seen  
from a therapeutic stance. The overarching dilemma, as I see it, is a discursive tension in late  
modernism between ideals of monogamy and the conflicting ideal of an individual’s right and  
responsibility to look after his/her own wellbeing. Secondly, the analysis reveals a linguistic  
dilemma: the vocabulary of love in essentialist-mystical terms is strongly divergent from talk  
of love as hard work. When should one use what kind of language? Should there be  
consistency or is it acceptable to be inconsistent? Thirdly, as feminism has pointed out,  
gender issues are potentially problematic within the reproduction of a romantic discourse  
(Evans, 2003; Swidler, 2003). When one takes for granted an essentialist explanation of  
gender differences this has further consequences for the available repertoire of gender roles,  
gendered power and the performance of gender, attraction and sex.  
 
Questions for practitioners to work further with  
 
Why do we position ourselves in the romantic discourse? Power issues and the persistence of  
romantic love, seen from a therapeutic perspective, need further explanation, allowing for  
exploration of gender topics, sexual orientation, class, ethnicity and the questioning of a  
Bourdieuian reading of habitus (Bourdieu, 1986). Is it possible that being romantic is a  
privileged position and holds a kind of status for some socio-cultural groups, at the same time  
functioning as a non-dominant frame of reference for other couples? Being romantic is not  
necessary for love, as this analysis has shown; love could be something other – something  
more or less - than romantic. For the field of couple therapy one might rethink the impact that  
being romantic has on a couple in terms of expectations, contradictions and paradoxes.  
 
  




In this final chapter on love I will address the love in danger discourse, specifically as  
manifested in talk of infidelity. After an initial deconstruction of the term ‘infidelity’, I will  
give a brief account of Foucault’s work on the history of sexuality, and then proceed to track  
the discourses I identify in my interviews with T in much the same fashion as I have in the  
previous two chapters. My research focus this time is on T’s reflections on infidelity, with the  
analysis centring primarily on moralistic, psychological and gender discourses, as well as the  
emergence of counter-discourses, and some reflections on when it is considered acceptable 
for  
a therapist to give advice.  
 
Introduction: Infidelity  
 
Infidelity is a common challenge for which couples often seek therapy and counselling.xl  
Many couples encounter infidelity and talk about this experience as a crisis often followed by  
emotions of shock, grief, anger and mistrust. A quite common reaction for couples when  
infidelity surfaces, is to question their relational status, a response based on a conception of  
infidelity as the ultimate betrayal. This stance is one that has wide support not just in the  
particular couple in question; friends, family, colleagues – and, in high profile cases, the  
media - are all readily engaged in the task of offering moral support to the one betrayed,  
through statements such as, “You shouldn’t put up with this”, and “How could he/she do this  
to you?”. In drawing on an overarching discourse in our society about the necessity for  
couples’ exclusivity, Princess Diana could be said to have both brought to the fore and put a  
face to such assumptions in her famous sentence, "There were three of us in this marriage, so  
it was a bit crowded".xli  
 
At the same time, while we exchange veiled glances and hush-hush comments when  
somebody we know has ‘someone on the side’, according to well-known statistics presented  
in researchxlii and the media on the incidence of infidelity, this phenomenon is nonetheless 
not  
entirely condemned or considered an act one should try to avoid. Moreover, as the practice of  
infidelity certainly persists, alternative discourses to the solely moralistic one must necessarily  
also be in play. There is indeed a simultaneous process occurring that challenges a purely  
moralistic stance, and even clears space to offer emotional and moral support to the person  
who ‘has something going on’, often expressed in terms such as: “You deserve it - you need  
 
  
to carry on with this affair. I have never seen you so happy”. It may perhaps seem  
incongruous that it is yet again friends, family members, and colleagues, who hear, see,  
deduce and play a more or less complicit role in and facilitate these stories, providing support  
in the form of an alibi, an ear, or an extra bed, as needed. The term “deconstruction” was  
made known by the philosopher Derrida (Derrida, 1966)xliii and is used in social science to  
denote a philosophy of meaning that deals with the ways that meaning is constructed and  
understood through the interplay of authors, texts and readers. The praxis of deconstruction  
then involves analysing by ‘un-doing’ concepts to discover and recognise the underlying and  
implicit meaning of a phenomenon or discussion. Given the view that it is language itself and  
the practice of language that construct our reality, it follows that what we conceive of as  
problems and how we choose to solve these problems also stems from languagexliv. In other  
words, within such a perspective, problems are both created and maintained in language when  
it is used in an unreflective manner. The task according to Derrida and social constructionism  
is to deconstruct or "undo" a concept saturated with implicit and explicit meaning with the  
aim of gaining new meaning and knowledge. In the following I will deconstruct the notion of  
infidelity after having first defined the term.  
 
Infidelity “occurs when a person who is married or in a long-term relationship has sex with  
another person” (Collins co-build lexicon, 09.11.06). According to this definition, two criteria  
are necessary for infidelity to be claimed: i) the existence of a pre-defined sexually exclusive  
relationship, wherein ii) at least one of the partners has sex with another person. Taking this  
definition at face value, infidelity is strictly defined as sexual intercourse, though at the same  
time many clients speak of emotional infidelity – defined for our purposes as falling in love  
and forming an emotional attachmentxlv - as equally threatening and emotionally disturbing 
as  
a sexual encounter. I will in this chapter address both emotional and sexual infidelity.  
 
Looking at these definitions of infidelity, we can trace a common thread connecting them, in  
the form of already implicit and taken-for-granted values and norms built into the very term  
infidelity itself. Such meaning surfaces when prefixing the larger notion of ‘fidelity’, one that  
carries a higher status in language and in life than its counterpart and nemesis, infidelity.  
Purely linguistically, ‘fidelity’ is recognized as occupying the moral high ground, an  
honorable concept in contrast to infidelity’s immoral, shady character. Technically, the term is  
understood in common language as the act of being sexually unfaithful, a non-preferable  
 
  
action bearing the further implication that sexual unfaithfulness is negative to a relationship.  
Taking this at face value, it can be argued that by using the term infidelity in an automatic,  
conventional, or unreflective manner, one can be said to position oneself within a moral  
context; in such a moral context, fidelity serves to further uphold the ideal of monogamy,  
thereby compromising an analytic approach to the phenomenon of extra-relational 
encounters.  
 
For the aim of the analysis at hand, the terms to be used in the following discursive analysis  
will be as follows: when a source in my material uses the term “infidelity”, I will cite it as  
such and in the vein in which it is intended, namely as indicating acts of non-fidelity, be they  
emotional or physicalxlvi. However, in order to maintain a deconstructionist stance toward the  
linguistic phenomenon at hand, I will i) apply the term “extra-relational encounter” when I  
take a meta-position to the different discourses about unfaithfulness as they manifest in  
everyday language, and ii) apply “in/fidelity”xlvii, when I want to emphasise the explicit,  
associated connotations inherent in everyday use of the term, such as betrayal, immorality,  
threat to a relationship, among others.  
 
Foucault: The history of sexuality, and ‘scientia sexualis’  
 
 It is interesting to recognise to what extent and in which ways both emotional and sexual  
in/fidelity contribute to the construction of therapeutic discourses in therapy and in so doing,  
create a context wherein sexuality itself is deemed an issue worthy of counselling and therapy.  
It has neither historically nor culturally been common practice to seek therapy for sexual  
matters (though in England sex therapy – often behavioural - is quite well established), nor is  
it even a given today that all couples would welcome professional help with issues of such a  
private nature. One possible historical and cultural context in which to understand how sexual  
matters may nonetheless be regarded as an issue for therapy can be drawn from Michel  
Foucault’s analysis and archaeology of knowledge.  
 
In The History of Sexuality (1976/1981), Foucault understands sexuality as a discursive  
formation that arises epistemologically and through history. According to Foucault, we have  
in Western Europe developed knowledge about sex through our various ways of talking about  
it, which have in turn and over time constructed our episteme about sexuality (ibid). Sexuality  
has as such gradually come to be regarded as a body of knowledge and has thereby further  
contributed to the development of the professions such as psychiatry, psychology, and  
medicine. Specifically, according to Foucault, sexuality has been constructed as knowledge  
 
  
through the ritual of confession - in particular, confession as practised within the traditions of  
psychoanalysis and the Catholic Church. He claims that throughout the 17th century there was  
an imperative to confess and perhaps a paradoxical insistence on talking about sexuality  
(ibid). Confession is seen as tied to an imperative to find out ‘the truth’ – which again is a  
truth begging to be confessed. Foucault writes:  
 
"We have since become an extraordinarily confessing society. Confession has spread its effects 
far  
and wide: in the judicial system, in medicine, in pedagogy, in familial relations, in amorous  
relationships, in everyday life and in the most solemn rituals; crimes are confessed, sins are 
confessed,  
thoughts and desires are confessed, one's past and one's dreams are confessed, one's 
childhood is  
confessed; one's diseases and problems are confessed..."(ibid: 59)xlviii.  
 
Psychoanalysis is a powerful episteme for sexuality, representing in essence a scientific  
version of the Catholic confession. By constructing human emotional problems as  
representative of repressed sexuality and positing the analyst as supreme interpreter of  
sexuality, sexuality itself is in this process effectively further constructed as hidden, difficult,  
dangerous and a matter requiring treatment. With this practice of confessing hidden sexuality,  
prescriptions were developed of how to tame it, further creating an episteme of self-discipline  
wherein sexuality’s sanctioned role is solely reserved to matters of reproduction. Last but far  
from least, the psychoanalytic tradition postulated what was to be considered unnatural  
sexuality, and constructed what was to be understood as normative sexual behaviour.  
Women’s bodies became sexualised in their role as bearers of children. Children had to be  
protected against masturbation, and all forms of perversion, including homosexuality were  
dangerous and indicative of the need for treatment.  
 
Another essential influence on our notions of sexuality is found in the power of confession as  
practised in the Catholic Church. According to Foucault, the Catholic Church’s emphasis on  
confessional activity sends the message that sexuality has a fixed nature that we must repress  
or tame; as sexuality is further talked into existence by defining it as essentially problematic,  
the paradoxical situation is created whereby it is through the specific and unique practice of  
confession that one can be redeemed. The dynamic of confession is manifested in sentences  
such as “I have sinned and had sexual fantasises” or “I have sinned and committed sinful  
acts”, whereupon the priest responds by encouraging as detailed and concrete a narrative as  
possible. Every detail is to be laid forth in confession every trace of pleasure experienced is to  
be examined in the name and shadow of sin. Foucault’s analysis with specific reference to the  
 
  
Church and psychoanalysis has relevance for couple therapy contexts. I see the confessional  
and psychoanalysis as forerunners of the self-reflexivity of contemporary therapy.  
 
Tracking the discourses  
 
My linguistic deconstruction of in/fidelity above points to a single dominant discourse about  
extra-relational encounters, namely that in/fidelity is a betrayal within and of a relationship –  
given the simple fact that in/fidelity stands in a linguistic relation to fidelity and that we  
intuitively rank fidelity higher than in/fidelity. However, if this is the case alone, therapy  
would then logically be reduced to a simple matter of negotiating between the offender and  
the injured party. The very fact that in/fidelity is a matter to bring to couple therapy, as  
opposed for instance to a courtroom, carries an expectation that there may be more at stake,  
that therapy should and will reveal something more than the “either/or”. With this in mind, it  
is particularly interesting to investigate what kinds of discourses are in use when therapists  
talk about in/fidelity in order to then focus on how these different discourses offer an array of  
subject positions to take up. I will also look more closely at how these discourses interact, and  
whether there is any kind of specific dynamic between or hierarchy organising them.  
 
The data for the following analysis comes from an interview with T in which we are  
discussing a taped therapy session with a man who is seeing T because his wife is in love with  
another man. The theme in the video sequence is the man’s concern about his wife, as the  
client asks the therapist for advice about how to handle this situation. He also questions  
whether she can be held accountable regarding the children. T is talking in our interview  
about how T is working in the therapy to help the man distinguish between using the children  
as a power strategy against his wife, and acting in the children’s ultimate best interest, and it  
is in this context that the following discourses have been traced.  
 
A moralistic discourse – the high merit of faithfulness  
 
An implicit reference to a moralistic discourse can be seen when T’s client asks the therapist  
whether his wife’s in/fidelity ought to have some consequences. The very fact that he asks his  
therapist - here held up as an expert and a representative of institutionalized knowledge - can  
be seen as an example of a moralistic discourse negotiated to the surface. Specifically, the  
consequences he looks for can be read in a moralistic context as a plea for sanctions.  
 
  
Further, having made no reference to the persuasiveness or even the presence of this 
discourse  
in our interview together, T then intuitively turns to this discourse by commenting to me as  
interviewer:  
 
T: He shouldn’t feel that he has a moral right to the children. I think about this client, with his 
moral  
indignation, I think he’s right in feeling it, but he can’t take it out on his children. I think the 
client is  
saying to his wife, ‘You can’t just come here when it suits you, after all you’ve done’. It’s like, 
‘The  
children are a bit more mine now than yours’. He’s talking about his anger.  
 
Both T and the client, then, talk in the session within this moralistic discourse and from a  
shared acceptance of its potential implications, whereby if one is unfaithful one stands to be  
judged, and risks further possible consequences including loss of home, name, and children.  
A moralistic discourse offers a subject position for both men and women as highly socialised  
moral actors. A construction of in/fidelity as an immoral act, then, positions the client in these  
sequences in at least three ways: i) as having the right, by virtue of being the designated  
victim, to seek support in his attempt to be understood and tell his story, ii) as a responsible  
person wanting and trying to save his marriage, and iii) as a more responsible person than his  
wife at the present time.  
 
Such a moralistic discourse on in/fidelity is widely recognised in the Norwegian protestant  
culture, with which our initial encounter lies in early childhood religious lessons, drilled into  
us through the powerful words of the Bible’s 6th and 10th Commandments: “Thou shall not  
break the marriage vow” and “Thou shall not covet thy neighbour’s wife”, further reproduced  
and more potently sexualized into a discourse in the Catholic Church’s confession ritual as  
mentioned above. However, although this discourse has been dominant since the Middle  
Ages, the brand of ‘moralistic’ is not necessarily desirable in contemporary society. T  
explicitly expresses this attitude in one of the interviews:  
 
T: Well what I like to think about myself is (laughter) that I’m flexible and open. That I’m 
openminded  
about... that I’m not old-fashioned”.  
 
This use of the term “old-fashioned” suggests not being open-minded and in step with the  
times and the importance of not being moralistic with respect to sex and intimacy. And yet, as  
a culture we are unclear here: the unambiguousness of previous centuries’ values is not  
wholly dismissed. Hence we can see an ambiguity surfacing in this moralistic discourse. The  
collision of previous ideals, such as the moralistic stance against in/fidelity, shapes new  
practices that in turn ‘legitimate’ in/fidelity and thereby makes it unacceptable to be  
moralistic. This impact results in flaws, fractures and breaches through which new meaning  
 
  
is brought forth. Such tension and ambivalence – between and about old ideals and new  
practices - breeds paradoxes, resulting arguably in the paradoxical spirit of modern times,  
whereby in our discursive ambivalence we both judge and condone in/fidelity.  
 
Psychological discourse – “Not bad, but mad”  
 
When engaged in an extra-relational affair, many describe themselves as caught in a net of  
desire, lies, absent-mindedness, and teetering on the edge of the law as they take risks of  
which they never before believed themselves capable, all in order to be with the beloved  
other. It is not unusual to be perceived by others as ‘not being oneself’, an observation  
carrying the serious implication of in/fidelity as a breach of the person’s very self. A  
psychological discourse about in/fidelity emerges when having an extra-relational affair is  
connected with questions of mental accountability. Such a psychological discourse manifests  
in both public and private descriptions of not being accountable. In the private sphere,  
unaccountability has many colours and connotations. I recall an incident that made a lasting  
impact on my sense of the discursive catch-22 that can arise in situations of in/fidelity in an  
episode with some friends. They rang me and said that there was a crisis, and could I come  
over for an hour and help them with an acute situation. The man had just discovered that his  
wife was being unfaithful. This man said he wanted to leave the house immediately and that  
he wanted to take their baby with him. He was packing and left the house five hours after the  
in/fidelity was revealed. It was as if by this action he was saying to his wife, “Now I  
understand all the changes in your attitude and behaviour these past weeks, why you’ve been  
absent-minded. I can’t trust you and I want to protect our baby from your unreliability”. As an  
observer to this episode, I wondered whether this woman thought that perhaps her husband  
was in fact acting less mentally accountable than her, but perhaps she was not in any position  
to claim this because the discourse he was drawing on was too powerful.  
 
This discourse of unreliability on the basis of having had an affair relies on a normative view  
and justifies the husband’s indignation and perceived right to take the baby as far away from  
the wife as possible. He holds the joker, as it were, and has a leg up on her, despite his state  
and because of her actions. Being mentally unaccountable in the eyes of an observer gives the  









T: In the last session, the one I had with the man and woman together, he tried out a 
hypothesis about  
her being in a mid-life crisis or even psychotic. He had discussed the possibility of her being 
mentally  
unstable with their friends and he experienced support for this hypothesis of her being 
mentally  
unaccountable for the time being.  
 
When the client construes his wife as being in a mid-life crisis, he applies a psychological  
framework to question whether or not she is mentally accountable, a manoeuvre with  
potentially powerful effects. In this particular therapy sequence, then, talk of possible  
consequences regarding collaboration around the children points in fact to the construction of  
a psychological discourse wherein the wife is not to be held accountable - she is, after all, ‘not  
herself’- a state prompting the husband to ask for full responsibility and sole custody of the  
children. By bringing it into the context of family therapy, accountability is treated as  
belonging in the public domain, a matter of legitimate public concern within a legal paradigm.  
In Norway, for instance, there is a legalised and legitimised link between the perception of  
someone’s mental instability and society’s declared responsibility to investigate and evaluate  
that individual’s ability to care for children. I understand this discursive connection as an  
example of how anchored the psychological framework is as a motivation for personal action.  
 
Echoed discourse about gender and motherhood  
 
This psychological discourse is closely related to, enhanced by, and in turn contributes to a  
further discourse, albeit vaguer and less central, that I label ‘echoed gendered discourse’ about  
motherhood. In the above sequence, one finds an example of how an echoed gendered  
discourse is activated, in the husband’s concerns about his wife’s accountability and  
particularly in her relation to their children.  
 
As I read it this constitutes a very subtle shift to the opening of a historical discourse which  
constructs women first and foremost as mothers and wives, and in which women’s sexuality is  
tied to their roles as wives; sex outside this frame is to be regarded dangerous and dirty and  
opposed to the ideal of female purity, affection and loyalty within the frame of marriage. This  
discourse positions the man and the woman differently vis a vis sex and in/fidelity. This view  
is also represented in a traditional account of in/fidelity, which has historically held up men as  
being more naturally predisposed to unfaithfulness than women (Willott and Griffin, 1997).  
This discourse emphasizes the biological forces compelling men to seek a mistress commonly  
 
  
referred to as male-driven sexuality (Hollway, 1984). Traditional perspectives on gender and  
gender roles are moreover rooted in an essentialist assumption about natural gender  
differencesxlix (Gross & Simmons, 2002): a man, in essence, is supposed to be strong and  
protective while a woman should be gentle and virtuous.  
 
The term ‘echoed discourse’ came to me almost like an actual voice, like an echo. When I  
read the section on the husband questioning his wife’s accountability, I recognised that the  
associations it raised for me about women, sex, infidelity and motherhood created a 
resonance  
with discourses belonging to earlier times but still with contemporary currency. An echoed  
discourse about women, motherhood and infidelity is more like a layer of positional residue,  
an echo of traditional beliefs we are reluctant to voice in modern times, as if political  
correctness has silenced the voice of what is nonetheless a clearly present discourse. In other  
words, echoed discourses are traces of constructions and predispositions that we do not talk  
about in public, but that still inform what can be said and done. How, then, does this  
traditional view of gender roles connect to a discourse evoking questions of motherhood,  
accountability and in/fidelity? Is it that fathers can leave their families if in love with someone  
else, while if a mother voluntarily leaves her children for the sake of another partner she is  
perceived as a greater betrayer and therefore more blameworthy? When women and 
in/fidelity  
are discussed from this historical perspective, the positioning appears to be either/or: women  
are either sexual beings, representing temptation, or they are virtuous, giving birth to and  
caring for children in more of a Madonna spirit - specifically not as sexual beings but as a  
pure, caring gestalt. This premise becomes more distinct when these two positions become  
intertwined, as when a woman expresses her sexuality at the same time as she claims to want  
to care for her children, and - to make matters worse - in a context outside the original nuclear  
family.  
 
I raise this issue on the basis of a hypothesis that we as therapists are vulnerable to these  
possible discursive gender tensions. Are we, when it comes down to it, more ready to look  
morally askance when it is a mother rather than a father who gets involved with a new  
partner? Is there even a connection between such emotional repertoires and a tenacious if  
covert impression that we put more trust in mothers and motherhood than we do in fathers  







Discourse and counter-discourse  
 
In response to moralistic and psychological discourses surrounding in/fidelity, various 
counterdiscourses  
can be identified. While it is conceivable to read the hope in a moralistic and psychological  
discourse that the long established couple will endure, there are other discourses challenging 
such  
agendas. The permissive discourse, for example (Hollway, 1984), challenges the moralistic 
discourse  
that takes the survival of marriage as the prime objective. In such a permissive discourse, the 
principle  
of monogamy itself is challenged, as it is considered the right of both men and women to 
express their  
sexuality in any way they choose. In assuming that sexuality is natural and not to be repressed, 
the  
permissive discourse is closely allied with the male sex drive discourse, differing only – if 
significantly -  
in that it applies the same assumptions to both men and women (ibid).  
 
In the following I will account for a discursive dynamic that overrides both moralistic and 
permissive  
discourses about in/fidelity and diverts attention to rhetoric that suggests a quite different 
rhetorical  
position for therapists, and points at what is at stake when taking up a stance towards 
in/fidelity.  
 
Hearts trump  
 
T says in the extract below that T does not want the husband to feel any moral right to the  
children, so the first premise is that being in love with someone other than your partner 
should  
not have any consequences for parenting.  
 
T: I don’t want him to feel that he has a moral right to the children only because she has fallen 
in love  
with another man. Because it’s very hard for her, it’s not….she’s not that kind of woman, one 
of those  
who fool around….she’s on a wave, she can’t stop it.  
 
Second, T then goes on in the same extract to counter a one-dimensional narrative of the wife  
by emphasising that “she’s not that kind of woman, one of those who fool around” and on the  
video I saw, goes as far as to tell the client directly that T does not support his image of his  
wife as irresponsible or unaccountable at this time. In T’s challenge to the client’s dominant  
description of the wife’s unworthiness, T in effect fragments the overriding moralistic  
discourse. In defending the wife, T introduces the notion that you may have an extra-marital  
relationship and at the same time be a trustworthy parent if you are a “serious person” as  





Looked at more closely, T’s talk about in/fidelity gives being serious in wanting a new  
relationship a higher discursive status than the moralistic discourse. What might be the case  
here is that if the wife was in fact someone who did just ‘fool around’ T’s perspective on the  
man’s situation would perhaps be different. But because she, in T’s eyes, is a responsible  
woman - meaning she is serious about this new man - T’s utterance serves to implicitly  
communicate that being ‘serious’ in an extra-marital relationship can in one fell swoop  
release you from the consequences of judgement by situating you within a new and more  
forgiving discourse, namely the romantic. Here, then, falling in love and having an extramarital  
relationship are redeemable acts if connected to intentions of having embarked on a  
new, steady relationship. As seen in being in love (see 102), the overriding significance of the  
betrayer’s seriousness - of character as well as in the new relationship - serves to portray this  
woman as having been hit by love, making her and others in such circumstances passively and  
discursively redeemed. A narrative about falling in love then supersedes a narrative of  
in/fidelity, overriding, as it were, the otherwise often pervasive moralistic discourse.  
 
Separate parental and couple issues  
 
T is not simply presenting decisive arguments against the discourses this client draws on, but  
rather is introducing a kind of process, one that can be seen as a therapeutic intervention to  
uphold the need to keep separate parental and couple issues - a positioning that in itself draws  
on a late modernistic discourse re-situating the family as a unit that can manifest in various  
forms, and wherein parenthood and marital status are no longer necessarily one and the 
same.  
In T’s role as family therapist, then, the challenge lies not least in clearing a path for this  
discursive shift, a priority T acknowledges and holds up when encouraging the parties at odds  
not to entangle the two central themes of parenting and coupledom when tackling marital  
challenges.  
 
T: ... I am very pleased as a therapist, when people say, as clearly as this man says in this 
session, at  




Historically speaking, such a discourse is a relatively new construction, as I see it, brought  
forth by the interplay of at least three primary factors. The effects of i) the rapid increase in  
the number of divorces, coupled with ii) the new terms and entitlements of childhoodl, finally  
merge with iii) the romantic emergence of coupledom as an unchallenged entity that can exist  
independently of the tasks of production and reproduction, resulting in the legitimisation of  
 
  
new practices. It is in this vortex that new discourses are created. Children, parents and  
coupledom are then made into separate familial entities, as this discourse makes room for an  
acceptance of the redistribution of family life - a new centre of gravity for the family form as  
it were - thereby establishing the grounds for parenting and coupledom to be sifted and  
separated.  
 
Constructing advice-giving as acceptable and unacceptable  
 
The focus thus far in this chapter has been primarily on the way discourses are constructed  
and hierarchically organised around in/fidelity. We have also seen how a dynamic emerges  
between the discursive forces at play: a moralistic discourse is challenged by a permissive one  
but with reservations, as the romantic discourse of love trumps both the moralistic and  
permissive attitudes towards in/fidelity. While analysing the interview material, I recognised  
another noteworthy dynamic surfacing when T talks about whether or not, and when, to give  
advice. Giving advice in systemic couple therapy is not necessarily seen as the proper thing to  
do, the rationale for this being that people should rather be in a position to draw upon their  
own resources to find their path in life. In systemic literature this is expressed as “clients  
being experts on their own life”, and is recognised in systemic terms as a “not-knowing  
position” (Anderson and Goolishian, 1992). These notions among others serve to underline a  
paradigmatic distinction between a systemic therapeutic ideal and the expert-oriented  
professionalized attitude found in traditional psychotherapy. And yet, systemic therapists do  
offer advice to their clients. The participants in the interviews conducted for this research, as  
heard in the collective therapeutic voice embodied in the T-construct, talk about situations  
where they advised or positioned themselves in order to legitimise giving direct guidance  
regarding their clients’ lives. The therapists explained when and why they consider it  
important to give advice in an effort to make manifest that there are in fact some situations in  
which advising clients is meaningful, and others where it would not be deemed effective or  
functional. This dilemma of whether or not to offer advice was raised with regard to sexuality  
and - in particular – to situations in which things do not work out as expected.  
 
Dead relationships  
 
The following is a sequence in which T gives a rationale for when to give what kind of advice  
related to questions of sex, in/fidelity and monogamy. The background for these excerpts is an  
 
  
interview in which T and I had been looking at a video-clip of a couple’s therapy session. T’s  
first reaction to the video-cut is to declare:  
 
T: This is a dead relationship …Her way of nagging at him – makes him dead, [and…] she’s so 
cold –  
well, eh… they’re both rigid.  
 
T follows up the word “dead” with other words suggestive of a post-mortem metaphor such as  
“cold” and “rigid”. What kinds of premises are drawn on when speaking about dead  
relationships? I might begin to answer such a question by transposing metaphors of death,  
rigidity and coldness to their opposite pole, images of life, vitality and warmth with all the  
sexual and sensual connections inherent therein. Moreover, the presence of a vital sexuality is  
implicit in our culture in the qualities that define a good relationship. Clients seek therapy  
because their sexual relationship is experienced as dead, boring or conflicted. I asked T how  
therapists then account for the fact that sexuality, once so vital in the phase of falling in love,  
can subsequently become so difficult. T did not answer my question explicitly or directly, but  
rather provided an explanation for why people stop having sex in terms of a bad habit – a bad  
habit you can reshape into a good one.  
 
T: Well… I think sometimes you end up getting into a bad habit of not having sex… perhaps 
after the  
birth of a child or something like that... and they struggle …um...so I think… natural…I suggest…  
now the two of you have had a break and then I say to the couple, “You have to start again. 
Yes just  
try it… just put some effort into it”.  
 
This explanation for the absence of sex translated into “people getting into a bad habit”  
provides a rationale that by definition makes it acceptable for T to give advice; a bad habit,  
one might argue, calls for advice in order to work it into a good one. The interesting question  
here is how to explain the fact that T legitimates giving advice in such cases. Returning to  
being in love (Chapter ), the state of in-loveness was emphasised as a necessary late modernist  
premise for entering into an intimate relationship. Given such a premise, which may further  
be immediately and implicitly associated with sexual attraction and involvement, one might  
ask how essential it is that sexual activity endures in an intimate relationship. The answer to  
this is of course neither clear-cut nor easy. When couples come to a Family Therapy  
Guidance Centre, sexual problems are often presented with a kind of despair behind the words  
“we don’t have sex any more – we’re like siblings” or “s/he doesn’t want to have sex with me  
any more”. Does the pressure many therapists feel when presented with issues experienced by  
couples as overwhelming organise them in such a way as to leave them feeling obliged to  
offer some particular advice or intervention?  
 
  
 “Just do it!”  
 
Looking more closely at the discourse T taps into, it seems the overarching idea is that an  
intimate relationship is expected to be a sexual one; moreover, sexuality is one important  
criterion defining such a relationship. When sexual interaction is absent, the very essence of  
being a couple can be in jeopardy with the couple’s identity as intimate at stake. Is this, then,  
a legitimate situation for giving advice? If so, what is the rationale behind doing so in such a  
case? One possible answer is that T leans on a belief about sexuality as critical for a  
relationship to thrive, and is aiming to save the couple from a possible break-up by giving  
them a push in the right direction. In so doing, T is positioning advice-giving as acceptable if  
the underlying intention is to prevent either a break-up or sexual in/fidelity from occurring. In  
a ‘To have and to hold’ discourse (Hollway, 1984) such a contextual justification for giving  
advice makes sense. Alternatively, one might interpret T’s comments as pointing to a more  
therapeutic manoeuvre. More specifically, from the perspective of the practice of conducting  
therapy, the therapist considers the absence of sex a bad habit that can be changed, that the  
couple needs to “just put some effort into it”, whereby T can help them by using T’s authority  
as a so-called expert to be in a position to say, “Just do it”li. Of further interest within this  
stance is how one interprets what is characterised as a sexual problem in a relationship: how  
for example does ‘having sex’ and ‘not having sex’ relate to therapeutic principles about  
couple therapy and to a wider discourse about sexuality and its role, function and meaning in  
long-term relationships?  
 
Drawing the line  
 
As seen in the above sections, therapists do give advice and I am further interested in whether  
therapists would articulate any limit regarding the kind of advice that could be offered. Given  
the idea that sex is on the one hand the glue in a relationship, while a lack thereof is on the  
other a reason for leaving, I was curious whether it would it be possible for T to give advice in  
terms of other less conventional arrangements or mutual agreements to meet the partners’  
respective need for sex.  
 
A: But do you have any limits about the kind of advice you might give? For example, if they do 
not  
have sex for some reason…and one wants sex…do you give any advice? Or do you suggest for  
instance taking a mistress or lover?  
 
T: No, I don’t.  
 
A: No?  
 
  
T: No!  
 
T: …I don’t think it is healthy for a relationship… Generally… I don’t give advice... No I don’t 
give  
advice… Well, it might happen that the couple finds it appropriate…it’s ok…but if one of them 
is  




In this sequence T claims there is indeed a limit to what kind of advice might be given. My  
question was intended to mirror what I consider a relevant dilemma for many couples: on one  
level they want to stay together, but on another they also want themselves or their partner to  
live out their sexuality even if it does not occur within the relationship. T rejects the idea of  
supporting the solution I sketched in my question. The reason T will not give such advice to a  
couple, namely to encourage them to think of alternative practices such as taking a lover, is “I  
don’t think it is healthy for a relationship”. By emphasising “healthy”, T positions T-self as  
an expert on what is in fact healthy for a relationship, while not accounting for what would be  
unhealthy or why. As T does not refer to T-self as drawing on a particular psychological  
theory, I wonder whether T here speaks from a more moralistic position, of infidelity as both  
a sin and destructive, rather than foremost positioning T-self in this context as a professional  
whose aim is to facilitate the particular couple’s own helping strategies. Drawing on the  
“healthy” relationship presents a strong metaphor that suggests purity, a powerful 
counterpole  
to the so-called “dead relationship”.  
 
Here it seems that T uses the discourses actively with the aim of protecting a boundary, or to  
protect monogamy in relationships. As T says, “One has to draw a limit somewhere”. What  
then is the difference between acceptable advice and unacceptable advice as constructed by  
T? As both instances of advice-giving regard sex, it appears to be acceptable for T to advise  
couples to limit their sexual activity to within the framework of a steady relationship, and  
conversely to be unacceptable to advise a couple to seek sexual stimulation outside such a  
framework. Advising a couple to separate sexuality from their relationship creates a breach  
with the very idea of what a relationship is and should be: love and sexuality seem to be  
paired in the ideal of a healthy relationship. This, finally, has further relevance for the  
acceptability of in/fidelity when occurring within the context of being in love, as opposed to  
its unacceptability when motivated by a basic need for sex.  
 
  
Discussion of Love in danger  
 
The aim of this analysis has been to investigate talk of in/fidelity within a landscape where  
contemporary discourses about in/fidelity are double-edged, ambiguous and contestable. I  
will raise some questions important to highlight against the background of the analysis and  
that as both a researcher and a therapist I regard as particularly relevant for therapeutic work  
with in/fidelity issues.  
 
Talk about in/fidelity within a couple therapy context  
A dominant discourse about in/fidelity has been that in/fidelity is wrong and immoral; this  
view was enshrined in the Norwegian legal system, as in/fidelity was a legal reason for  
divorce until 1991lii. This monistic cultural discourse has informed earlier couple therapy  
traditions as well, with the consequence that the therapist’s professional and private selves  
were congruent and the therapeutic aim was clear with the ideal of the maintenance of  
marriage.  
 
In late modernity, I have claimed, practices have emerged that dispute monogamy; alternative  
discourses are available other than that of condemnation of in/fidelity. Taking this into  
consideration, new professional challenges must be dealt with in the field of couple therapy.  
At the same time talk about in/fidelity is still loaded with tension. The term “in/fidelity”, as I  
have pointed out in the section Deconstruction of in/fidelity (see p 131) in an already fixed  
linguistic relation to the term “fidelity”. So my argument is that while practices of in/fidelity  
are not new - they are perhaps as old as the institutional ideal of monogamy - nevertheless for  
couple therapy the potentially wide range of attitudes which in/fidelity evokes is a relatively  
recent occurrence. In the analysis I found that the discursive struggle, dynamic and  
hierarchical, mirrors the therapist’s stance towards in/fidelity to a greater extent than does the  
fact that they draw on particular and identifiable discourses. How then do these discursive  
dynamics influence the therapist in couple therapy work when themes of in/fidelity are  
present? My subsequent discussion comprises questions and dilemmas that represent my  
findings better than fixed claims and statements. One hypothesis for further consideration is  
that issues of in/fidelity dispose therapists to be drawn more easily into questions of what is  
right and what is wrong, because of the historical notion of in/fidelity as a moral issue. What  
happens to the methods, interventions and aims of the therapeutic dialogue during this  
discursive transformation?  
 
  
What are the differences in the therapeutic process when we shift from viewing in/fidelity in  
couple therapy as a moral theme to approaching it as a professional theme?  
 
The professional I and the personal I  
 
Another but related question is whether therapists report any discrepancy between their  
professional “self” and their private “self” and whether they talk about these as being in  
conflict; if so, how should these conflicts be negotiated? For example: in the interviews with  
the therapists I recognised that some of them took a therapeutic position towards in/fidelity  
that made me wonder whether working as a therapist positions one to take a more 
openminded  
perspective on in/fidelity than one might in the private sphere. Does one’s  
professional footing impose a more permissive stance than the individual behind the  
professional title would otherwise have drawn on? If this is the case, one way of  
understanding it is that therapists speak within a context or debate where it is not appropriate  
to be regarded or perceived as moralistic. The opposite of being moralistic in this context is to  
be tolerant, open-minded and flexible. But there is a potential tension here: one of the  
therapists said clearly that she/he would not tolerate in/fidelity in his/her own partnership, 
but  
in therapy she/he took a very tolerant stance to in/fidelity and this was a clear professional  
attitude. A thoughtful question is whether one should as a therapist give credence to the  
position of being a facilitator in the issue of in/fidelity. Does working as a therapist  
predispose one to take various positions in accordance with constructions of professional  
experience and expectations? Drawing on a permissive discourse, one can be perceived as  
tolerant and wise. Nevertheless, therapists and counsellors will still claim that they are within  
their rights professionally to raise a moralistic discourse or, having privately condemned  
in/fidelity, to forego the right to be explicit about it when facing clients. By taking a wider  
perspective on the story and feelings of betrayal, the therapist can lend support to the client’s  
journey towards acceptance - a therapeutic manoeuvre known as opening up new and  
alternative meanings - and this, as I see it, is an ethical stance. On the other hand, such a  
position is also rife with power, by virtue of the therapist being seen in our culture as an  
expert, as one who is wise above all others and who occupies a position of moral supremacy.  
 
How can we understand this different positioning between a private ‘I’ that regards in/fidelity  
as the worst thing that can happen, and the professional ‘I’ that regards it as understandable?  
One possible answer to this discrepancy might be found within the systemic theoretical  
 
  
ideology: that one should be less concerned with content, and more interested in  
contextualising problems. So perhaps we can claim that where there is a lack of therapeutic  
theories with distinct references to a clear technical-therapeutic approach, there is a  
compensatory pull, drawing systemic therapists to adopt a more permissive voice in the name  
of tolerance. Is this an area where we could say that, when it comes to in/fidelity, there is  
more discursive production than in other fields of therapy, and that as a consequence there 
are  
then perhaps more discourses at play in the systemic therapy room than there are methods?  
And is this perhaps just as it should be, namely that our very therapeutic method should  
simply be discursive and reflective in nature?  
 
Romantic love trumps  
 
One of the “findings” in this analysis of love in danger is that therapists are not drawing on  
either a moralistic or a permissive discourse about in/fidelity but instead are more concerned  
about a context within which to understand the in/fidelity. A context for understanding  
in/fidelity could be one in which the one who has been unfaithful is serious or not in the new  
relationship. So the act in itself, the in/fidelity, is not something that simply calls up  
judgements or moralistic phrases from therapists; this will depend on the context. And, the  
other way around, therapists may talk about clients’ in/fidelity in terms of being unhealthy  
and destructive for a relationship, but at the same time talk about her/his own experiences  
with in/fidelity as having been worth it. To me this incongruence is not a critique or  
something one should avoid, but simply an expression of discursive struggle and multiplicity.  
But the question is still how to navigate dominant narratives which traditionally have the  
power to summon people’s indignation, shock and condemnation and which have a historical  
repertoire of revenge and calls for justice, not only within the couple but between families and  
allied groups. What emerged to be most surprising finding for me was that the conflicting and  
incongruent attitudes held by therapists towards in/fidelity in the end reflect a hierarchy of  
values that discursively organised my material. This hierarchy points at hearts trump all  
making possible a position that in the name of romantic love in/fidelity can be legitimised. So  
perhaps this is the answer to the above question about what the compass should be; hearts  
trump all sets a standard for how to navigate in/fidelity in modern times. It can be framed as a  
post-modern dilemma, whereby all is well as long as you are perceived as conforming to or  
 
  
conventional toward and at the same time as challenging and over-riding these conventional  
standards in the name of love.  
 
Personal life crises and the use of moralistic and religious discourses  
 
Against the background of reading the interviews with the therapists it strikes me that there  
might be a clear connection between life-crisis narratives and the functions of old religious  
and deep-rooted cultural discourses. I understand this connection as that when life crises hit -  
with the associated feeling of losing the ground beneath one’s feet – one seeks established,  
well known discourses, which as cultural expressions we take for granted as embodying truth.  
When doing the analysis it occurred to me that when issues of sexuality are at stake,  
moralistic and religious discourses are particularly activated. The particular ways in which  
moralistic and religious discourses are used differ and are dependent on the positions that  
people take in these narratives, such as ‘victim’, ‘betrayer’ or ‘observer’. A challenge from a  
therapeutic stance is that such “old’ cultural discourses as moralistic and religious ones have a  
tendency to limit people’s choices to an either/or polarity as reflected in terms like I don’t  
want to see you ever again after your unfaithfulness or how can I ever go back to my  
marriage after I have been unfaithful? Old narratives traditionally propose some direction for  
how to manage crises, but at the same time they offer positions of revenge and sanction and  
questions of compensation for both the “victim” and “the betrayer”, as well as consequences  
of such positions without reflecting that these positions within a wider context might cause  
harm and pain to those involved in the situation. A repertoire positioning people within an  
either/or vocabulary when talking about in/fidelity becomes particularly complex in cases  
where, for example, it is used to raise doubts about the offending parent’s ability to care for  
the children, thereby putting the un/faithful parent in the predicament of having to prove that  
their love for their children is stronger than their feelings for the new partner. If this is  
presented as an either/or situation, a parent has to demonstrate that she/he is first and 
foremost  
a mother/father and, secondarily and less importantly, an independent person with her/his 
own  
life. Possible choices stemming from this position include i) to leave more of the daily care of  
the children to the other parent, or ii) to leave the new man/woman and in so doing uphold 
the  
continuation of the nuclear family, a choice which may be said to serve as a stabilising  
strategy. In such situations, old narratives in which in/fidelity was a matter of law and where  
one could indeed be tried for breaking marriage vows are echoed here and the therapist’s way  
 
  
of navigating may influence the narrative for both members of the couple. However, equally  
important is the fact that these old discourses are not necessarily activated as discourses of  
direction for how to live one’s life in times of crisis, but rather as the analysis has shown,  
counter-discourses unfold where moralistic and religious discourses are used. These claim a  
morality-free message, wherein an ideal instead prevails neither of judgement nor of  
moralizing, but rather of freedom and open-mindedness. The case remains, however, that  
whether or not one draws upon moralistic or permissive discourses one is in one way or  
another drawn into discourses that invoke ethical and existential issues when the subjects of  
sexuality and in/fidelity are raised.  
 
Talk about sex and talk about love  
 
In the beginning of this analysis I looked for how accounts of in/fidelity were thematically  
presented, whether there were unitary or disparate accounts of in/fidelity and monogamy 
and,  
if disparate, how in/fidelity and monogamy then were discursively regulated. Looking back  
over the analysis, I see that with the theme of in/fidelity, no talk appears to be directly  
connected to talk of sexuality. In other words, there are few references to sex talk in the  
therapist’s vocabulary; the material turns out to be about something else, namely parenting  
issues, romantic love issues and communication problems. So talk about in/fidelity in a  
therapeutic setting often becomes “translated” into talk about love over talk about sex  
(Giddens, 1992). Talk about love as a replacement for talk about sex, when the issues are  
about sexual in/fidelity, might mirror different ways of framing the relationship between sex  
and love in contemporary times. Various accounts of how to understand love in relation to sex  
exist side by side. One is that it is possible to separate sex from love; such constructions are  
shown in utterances such as we have good sex but there is no love. Constructing sex as  
uncoupled from love offers a different positioning when talking about sexual in/fidelity, as in  
the claim that it was only sex, and I still love you. This positioning puts the therapist in a place  
in which s/he might take a stance toward implications of a linguistic separation of sex from  
love. If therapists are positioned within a traditional romantic discourse, they will be more  
focused on romantic love talk, where love is good communication and sex is ideally included  
in the constructions of love, monogamy and good communication. When talk about sex and  
desire is separated from this context, sex then becomes invisible, difficult and unclear.  
Looking at how the romantic discourse can be said to fit with ideals for how therapy is and  
 
  
should be I detect another frame of reference for understanding the absence of talk of sex  
within the therapeutic context of in/fidelity. This is an explanation regarding the theoretical  
premises of systemic therapy that focus on language; the search for therapeutic solutions in  
language pays less attention to sexuality and the body. Therefore in Norway, we see a  
distinction between professional training in sexology and training in family therapy. A lack of  
sexual vocabulary in the material might reflect a possible professional blind spot. Whereas in  
the romantic discourse, the family represents a place where sex, reproduction, emotions,  
parenting, and household all function together in one unit, this model is dissolving in late  
modernity. New practices of intimacy, sexuality and parenting are emerging and professional  
culture is stuck in the old model, somewhat inattentive to the new practices in which love and  




I have in this chapter on love in danger addressed therapists’ discourse on issues of in/fidelity.  
I analysed the various discourses in the interviews: the moralistic, psychological and gendered  
echo discursive readings of the material. In a context of therapy, clients’ talk can be  
understood as an effort to manage relational and existential pain. When experiencing  
in/fidelity as a shock and an undesirable event, one might explore an inner dialogue, asking  
“Why me? Why now?” while at the same time outwardly and actively trying to find meaning  
in dialogue with friends, relatives, colleagues and experts such as therapists, counsellors, or  
priests, among others.  
 
My subsequent tracking of the development of counter-discourses ultimately merged with the  
question of when it is and is not considered acceptable for a therapist to offer advice. In the  
discussion I questioned the therapist’s role and the various positions available in relation to  
in/fidelity. As the analysis suggests, therapists are not detached from this tension. The  
material illustrates that therapists navigate differently not only in relation to the topic of  
in/fidelity, but to the whole context in which in/fidelity occurs. However, in the end, it seems,  
heart trumps all.  
 
Question for practitioners to work further with  
 
How can the systemic therapist explain and understand why In/fidelity hits so hard when, at  
the same time, so many are said to have this experience? Is it that the old narratives trap us in  
 
  
the legitimacy of condemning in/fidelity and this still-powerful force is a sign of its  
soundness? Or is it that because of this force, people remain immature and still allow  
themselves be punished by these old narratives and need to pursue a sexual revolution?  
 
  




In this chapter I wish to step back from the previous chapters and discuss what I have learned  
from doing this research, what it has meant for me as a professional and how this research can  
contribute to the field of systemic couple therapy. In so doing, I allow myself to let my  
personal and professional voices be heard even more clearly than in the previous chapters. In  
the analysis chapters, discussion of the successive issues raised was interwoven throughout  
the chapter. In this chapter I produce an overarching discussion, structuring the chapter as  
follows: first a re-visiting of the research question; next, self-reflexivity issues and limitations  
of the study; implications of this doctoral project for my practice as a therapist and for the  
Norwegian systemic couple therapy field; and finally consideration of questions for  
exploration in further research.  
 
Summary of research process and key findings  
 
The main findings of the analysis are summarised here.  
 
 ‘At stake’ issues  
 
Out of this project emerged a new conceptualisation for me, the notion of ‘at stake’ questions  
(see Introduction). I coined the term ‘at stake’ issues, to address those themes in couple  
therapy that emerge when the couple therapist is faced with ‘overarching’ questions about  
love and intimacy. Such issues are more often voiced in a philosophical-existential vocabulary  
than a traditional psychological/therapeutic one. liiiThey are questions that call upon and  
challenge us as people in our quest to learn how to live and love. Crucial to me in the process  
of identifying these questions and dilemmas that couples bring to therapy was that they first  
emerge as quests when couples are in situations in which they must make a choice regarding a  
change of direction in their lives. In my analysis, these ‘at stake’ questions were particularly  
interesting because it was apparent that such open value questions have no fixed answers in  
therapy textbooks but call for answers in the form of tradition, values, practices and therefore  
discourses. My analysis made it clear that it was ‘at stake’ questions that were the key to  
finding discourses, and they were useful for structuring the three analysis chapters that all deal  




Between everyday discursive knowledge and professional ‘expertise’: the twilight zone  
 
I demonstrated that the knowledge-in-use in couple therapy is quite existential in nature,  
exploring questions of how to live love in life and how to think about intimate relationships  
when expectations of love are confronted by friction and problems. Given one of the  
systemic therapeutic ideals of taking a collaborative and narrative stance in which the client is  
seen as an expert, it is then sound for therapists to draw upon everyday knowledge, as well as  
clients’ own approaches to finding meaning, rather than drawing on generalised, 
evidencebased  
methods and interventions. However, a focus for the analytic work then became: what  
happens in the professional empty space or ‘twilight zone’ between therapists’ and clients’  
everyday knowledge, and clients? I became concerned with what happens in the space  
between the exercising of everyday knowledge about love, and the expectation that therapy  
involves receiving expert professional advice. An example of this is the difference between  
one’s friend saying, “This relationship is unhealthy” and when one hears something similar in  
a professional therapeutic context. In the analysis, I was able to show that it is often unclear  
what belongs to a professional disciplinary domain and what is folk theory.  
 
Hence, the next task for the analysis was to trace the processes whereby therapists draw on  
everyday knowledge about love and intimate relationships, and those operating when they  
define their utterances as definite professional ‘knowledge’. I noticed that therapists were  
especially likely to frame their utterances as professional knowledge when ‘at stake’ issues  
arose for them. The analysis tracked how therapists position themselves differently when  
talking about merely sharing their thoughts with clients as opposed to speaking them in a  
professional mode.  
 
As the analysis grew, I considered that the question of when therapists shift between  
performing (doing) ‘being seriously professional’, and choosing to use everyday folk ideas  
could be approached with a Foucauldian analysis of power and knowledge. I have recognised  
in my material that the issues that influence therapists to take a serious professional voice are  
issues that traditionally belong to larger ethical and moral questions, such as issues of  
sexuality. Foucault (1980, 1981) has shown how psychology became a discipline that might  






Rose (1989, 1999) extends the argument to say that  
 
“In producing positive knowledges, plausible truth claims and apparently dispassionate 
expertise,  
“psy” makes it possible to govern subjects within these practices in ways that appear to be 
based, not  
on arbitrary authority, but on the real nature of humans as psychological subjects” (p. Vlll).  
 
I have expanded on Foucault and Rose in my analysis to show how systemic couple therapy  
might unintentionally use knowledge and position to govern the subject regarding questions  
of love and intimacy. I argue that couple therapy is especially predisposed to “govern the  
subject” since much of the knowledge in use is traditional and loaded with agendas tied to  
normality and exclusion processes, such as theories about monogamy, attachment and  
sexuality. These issues again were traditionally located within the domains of philosophy and  
religion but are now transferred to psychotherapy. Psychotherapy is commonly viewed as an  
area of professional and “neutral” knowledge. In fact some of the participants were  
absolutely clear about the power-knowledge position afforded them in this view, and claimed  
that they had to maintain and use it because “sometimes one has to draw a line “(Analysis  
p.144).  
 
Identifying evaluative speech about couples  
 
One example of the above issue of power and knowledge in my material is talk about intimate  
relationships in evaluative terms such as ‘good,’ ‘healthy’, and ‘satisfactory’. In the  
Introductory Literature Review I referred to marriage research that draws on psychological  
theories that premise the possibility of objective measurement and distinguish between  
‘functional’ and ‘dysfunctional’ relationships. In my analysis I focused on exploring what  
kinds of discourses inform therapists’ use of such evaluative descriptions. This is important  
as therapists’ evaluations of relationships often serve in our society as legitimating remaining  
in or leaving a relationship. I pointed to ways in which an unreflective evaluation from a  
couple therapist might have serious consequences if made formally within a professional  
context, even when the therapist might merely be drawing on everyday language and  
discourses.  
 
Discursive tensions  
 
 I identified three therapeutic contexts in my material: being in love, love in doubt and love in  
danger. In these contexts, the therapists in my study were seen to be drawing on different  
interpretative repertoires and discourses wherein different subject positions were available to  
 
  
be taken up. From my analysis it seemed that the discursive resources upon which therapists  
were drawing were indeed, as Billig says, inherently dilemmatic (Billig et al. 1988; Billig  
1991). The diverse therapeutic positions identified and outlined in the analysis seemed to  
mirror an inherent conflict between at least two forces struggling to manifest themselves  
culturally: the permanence and continuity of the nuclear family in a romantic discourse, and  
the importance of the individual’s rights and freedom to make different choices in sexuality,  
intimacy and love. I became particularly interested in a discursive dynamic in which  
therapists support, counteract or disturb clients’ discourse or actively introduce alternative,  
sub- and counter-discourses. The discursive tensions between discourses that stabilise and  
discourses that de-stabilise norms, institutions and ways of organising love, sex, parenting,  
and intimate relationships manifest particularly when the issues are ‘at-stake’, as for instance  
in in/fidelity. An interesting observation from the Analysis is that while there seems to be a  
discursive dynamic, a certain hierarchy is also present. Therapists may ‘defend’ infidelity  
only in the name of love, implying that as long as you are in love and serious about it,  
infidelity is understandable and not blameworthy (see “Love trumps”, p.148).  
 
Limitations of the study  
 
Here I review a number of decisions I made at various key points in designing and carrying  
out this study, for example regarding sampling. I conclude with some thoughts on conducting  
research in a foreign language, in my case in English.  
 
The sampling issues  
 
I now realise that recruiting family therapists when working myself as an educator and  
supervisor has not been the easiest way to get data suitable for the research question as it has  
evolved. The participants and I were preoccupied with my position of being quite familiar  
with their work and also potentially occupying non-complementary roles that might have  
influenced what they disclosed. Or to put it another way, I could have analysed publicly  
available texts rather than texts I had to gather myself, and thus have avoided concerns about  
anonymity and unclear relational issues, raised by us being “colleagues” who will see a great  
deal of each other further on. The model I initially chose of observing therapists in action  
became unnecessarily complex and I wonder whether the therapists hesitated to disclose  
themselves because of my position as “one of them.” I think the impact this had on the  
 
  
50material was that it was less filled with at-stake issues and less “rich” regarding certain  
issues, and this reflects that I was too “cautious” with challenging therapists and too polite.  
 
In the analysis I think I had the same ‘participants’ voices’ in my head, excusing and  
legitimating their way of doing couple therapy; perhaps I would have been less attentive to  
these voices and “freer” to focus on the discourses and positioning in my analysis of the  
material if I had not had these experiences of sitting face-to-face with the participants.  
 
Changing my initial theory and methods - adequacy of the material  
 
I consider whether it would have been better to have been able to follow the discursive theory  
and method from the start of the sampling process, as it has been challenging to have to read  
material initially gathered for a phenomenological study that turned out to be a discourse  
analysis (see p 50). One of the concerns throughout the analysis has been whether the 
material  
has been discursive enough. Had I known from the beginning that I was to do a discourse  
analysis I would have asked more directly about dilemmas, themes of conflict and questions  
of values. From time to time during the analysis, I thought I had to “koke suppe på en spiker”  
(make soup out of a nail), a Norwegian expression about making something out of (almost)  
nothing. On the other hand, perhaps in embarking on a phenomenological study I have  
collected discourses in a more subtle manner in that they are not in plain view but present all  
the same, just as they are uttered in therapy. In this way I have seen discourses perhaps in the  
same way they unfold in couple therapy.  
 
Doing research in a Norwegian context  
 
The social context of couple therapy in this study is conditioned by the fact that Norway is a  
fairly small society. My impression is that in the couple therapy community, getting a job at a  
family therapy guidance centre holds high professional status. One sign of this is that few  
family therapists quit once they have such a post. Habitus (Bourdieu, 1986) among family  
therapists in Norway is such that s/he is typically from the white middle class, manages to  
maintain an appropriate harmony in life, not too boringly traditional or too bohemian. The  
typical family therapist is particularly interested in communication and in processes of  
mediation, and they celebrate the feeling of enabling people to experience resilience and  
forgiveness. Norwegian family therapy forerunners and pioneers are people who, besides  
being in love with their work, also have relatively high incomes and stable economic  
 
  
situations. , are interested in art, music, literature, fond of cooking and drinking wine. They  
are well experienced in the various modes of “having a relationship”, but they would assert  
ultimately that “my home is my castle”.  
 
In fairness, this is also a suitable description of me, more or less; how has this habitus  
similarity influenced my analysis? Knowing and respecting habitus rules such as not  
snooping into another’s mess and chaos have informed me both in interviewing the  
participants and also in how I have interpreted the material. As an example, the discourses I  
have mapped and labelled are inspired by religious images, novels and poems hence my world  
of references is recognisable in my findings. A punk-and black-metal informed discourse  
analytic person would possibly get a quite different analysis than mine. Although I have been  
critical, I have been most informed by my own cultural references of not being unnecessarily  
rude, and being grateful, which manifest in my reading the material through the lens of best  
intentions, which again means, “don’t push it too far”. In the end, however, the question for  
me has been, what are the advantages and/or limitations of researching participants similar to  
myself? The value of this has been the opportunity to look closer at my own cultural  
background and explore the twilight zone of the professional/personal interface, and that has  
been a privileged position to have. Of course, I could have expanded more on my position in  
the Norwegian therapy community in the analysis, and explicitly put questions of similarity to  
participants on the agenda, asking myself and other readers why I see what I see here. I could  
have used this situation of alikeness with the participant to further enrich my analysis and thus  
situated myself even more distinctly.  
 
Conducting research in a foreign language  
 
Writing in a foreign language has been demanding, frustrating and to a certain degree  
limiting. Although I have had excellent professional help with the language, I have been  
challenged on so many levels by writing in English. First of all, not being able to find the  
immediate expressions has made bridging the distance between my thoughts, intentions and  
desires on the one hand and the written text on the other into a long journey. What I felt got  
lost in this distance has been playfulness, creativity and my own sense of authority. It has also  
been demanding to research within a Norwegian context and with potential Norwegian  
readers in mind, while at the same time struggling to understand and follow English  
conventions for writing; the analysis and key findings would perhaps be different if I had  
 
  
operated in just one cultural and linguistic context. A third issue regarding minority and  
majority issues has to do with the experience of expressing myself from a position of  
marginality because of not being able to cope well enough with the language to express  
myself. Burck (2004) has some useful perspective for me; pointing at the socio-political  
meanings of language-speaking and “the different experiences of self” (ibid: 320) and her  
research clarified for me, why I have felt so strange in doing this research in a foreign  
language – in the meaning of not being able to express myself in the way I want to express  
myself – and in the meaning of not being “good enough” in a wider cultural-power meaning.  
 
The possible benefits have been that the text is perhaps more transparent. Working in a  
second language has filtered my thoughts in a way that has been new for me and has been a  
useful experience. I am so caught up in the Norwegian language that the distance created by  
working in English has allowed me to discover valuable nuances. As one example, I had a  
Norwegian expression “på spill” in mind when I worked with my proposal, as a device in  
clarifying my research agenda. When I looked for an English translation of that notion I found  
that “at stake” was explained with “risk of loss of something” and associated with notions  
from the financial stock market world that helped me in contextualising a clearer point of  
departure; something is at stake for the couple, and in a way, this “at stake” in English became  
stronger in denoting the risks of being a couple than the Norwegian “på spill” (“up for play”,  
“on the table”, in the sense of gambling). I have also been able to put together insights that  
would have been otherwise difficult to see, as when I worked with my analysis of the  
Norwegian term “forelskelse”, similar to the English “falling in love”. However, the  
Norwegian expression does not have the concept of “falling” in the term, and working with  
“falling in love” was helpful in relating to a discourse of “I cannot help falling in love”. This  
in turn has given new insight and turned what has been framed in a taken for granted language  




Below I will summarise my reflections on how I came to write the thesis as I did, what it has  
meant to me and how my therapy practice, values and assumptions interacted reciprocally  
with the research agenda and process leading to the research outcome. Two issues are  
particularly emphasised, the tension between myself as a therapist and myself as researcher  
and secondly the experience of becoming more politically oriented than I expected.  
 
  
Tension between myself as a therapist and myself as a researcher regarding therapy issues  
 
In the methodology chapter, an issue for me was to reflect on the different roles of being a  
therapist and being a researcher. Here I reflect on how the application of lenses of discourse  
and power impinges on the final research results. At the end of this writing-up process, are  
there any costs involved in the deconstruction of the professional practice of couple therapy  
and if so, what are they for me? I see that in my professional narrative an important  
motivation for me in training to be a therapist has been to solve relational riddles such as how  
to understand that people once deeply in love can end up not even managing to speak to each  
other. In my therapeutic practice, I have enjoyed the small universe of clients and myself, in  
which we together have explored the couple’s histories, memories and dreams. During the  
research I have found the notions of discourses, positioning and power useful on an abstract  
level of analysis, explaining the relativism of categories such as marriage, love, intimacy,  
sexuality and the ongoing discursive struggle between stabilising and destabilising forces of  
love and monogamy. Doing a discourse analysis has made me conscious of therapy’s status  
as a field in which knowledge consists of cultural constructions. This realisation has made me  
even more aware that knowledge in use truly is temporary and actively constructed How is  
one to grasp the connection between the abstract level of analysis and the level of practice  
where clients’ subjective experiences of pain must be dealt with?  
 
As a clinician, I wonder what will happen to my drive to solve relational mysteries with  
discourse analysis in mind - will this create an analytical and almost sociological-political  
atmosphere? Will it have a paralysing effect on my own practice in my deconstruction of the  
couple therapy session in itself, distancing me from clients’ emotionality? Will I be in doubt  
about what therapy now really should be about on a fine-grained level, sitting face to face  
with clients? My deconstruction of my own profession of therapy and my deconstruction of  
love which also concerns my personal, private life has in practice meant that I have been  
powerfully reminded that there is a multiplicity of practices, of ways to be a couple therapist  
and to live with love. I do not know if this reminder has been purely positive, as too many  
realities at the same time have been disturbing. In counting the costs it seems as though I  
have peeped into a room and have not been able to forget that I have seen the inside of this  
room, and this has been both liberating and distressing because what am I to do with all these  
perspectives? How will I deal with the two levels – the academic and critical level of analysis  
and the level of practice comprised of all my experience practising therapy? I must not forget  
 
  
however, that clients bring the unexpected into the room, and that this in turn influences the  
therapist’s thoughts and feelings. The therapist is not responsible for working all this out or  
for having perfect control of what happens. At one point in this process I heard a little voice in  
my head asking whether love should be referred to as ‘the wordless field’, that love is perhaps  
the last mystical frontier that should be reserved from research. I have also convinced myself  
that therapists are important almost in whatever they do, because people need someone who  
will listen to them, and perhaps they, too, should be left in peace. My critical voice has been  
challenged in the analysis by the protest that it is not necessary to be so critical, or to look at  
intentions, power and functions all the time. “Can’t you just leave it as it is?” which means,  
“as it appears to be at first glance?” At the same time, during the research process I have been  
very engaged in the critical aspects, as if I had a drive to go in-depth and shape a form and a  
language that could reflect my initial curiosity for doing this research. I have convinced  
myself that the position of researcher is a powerful one and somewhat more liberating than  
being a therapist. Looking at a broader picture with a different aim has been another route to  
understanding why I became a therapist in the first place, and how I came to practice as I have  
done. I will account later on in this chapter for how a discursive approach to couple therapy  
might be conceived.  
 
Arriving at being political  
 
In the exercise of self-reflexivity I ask myself why I have ended here, with a thesis that is  
discursively and politically oriented and not phenomenological as I first planned. A political  
approach to research in the first place seemed strange to me, as I have thought of myself as  
more interested in poems and myths than in demonstrations and political slogans.  
 
One clear reason for my ending up political has been the experience of reading  
poststructuralist literature that provided me with an alternative epistemology and ontology 
and  
which lead to the strange experience of the act of analysis of the data almost forcing me to  
apply my new lenses on reality and subjectivity outside the research project as well; in  
appropriating these lenses, it was almost impossible not to become political and critical. I can  
compare this process with another theoretical watershed in my life when I was introduced to  
systemic thinking, which again was so strong an experience that it changed my  
psychodynamic inspired thinking and way of practicing therapy to a systemic orientation.  
Another less obvious but related reason might be that I have identified the discursive struggle  
 
  
between exclusion and inclusion processes with my experience of being marginal and  
different. I realize that earlier I have ransacked poems and fiction for comfort and  
confirmation of my narrative of being different from others. This narrative has been  
influenced by two experiences in particular: one is being adopted from Korea at a time when  
adoption was very rare; and the adult experience of living within a same-sex relationship. I  
have managed the experience of being different by not defining myself or my life as different,  
for instance by not disclosing myself to anyone but friends and family. I now see that this  
research has provided a channel for raising this voice and claiming space for my differences  
while not having to view my experiences as marginal. Combining drawing on these  
experiences and motivations with professional curiosity has been an important process for me,  
both personally and professionally.  
 
How this research can be a contribution to the field of systemic couple therapy and  
suggestions for further development  
 
In the following I account for how this research may contribute to the field of systemic couple  
therapy, both theoretically and to practice, mainly by pinpointing the fruitfulness of a  
discursive approach for the field. I do not claim to offer a complete account of its usefulness;  
my reflections emerged from and are limited to the work presented in this thesis.  
 
My main suggestion is a discursive approach to systemic therapy, and I include here one  
example of how doing this research has influenced me in approaching discourses in couple  
therapy. In addition, I present issues of gender, ideology, research on the therapist, and finally  
the notion of voices within therapeutic practice.  
 
I incorporate here my suggestions for further development, although I find it hard to  
distinguish clearly between what might be contributions to and what are issues for further  
development, as these are related. But for the sake of the reader, I summarise my suggestions  
for further theoretical and practical developments in each section, marked explicitly in the text  
as “Further developments”. For practitioners, these “further developments could be read  
together with the concrete suggestions for practice at the end of each analysis chapter, to get 
a  
more in-depth account of clinical practice issues.  
 
 A discursive approach to systemic couple therapy  
 
“What discursive thinking can bring to therapy is a greater awareness of how language 
features in  
what we understand and what our communications produce” (Strong&Locke2006:587: )  
 
  
Postmodern insights with relevance for systemic therapy, such as the turn from a search for  
‘objective’ knowledge towards construction of alternative understandings based on diversity  
and plurality, have and must continue to have substantial implications for practice. An  
ongoing issue for family therapy research is to outline how this influence appears in practice.  
As accounted for in this thesis, a systemic perspective facilitates the value of multiple  
versions of reality (see Introductory Literature Review, p.22) and in fact some would said that  
is what a systemic perspective is. Bateson (1972) asserted the ‘significance of multiple  
perspectives’ or ‘double description’, - the idea of exploring an issue from different angles,  
or with the other’s voice in mind (Shotter, 2004) with the practical implication that as a  
therapist, one should understand that people speak and interact in distinct ways that shape  
their meanings and activities. However, this research has made me question whether the  
systemic perspective covers my preoccupation with concepts explored in the thesis such as  
professional power, knowledge, dominant discourses and positioning, and that has lead me to  
explore how a discursive approach to systemic couple therapy might unfold in practice. What  




A useful description of a discursive practice for me is contained in the work of Hare-Mustin  
(1994), who compares the therapy room to a mirrored room that reflects back just what is  
voiced within it. The limitations of a therapy which merely mirrors what is voiced within it,  
according to Hare-Mustin (and I agree) is that psychotherapy is deeply involved in the  
generation of values and norms, and thus requires an ethical sensibility. What I find  
particularly useful in Hare-Mustin’s argument is her claim that family therapy could function  
as a form of social control, an argument that relates closely to the Foucauldian analysis of  
power and knowledge that informs my thesis. I claim, in line with Hare-Mustin (ibid) as one  
example that couple therapy might be said to serve the agenda of the dominant culture of  
romantic hetero-normative love (see Analysis).  
 
Sinclair (2007) revisits Hare-Mustin’s article (1994) exploring the importance of  
acknowledging the discursive content of the therapeutic process. A central theme of Hare-  
Mustin’s work is that “Unless therapists recognise their participation in discursive practices  
they may unwittingly collude with and reinforce harmful cultural practices” (Sinclair, 2007:  
147). This is a clear statement about responsibility of therapists to engage in a debate about  
 
  
how political and moral issues arise in therapy. Sinclair (2007) reviews the contributions to a  
discursive approach of a range of authors who have pursued Hare-Mustin’s ideas. She cites  
Sue & Sue (1999), who point to the tendency towards eurocentricity in the many approaches  
to treatment, and feminist therapists who criticize family systems theory for not adequately  
addressing issues of values, justice and responsibility in the context of patriarchal sociocultural  
systems such as Burck and Speed,1995, Goldner, 1991, Hollway, 1984, 1995  
Kitzinger, Wilkinson, 1995 to mention some. Although these have been important  
contributions to a discursive approach, there is still a need for more systematic and substantial  
development of ideas about what a discursive approach could and should focus upon. Sinclair  
(2007) claims that there is still work to do to integrate abstract concepts from discourse  
analysis with the more practical realm of therapy. Such a move would involve an  
epistemological and ideological shift to a more critical and reflexive approach, away from the  
ideological stance Sinclair (2007) refers to as ‘liberal humanism’liv. Liberal humanism locates  
human problems as distinct and separate from social, cultural and political contexts within  
which they occur and Sinclair claims that this position produces therapists ill-equipped to  






During the process of writing up this thesis with a focus on discourses in couple therapy I  
realise that I have almost omitted the work of Michael White. White has in fact brought the  
concept of discourses into the therapy room (White, 1991) and one reason why I have not paid  
close attention to the discursive approach in White’s work is that I needed to “go into my  
process”; I needed first to work on writing a description of the discursive field of therapy on  
my own before I could recognize White’s concepts as applying critical thinking to practice  
and as an attempt at liberating the individual from cultural practices and discourses. I realized  
that White applies discourses in his work in line with Foucault’s thinking. One example of  
discursive practice in Whites’ approach is where he claims that therapists need to deconstruct  
people’s problems by externalizing problem discourses. In White and Epston in Narrative  
Means to Therapeutic Ends (1990) the externalizing problem discourse is explained as “an  
approach to therapy that encourages persons to objectify and, at times, to personify the  
problem that they experience as oppressive. In this process, the problem becomes a separate  
entity and is external to the person or relationship that was ascribed as the problem. Those  
 
  
problems that are considered to be inherent, as well as those relatively fixed qualities that are  
attributed to persons and to relationships are rendered less fixed and less restricting” (ibid:  
38). White here makes the therapy discursive by liberating the counter-discursive practices of  
a person’s local knowledge so that different stories about the subject can emerge that  
highlight preferred outcomes (1990). Counter practices might be seen as actions that invite  
alternative descriptions and these descriptions differ from dominant descriptions that the  
individual and others have previously given regarding a particular event (White, 1990). I  
realize however that my “overseeing” of White’s writing reflects my own research focus on  
discourses in therapy; this may also reflect shortcomings or dilemmas in the application of a  
discursive perspective to personal narratives. One difficulty here might be the difference  
between a story and a discourse, and how to deal with personal responsibility and an ethical  
stance if one externalizes the problem as merely a problem-saturated narrative, such as in  
work with men who abuse their wives. In sum, my “light resistance” against narrative therapy  
is caught in the critique of Kaye; “changing a destructive narrative to a more positive  
narrative within the same cultural discourse is not identical to getting free of that cultural  
discourse (Kaye 1999:33 quoted in Sinclair, 2007)). Another question is whether  
externalizing is merely a technique of linguistically separating the distinction of the problem  
from the personal identity of the individual (Tomm, 1989). One critical point I must raise  
concerns the shallowness of White’s emphasis on alternative stories; is his technique a way to  
simplify complex problems with which people struggle. I realize as well that this criticism of  
narrative therapy can be applied as well to my research project and the shortcomings of  
applying discourses in therapy and to sum up my position, that the complexity of therapy and  
discourses need to be further developed and elaborated, such as issues of the relativism  
(“epistemological correctness”, Gill, 1995) and injustice, oppression and domestic violence.  
 
An example from my own experimental discursive practice informed by doing this research  
 
I recently worked with a couple married for about 15 years. They had lost their son in a 
caraccident  
and eight years ago they adopted a girl now nine years old. Some years ago, she was  
diagnosed with ADHD. In addition, she has minor physical disabilities. This couple came to  
see me, because they struggled with distancing in their relationship, and had come to a  
crossroads of not being able to tolerate or bear more of this struggle. They had tried sincerely  
many things to get more intimate as a couple and as I understood it, they had tried so hard 
that  
all the attempts at closeness had only lead to worsening of the situation. In their own words,  
 
  
they had reached a level of disgust, shame, guilt and most of all, an overwhelming feeling of  
mutual dislike.  
 
The one thing they really agreed on was that the best possible condition for their daughter was  
to continue their marriage, since they thought of themselves as better parents jointly because  
of the child’s extra needs. Together, they could offer stability, good economy and a house  
well suited for her. They both expressed that providing optimal conditions for their daughter  
was also their common ethical responsibility.  
 
Informed by my work on discourses I framed some of their dilemma to be a discursive one,  
seeing two dilemmas as potentially conflicted in their life:  
 
1) Discourse about parenting: they want to be responsible parents, and they are locked  
into a discourse claiming that the most responsible way of being parents to their  
daughter is to continue marriage.  
 
 
2) Romantic discourse: they don’t love each other or like each other, but they are locked  
in a romantic discourse claiming that if you live together as a family, you have to love  





In an attempt to loosen their knotted situation, I talked with them about how different  
discourses are historically and culturally constructed, as people have raised children and still  
do without loving each other romantically while sharing a household. My aim for the therapy  
was first of all to free the couple from the restrictive premise that if they want to do the right  
thing for their daughter, they have to continue to live together, and to live together they have  
to love each other. In fact, the whole idea of having to love each other in order to do the right  
thing is making them in fact become even more desperate, as if they are forced to identify  
each other as the one who is the misfortune in their life. I went on in the therapy to suggest  
exploring how it might be possible to continue the intimate relationship and still live together,  
but also unfold new possibilities, positions and choices.  
 
Comments on the example: what I think of as a discursive practice  
 
What I did differently than before when meeting this couple is that instead of suggesting  
intimacy exercises that involve exploring a couple’s intimacy informed by traditional couple  
therapy themes of closeness, openness and forgiveness, I went more quickly on to their  
discursive dilemma, which I saw as caused by conflicting ideals: an ethical discourse of  
 
  
responsibility informed by parenting ideals and a romantic discourse claiming love as  
necessary for a marriage to endure.  
 
What I mean by a discursive approach is to recognise with much greater confidence how  
people use particular conversational strategies to manage pain, and I explored what the  
partners in the couple do with their talk and how they use talk to influence each other as  
speech acts (Austin, 1975). The woman in the couple above said to her husband:” you make  
me ashamed the way you are acting when my mother or father visit us”, and this utterance  
might be interpreted in terms of belongings and attachment, such as it is difficult for her to be  
intimate and she is struggling with childhood issues. However, it might also be addressed as a  
cultural protest, such as I am frustrated since the discourse of being a family is telling us to be  
intimate and to merge our extended family, premised on the idea that we must like each other  
and be alike. And having had children together we need to love each other and I don’t see  
any way out of the situation I am now trapped in.  
 
Discursive therapy as engaging clients critically  
 
 In the example above, I asked the couple how they understood the idea that if they still  
wanted to live together in the same house they had to love each other at the same time. The  
answers were discursive, in that they expressed such answers as “of course we have to, we  
have not heard of anyone else doing that”; “Clearly it’s unnatural and it’s wrong”. Discursive  
approaches to therapy often focus more on how any therapeutic conversation occurs than on  
what such conversation is about, even though many discursive thinkers concede that  
conversation’s whats and hows are highly correlated (Strong and Lock, 2006). Discursive  
therapists are therefore concerned with engaging clients, critically and practically, in the  
languages brought to and used in therapy (ibid) and aim to engage clients critically towards  
their taken for granted choices, premised thinking and sets of values and rules.  
 
Therapeutic comfort zones and ethics  
 
Taking the example with the couple above, I can imagine some of my colleagues arguing  
something like, ”But you cannot suggest the idea of still living together while giving up being  
a couple since this challenges common sense for how to live together”. I argue that it depends  
on the positions we take up as therapists. I mean that as therapists, and given my earlier  
arguments about power and knowledge, we have to be willing to engage with other forms of  
 
  
common sense (Kögler, 1996), and be prepared to suggest other forms of social life than those  
with which we are confident. In the analysis, I looked at what one can call the therapist’s  
spinal-cord knowledge, their immediate response to a dilemma, and I claim that it is an ethical  
position for therapists to strive to transcend these spinal-cord reflections and introduce the  
unthinkable to the client. A therapist could operate within the border of what the therapist’s  
comfort zone is and avoid discursive struggles, but I argue that discursive forces often are  
protecting what we refer to as normal, and the normal again is constructed intentionally; once  
you position yourself within the comfortable normal, you exclude both unintentionally and  
intentionally that which again might be liberating for the client to discuss.  
 
Discursive therapy emphasizes that as people experience difficulties, they often are  
constrained within certain discursive and interpretative repertoires (Billig,1999 Hollway,  
1995, Wetherell, 2001; Willig 1999 ) and these positions are constructed often through  
heavily normative processes telling people that what they are feeling, thinking or doing is  
wrong. A possible solution to therapeutic uneasiness is then to show clients their positioning  
within discourses and help them to consider discursive repositioning, thereby placing less of a  
burden on the individual of normative processes in meetings with new and alternative  
discourses.  
 
Further developments  
 
The continued attraction of relational work is supported by Beck & Beck-Gernsheim (1995)  
who suggest that love will replace religion as an existential anchor (see Literature Review).  
From this viewpoint, systemic couple therapy needs to develop perspectives, concepts and  
interventions that grasp the way the manifold nature of love is expressed as different and  
sometimes conflicting discourses influencing the particular couple seeking guidance. More  
concretely, I would advocate a discursive approach that includes therapists inviting their  
clients into a wider debate about the values, norms and expectations that are available to 
draw  
on at life crises and crossroads. And a further key question to the therapeutic field is; to what  
extent is couple therapy able to generate effective and less discriminatory counter discourses  





Gender issues  
 
Gender issues have in different ways been raised in this thesis, as couple therapy concerns  
how we relate and position ourselves differently towards gender scripts. This is equally  
relevant for same-sex relations, since the hetero-dominate gender scripts influence and inform  
how couples adjust or challenge this script. The various expectations for doing gender  
(Butler1999) in turn raise problems and uneasiness when people experience failure in terms of  
these scripts. The impact of the fact that there “exist” different and conflicting gender scripts  
is in itself a research area, since this manifoldness constructs different expectations about  
femaleness and maleness and raises dilemmas and paradoxes which are then brought into the  
therapy room. During the analysis I was at times gender-blind, as it was really hard to pick up  
the gender issues in the first place, possibly since gender is so enmeshed with the initial  
premise of couple therapy: that men and women are fundamentally different, and need  
therapy to overcome this difference and adjust, as one example.  
 
Taking a more discursive approach again; many feminist therapists reject the myth of valuefree  
psychotherapy. By making their biases explicit, feminist might facilitate client ownership  
of their values and choices. (Brown & Brodsky, 1992). Feminist family theorists have  
critiqued existing theories of family development, function, and dysfunction, stating that  
although feminism and systemic practice have traditionally been seen as two incompatible  
standpoints, they can be conceptualized as two parallel traditions (Goldner, 1991) Both work  
toward understanding the intersubjective experience that makes up the interpersonal field 
and  
both are analogous concerns that include problems of confronting and combating power  
misallocation, issues of hierarchy, and the process-product debate (ibid). Working with this  
thesis has made me more aware of the connection between gender and therapy and I will  
below suggest gender-therapy issues to further research .  
 
Further developments  
 
I will suggest three projects that extend the reach of discursive work in the field regarding  
gender issues. The first is to look more closely at how systemic couple therapists reflect on  
the connections between romantic discourse and reproduction of gender inequality, and at  
their styles of talk influenced in a taken for granted manner by, for instance, contemporary  
self-help bookslv such as Men are from Mars, and Women from Venus (Gray, 1992 )lvi.  
Another such question to investigate further is whether romantic love discourse stabilises  
 
  
gender scripts in terms of hetero-normativity, which again might marginalise other ways of  
structuring love, intimacy and sexuality. Application of a poststructuralist approach (Roseneil,  
2007) could thus be used to examine the premises of couple therapy. The third area is whether  
it is the case that therapeutic ideals such as being skilled in good communication, showing  
empathy, being a good listener and being concerned about relational work correspond well  
with female scripts in the romantic love discourse where femininity is described in terms of a  
concern with relational work. Couple therapy turns out to be a suitable aid in raising  
traditional female concerns and thereby underplays traditional masculine concerns in therapy.  
In this way, classic feminine discourses and couple therapy discourses are similar to ideals  
such as the pure relationship. It might be the case that women, therapists and societal ideals  
move synchronously towards particular notions about what love should be, for example that  
“one must understand one another, preferably intuitively in a relationship”, and that these  
ideals become more taken for granted, since they agree exactly with therapeutic ideals. What I  
mean with this is that it would be very interesting to have a discussion of how dominant  
heterosexual discourses shape therapy and ideas about how therapy ideally should be.  
 
Ideological agendas in systemic couple therapy  
 
In the Literature Review I have included critical work about romantic love, such as that of  
Evans (2003), who raised critiques of the dominant discourse of romantic love as unreflective  
in its concept of individualism, the increasing commercialisation of sex and love and the  
preservation of gender differences. In the work with the analysis, the practical implications of  
the power position attached to being a professional working within a government agency with  
issues of love and sexuality became clearer. An example of this is how therapists argue for  
their responsibility to give advice in cases of infidelity and in parental issues. This position of  
being so close to ethical and moral dilemmas makes the systemic couple therapist into a  
cultural figure, playing a central role when people seek advice for what to do and think about  
relationships. As such, therapists occupy the same positions as members of the priesthood,  
teachers, philosophers, politicians and researchers, as they all negotiate, deal with, distribute  
and communicate discourses, dominant as well as alternative.  
 
Further developments:  
 
 I think it would be interesting to examine discourses of love in governmental documents that  
shape the service of couple therapy centres in Norway, as this service is free while other  
 
  
services such as medical and health must be paid for. This is in itself a kind of message, one  




A further search for discourses of love in relation to media therapists’ expert roles is  
important because of the increasing and near-hegemonic power such therapists have in doing  
therapy in the media. It would also be interesting to look at discourses of love of therapists  
from three different kinds of therapeutic context, such as church-owned family therapy  
guidance centres, the official government-supported family therapy guidance centres and the  
private business therapists who hold high status .Finally, an overarching issue to work further  
with comes from a queer perspective. The various ways of living out intimacy and love that  
do not follow either the romantic/hetero-normative script nor the script where individualism is  
central, people that ‘fall out’ of the dominant discourses, either because they are excluded or  
because they strive for their alternative form of expression to be seen and heard (Roseneil,  
2007).  
 
These alternative expressions are not much present in systemic couple therapy yet, since  
couple therapy is still primarily pre-occupied with stabilising ideals of romantic love at a  
crossroads with ideals of individualism (as in Giddens’ notion of the ‘pure relationship’).  
“Queer” expressions of intimacy, love, sexuality and gender are not explicitly present in my  
material, but implicit since queer negotiations about how to live love and intimacy contribute  
to the creation of discursive tension. When the participants talk about what is natural and 
what  
is unnatural for example, the unnatural is taken into the therapy room via its presence in  
discourse. The unnatural is negotiated away and excluded, and therefore is still there. To  
concretise, in the therapy example I refer to from my own practice, the dominant discourse of  
romantic, nuclear love was present as one possible practice.  
 
The reason I could introduce an alternative discourse suggesting living together as just  
partners is that it exists as an alternative practice in our culture. In negotiating the normal,  
alternatives to normal already are spoken. I propose that a queer approach to research within  
the field of couple therapy has to be extended so that it can explore even more alternative and  
queer arrangements for living intimacy such as polyamory’ (Anapol, 1997) or the “right” to  
practicising “a-sexuality” or not having a sexual relationship, without having to defend such a  
 
  
stance. This for me is not just playing with thoughts but points to a further research area:  




Research on the therapist  
 
In my preparation of this thesis, two things surprised me: firstly, that researchers of systemic  
therapy have shown limited interest in exploring the idea that both the therapist and the client  
play a part in therapy - research has until recently focused on the client’s point of view, as if  
the client is the only contributor of research interest in the therapeutic conversation; and  
secondly, the fact that little attention has been paid by researchers to the role covert 
processes  
may play in therapy, although there are exceptions, such as Rober (1999). My research has  
strengthened me in thinking that a systemic perspective has a lot to gain by importing  
poststructuralist theories about subjectivity, especially in the training of family therapists in  
work with self-reflexivity. As seen in the Analysis and Method Chapters, approaching the  
therapist’s self as non-unitary and non-rational opened up ways of going beyond the  
therapist’s ideas of love to identify the various subject positions therapists take up.  
 
Further developments:  
 
 I suggest exploring further the insight about therapists as vulnerable and as dependent on the  
same discourses and experiences of clients in therapy with the aim of developing research  
methods that capture these parallel processes of couple therapists and couple therapy issues  
through the element of our training program called Personal and Professional Development  
(PPD). Reflexivity by clinician is the key topic to develop: how to pose questions to one’s  
own practice, including deconstruction of the taken for granted premises about what the aims  
of therapy should be, and what it means to be “therapeutically helpful” in contemporary and  
future manifold practices of love and intimacy.  
 
An additional thought: voices versus discourses  
 
Therapy has a long tradition of listening, and this listening has mainly taken a  
phenomenological approach to pain, confusion, despair and hope. One of the limitations of  
the concept of the ‘phenomenon’ is that it easily leads to a mentalistic and essentialist  
language of love. In response to this, the therapist might take the position of expert because  
of his or her professional familiarity with psychological terms for ostensibly internal or  
 
  
private experiences such as anxiety, stress, anger etc. The notion of discourse is an analytical  
device, while the notion of the phenomenon aims to offer a language for the world of  
subjective experience. From the point of view of practice, there is a gap and a significant  
difference between experiencing lovesickness as a phenomenon and exploring lovesickness as  
a discourse. Bakhtin’s concept of dialogue, recently referred to by a number of systemic  
family therapists (e.g., Andersen, 1995; Anderson, 1997; Penn & Frankfurt, 1994; Seikkula,  
2002; Seikkula et al., 1995; Vedeler, 2004), might work as a conceptual bridge between  
phenomenon and discourse. Voices have an inner representation and a discursive form, found  
in the concept of polyphony. Polyphony emphasises the value of attending to many different  
voices at the same time (see methodology p.). In the quotation below, Bakhtin uses the terms  
‘discourse’lvii and ‘soul’ in the same breath:  
 
Life by its very nature is dialogic. To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to 
heed,  
to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue a person participates wholly and 
throughout his  
whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with his whole body and deeds. He invests his 
entire  
self in discourse, and this discourse enters into the dialogic fabric of human life, into the world  
symposium. (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 293)  
 
The importance of dialogue is frequently highlighted in systemic therapy, especially in terms  
of empathic listening to the client’s narrative from a not-knowing position (Anderson, 1997,  
Rober, 2005). Bakthin’ s work, according to Rober (2005), demonstrates that dialogue is  
much more complex than a mere opposite of monologue; indeed, monologue may be  
understood as part of dialogism. Inspired by Bakhtin' s ideas, Shotter (1993,) emphasizes the  
word ‘practice’. He follows Wittgenstein (1953) in asserting that the meaning of words  
depends on the dialogical context in which the words are used. What we say is a response to  
what others have said before us, and our words are invitations to others to speak and give 
their  
response. Bakhtin (1986) puts it thus:  
 
“...any speaker is himself a respondent to a greater or lesser degree. He is not, after all, the 
first  
speaker, the one who disturbs the eternal silence of the universe. And he presupposes not 
only the  
existence of the language system he is using, but also the existence of preceding utterances – 
his own  
and others’ – with which his given utterance enters into one kind of relation or another (builds 
on  
them, polemicizes with them, or simply presumes that they are already known to the listener). 
Any  
utterance is a link in a very complexly organized chain of other utterances” (ibid: 69).  
 
In Bakhtin’s emphasis on the practice of language- how a word is actually used - and the  
emphasis on looking at the dialogical context, a language of phenomena simply becomes  
more public and external. Polyphony represents an alternative conception of the  
controversial concept of not-knowing (Anderson & Goolishian, 1992). The therapist takes a  
 
  
not-knowing stance in the session, not because of the emptiness of his/her inner conversation,  
but because of its polyphonic richness (Rober, 2005). For Bakhtin, the listener is neither an  
innocent bystander, nor is he or she a passive receiver of a message. On the contrary, the  
listener is an active participant in the dialogical interaction as he or she prepares him or  
herself to respond to what is being heard: "He either agrees or disagrees with it, augments it,  
applies it, prepares for its execution, and so on" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 68) and this captures the  
notion in discursive psychology about the therapist as positioned. This emphasis on the  
therapist as polyphonic solves the problem of the systemic therapist’s apparent emptiness.  
 
The poststructuralist view of the subject as non-rational and non-unitary might find resonance  
in Bakthin’s concept of the polyphonic self. The polyphonic self can work as a reminder of a  
position which offers space for the culture’s different voices by not censuring voices of  
shame, blame, taboos and loneliness, but embracing them as belonging to the collective voice  
coming from the experience of cultural conflict and fractures. By not personalising a voice of  
shame, but tying it meaningfully to a collective expression, one might unburden the individual  
somewhat while at the same time being careful not to deconstruct away the personal  
expression of pain. The therapeutic position, then, in addition to being a non-expert on the  
client’s life (Anderson and Goolishian, 1992), is to fill an “expert” role in suggesting that  
clients’ voices also echo voices from a culture in transformation, since therapeutic knowledge  
has the status of “truth telling”, Because cultural change is a constant, there is always a need  
for ceremonial, cultural figures such as priests, teachers, scientists, novelists and therapists in  
whom trust can be placed. The therapist might take this role actively in promoting the  
message that we all as individuals and in different ways are bearers of the culture’s pain and  
discursive struggles.  
 
End of scene: Love and therapy  
 
In this study I have questioned what therapists are drawing on when conducting couple  
therapy, which discourses -in-use are also expressed as therapists’ personal beliefs, what  
kinds of professional knowledge they refer to and when it is that they shift between different  
types of knowledge. This research has further revealed that there is a lot at stake when talking  
about love in couple therapy. In late modernity, old and new practices exist side by side, and  
there are stabilising forces and forces that move to challenge the traditional. These dynamics  




within one person’s life, between members of a couple and in families. The data indeed  
indicate that various vocabularies do in fact surface in a therapeutic context, bearing not  
merely descriptive but normative expectations of how love should be lived out and as such  
influencing couples’ experience of their relationship and their decision to seek therapy.  
 
In my work with this thesis I am aware that the final text might be regarded as a critique of  
couple therapy in general and systemic couple therapy in particular. This has not been my  
intention, but as the process has taken shape I realise that I have developed a sharper critique  
of some aspects of couple therapy practice. This is so because despite systemic couple  
therapy’s respectful non-expert, cautious attitude to the couple, the systemic therapeutic  
attitude can still communicate the impression that something is “wrong” with the individuals  
and/or the couple as they struggle with their relationship. This happens when problems and  
their causes are viewed as personalised, and the broader perspective that contemporary  
couples and individuals also struggle because of transformations of love and intimacy in the  
wider context of culture and history is ignored. We have an expression in Norway of being  
“nærsynt” which in English would be translated as “short-sighted”. My critique of systemic  
theories lies in the fact that they mostly have excluded a broader understanding of why  
couples struggle by continuing on an interpersonal, relational level without taking account of  
discourses, although there are of course exceptions (White and Epston (1989).There is further  
work to be done in outlining the relation between local therapeutic practices and the macro  
level of societal networks of power. I have just managed to get on the trail of the many  
dilemmas built into this work and unfortunately, I am only now, at the end of this thesis, fully  
aware of the existing research on discursive therapy and micro-macro relationships in therapy.  
 
What is of particular interest to me is to what extent the analysis has shown that these same  
client vocabularies are in fact also those of the therapists greeting them. My findings lie in  
sum in the discovery of a discursive dynamic, namely the extent to which and in which ways  
the therapists support, counteract, disturb or actively introduce alternative, sub- and 
counterdiscourses.  
I claim that therapeutic culture is also discursively constructed in dominant ways  
and I hope this thesis has shown that the multiplicity of approaches in couple therapy needs to  
be further verbalised, investigated and challenged through a discursive couple therapy with  
the aim of deconstructing taken for granted knowledge and the hidden and unintended uses of  
 
  
power by professionals to offer a repertoire of interventions for therapists when facing the  
different facets of contemporary love.  
 
The complexity of love also means that couple therapy is a multifaceted professional  
occupation. Love and difficulties with love are talked about in a couple therapy context as  
both the reason for pain and at the same time as a solution to fragmentation and alienation  
One is driven out in homelessness because of love and at the same time people find escape in  
love relations. Multiple cultural framings of love can coexist side by side, as seen in the  
analysis, and I regard it as a strength that therapists draw on multiple readings of love when  
doing therapy, because they then might reflect and mirror the cultural manifoldness of love in  
contemporary times. That therapists draw on multiple readings of love is not in the end a  
critique of therapists; as I see it, it is valuable for practice and for the complexity of the  








I wrote this text after completing the analysis, realising that the same discourses which I had  
explored in the analysis are dealt with by other professionals such as Tarot-readers, and that  
indeed, clients seek them out with the same trust as in their search for therapists. It was  
amusing to write my associations down in this little narrative and I leave it to the reader to  
decide if it holds echoes or memories of value for the reader (in which case I am pleased). It is  
meant merely as a reminder that the mystery of love will continue to be searched for and that  
discourses of love are all around us.  
 
A short meeting with a gypsy woman, Rose, and her tarot cards  
 
It was early on a Saturday morning in May and the air was crisp. Two friends, Mary and Ida,  
had parked their car and the eldest of the two women, Ida, held a newspaper notice in her  
hands. They had found the address they had been looking for. It was a café, an old café that  
had had many functions but was today a fortune-telling cafe.  
 
They went quietly up the stairs to the second floor. The stairs were dark and dusty, but the  
locale was airy by contrast, though it smelled of old cigarette smoke. When Mary reached the  
second floor, she saw a man, tall, sunburned and handsome, sitting at a desk covered with a  
cloth. He smiled. “Do you want a reading?” he asked. Mary turned to look at her friend, who  
said, “well, we’ll just take a few minutes, we’re just looking around.” “Oh”, the man said,  
“are you two from the press? We don’t like journalists”. “No, we’re not from the press. How  
come you thought so?” said Ida. “You two are so critical,” he said. “My intuition tells me to  
be cautious with you two.” The two friends looked at each other. It was as if they could read  
each other’s thoughts, and were saying, “ Now we should really be suspicious.” Ida, the  
eldest of the two friends said, “we’re here for a reading, but we just want to sit down for a  
minute, have a cup of tea, yes, and just sit down”. The young man grinned. “Sit down, have a  
cup of tea and look out there in the corner, there’s my wife. You can call her Rose.” Mary saw  
a woman sitting and reading a magazine. She looked young, almost like a teenager. “Rose is  
waiting for you two, just to tell you your destiny. She’s so good.”  
 
The two friends ordered a cup of tea. They giggled a little, asking each other if they really  
were going to do this. But there was really no question about it. Both of them had cash, since  
 
  
the gypsy woman didn’t take credit cards. It had been a demanding year for both friends, and  
they really wanted to reassure themselves that this coming one would be one of the better  
ones. “What do you want to know?” Ida asked Mary. Mary said, “Maybe something about a  
new job and money, and of course, love” she said and laughed loudly. Ida nodded, they knew  
each other well, they had told each other everything of significance, and they were equally  
good at analysing each other’s narratives. Now they were both seeking help for something  
they both had no knowledge of, the future, how it would be in the future.  
 
Mary was the first one to be read. Rose’s hand was so thin when they greeted each other.  
Rose was dark and wore a cap on her head. Mary sat down and Rose took her cards in her  
hands, flip, flop, laid them on the table in an arrow and then she seemed to have second  
thoughts, because she took the cards in her hands again, flip-flop. “Destiny” said Rose.  
“Destiny is waiting for you. I am now going to lay your cards and read them. I am 98%  
clairvoyant,” she said. “Fine”, said Mary. Mary felt strange, almost sad, and she looked at  
Rose and said, “I have never done this before.” “Don’t be afraid,” Rose replied. “The cards  
will tell you.” The first card, a dead man, was revealed and Rose smiled. “Oh, this is so  
good,” she said. “Love will come. You have had a lot of sorrow, I can tell, my cards tell me.  
But now love will come. For sure, I Know. Something will happen, when you’re ready.  
You’re not ready.” “How do you know this?” said Mary, quiet. “Oh -oh,” Rose said, “the  
card tells me.” Mary wondered if she had irritated Rose, so she didn’t ask any more. Rose  
repeated, now somewhat more lightly, “Oh, you deserve to have it good. You are very  
generous, you’re strong, you were a little girl, back then, you gave too much. You’ve learned  
a very hard lesson.” Flipp, flapp. A card felt out of the stock.  
 
“Oops,” Rose looked at the card, silent, and there was a long pause. “The past,” she said, and  
then she stopped. And then, “Snowy weather, cold outside, you shall learn to be loved.” Mary  
asked again, “eh, what do you mean, snowy weather?” Rose smiled, “look in the mirror. The  
mirror will tell you, this is your feeling. Everybody needs to have a good life.” Mary was  
silent, she didn’t ask any more questions, she didn’t comment, just nodded very carefully. She  
saw Rose look at the alarm clock on the table, a huge clock with a Mickey Mouse head. Rose  
lifted her voice, and nodded. “Yes, I think there will be a new one. It is coming now. A new  
start will come. You know I told you, I am 98% clairvoyant, you have to trust me.” Mary was  
still sad and anxious, the time had run out so quickly and she had so many questions. Mary  
 
  
wanted to understand what Rose meant, and asked, “How will I know that the right one is  
there? “ “Oh, you will know in your heart,” said Rose, almost comforting her with her voice.  
“The time is up,” said Rose. Rose raised her voice when Mary left the table, and as she went  





















ii The development of a Romantic Beliefs Scale (RBS) (Sprecher & Metts, 1999) that assesses 
beliefs about  
romantic love along four dimensions was useful in preparation of the semi-structured 




iii Self-report as the only method for research was challenged in the mid-1950s as researchers 
(see Burgess,  
Locke and Thomes, 1971) began to develop standardised short-form measures of marital 
satisfaction and could  




high immediately after the wedding, while it gradually decreased and often ended in 
disappointment and  




v As mentioned earlier in this historical review, the development of couple and family therapy 
was characterised  
by a shift in focus from individuals to relationships (Haley 1964).  
 
The authors refer to Broderick and Schrader’s (1981, 1991) classic tracing of marital 
counselling from a pioneer  
stage (1929-1932) dominated by very few practitioners, to the phase of establishment, 
signified by the formation  
of The American Association of Marriage Counsellors, on to a phase of Consolidation, leading 
to the first legal  
recognition of marriage counselling in California in 1963, and finally to a phase (1964-1978) 
called the  
formative stage, marked by the building of a professional literature and clarification of 
standards and practice.  
What is interesting about this reference to Broderick and Schrader’s review is that here 
Gurman and Fraenkl  
question and illuminate an issue needing closer examination, namely what happened to 
marital therapy after  




vi One reference is the Tavistock Marital Studies Institute with the influential work of Clulow 
and Ruszczinski,  




vii I use the term ‘couple therapy’ in this thesis because it emphasises ‘couple’ and the 
relationship more than  
 
the  








viii Olson, further quoted in Gurman and Fraenkl, asks,whether there was “a parallel but 
unrelated development  
of the marital and family therapy field” (Olson, 1970, p. 501) because “none of the pioneers 
were recognised as  




ix One might wonder if this is a very European view as one notices that the family therapy 
literature from the US  
refers consistently to ‘Marital and Family Therapy (MFT)’ as one entity.  
 




xi In pre-modern times, being passionately in love was separated from daily routines and 
claims, but in modern  
times this separation is conflicted. Many times I have seen and heard ‘victims’ of love, sitting in 
the therapy  
room, not having slept in days, losing weight, unable to concentrate on their children, their 
spouse or their work.  
All they can hear or see is the beloved, and all they can think of is the last meeting and how to 
plan the next  









xiii Shorter (1975) further explains and emphasises the middle class as pioneering this model, 
with the motherchild  
(baby) constellation as the nuclear relation which expands to embrace the father and husband. 
An  
interesting observation in this regard is the contemporary Norwegian ideal of fathers having 
permisjon (leave  




xiv Closing Time From The Future: More Best Of Leonard Cohen; The Essential Leonard Cohen, 
Stranger Music.  
 
 
xv The rise of the pure relationship is related in a complex way to globalisation and the growth 
of expert systems  
(Gross 2002)  
 
 1) The decontextualised knowledge on which expert systems rest undermines the authority of  
tradition while globalisation simultaneously brings people into contact with a wide variety of 
cultural  
practices. Lifestyle choices become the very core of self-identity.  
 
 2) As individuals pursue self-actualisation they become increasingly reliant on therapeutic 
discourses.  
These systems ask the individual to continually conduct a self-interrogation in terms of what is  
happening in the relationship so that the status of the relationship and its dynamic can be 
assessed.  
Expert systems refuse to bow to traditional authority as such; reliance on therapy or the 
discourse  
surrounding it leads people away from relationships in which they are constrained by tradition, 
away  




 3) There is greater trust in expert systems in that individuals are becoming less oriented than 
their  




xvi This reflexivity is to be understood by looking at the late modern revolution, the break in 
modern society with  












xviii The Protestant Reformation is significant in that it separated people from their traditional 
ties, such as  
 
the  





xix The most important contribution to my thinking is the notion of “the normal chaos of love” 
and its attention  
to the paradoxes in contemporary approaches to love - namely that love is more important 
than ever and at the  
same time more insecure than before.  
 
xx Wetherell accounts for subjectivity and identity by claiming, “We are saying that a sense of 
identity is always  
an invention, a construction, a melding and meeting point of discourses” (1995:135) and she 
draws on Hall  




of subjectivity meet the narratives of history, of a culture (Hall 1988 quoted in Wetherell, 
1995). This kind of  
approach makes space for what might be useful therapeutically when talking about love and 
romance, namely a  
position to take up, almost a perspective on life, that we use to live with ambivalence, 
contradictions and  
fragmentations.  
 




xxii Thanks to Wencke Muhlausen for showing me this possibility.  
 
  
xxiii For example, during the 1950s it was commonly invoked to produce the required norms of 
conduct in  
women, encouraging them away from their jobs and back into the home so that demobilised 
servicemen could  
return to both a 'traditional wife' and a job. Women are thus designated as the subject of this 
discourse, in that  
they must be married or at least conducting a relationship in order to have a sexual liaison. 
Men, on the other  
hand, are the objects of the discourse, since their acquisition as husbands and lovers is 
required before a sexual  
relationship is allowed to exist for a woman (ibid).  
 
xxiv Butler (1990) utilises the concept of a heterosexual matrix to identify this naturalised 
process of gender  
hetero-normalisation. Butler perceives this heterosexual matrix as “a grid of cultural 
intelligibility through  
which bodies, genders, and desires are naturalised”. In Butler’s perspective, it is the 
presumption of  
heterosexuality that ascribes bodies as gendered, rather than traditional perspectives that 
uphold the natural  
distinction of bodies into male and female that signifies the normality and naturalness of 
heterosexuality. Being  
and performing is an important constellation in Butler’s theory of gender. Similar to the 
construction of gender,  
sexuality is socially and culturally constituted, with desire constructed and policed through 
powerful societal  
discourses and social practices that are institutionally and individually supported at both the 
micro and macro  




xxv After I had done the pilot interview, I reviewed articles about Interpersonal Process Recall 
(IPR) that  
emphasised IPR as a supervision strategy empowering counsellors to understand and act upon 
perceptions to  




xxvi In making choices between contradictory demands there is a complex weaving together of 
the positions that  
are available within a number of discourses: the emotional meaning attached to each of those 
positions which has  
been developed as a result of personal experience of being located in each position, or of 
relating to someone in  
that position; the stories through which those categories and emotions are being made sense 
of; and the moral  




xxvii A parallel to this development can be traced when looking at shopping ideals and 
practices. I remember my  
parents and their generation’s joy at buying something solid, a treasure, and well worth their 
financial investment  
such as furniture. Looking further back to the grandparents’ generation, the same ideal was 
even more potent,  
focused as they were on investing in something that could be inherited, something that would 
“stay in the family  
generation after generation”. These days, a new shopping pattern can be traced, one in which 
the instant of the  
purchase is the moment of joy, a pleasure in itself.  
 
xxviii I refer here to an Aristotelian ethical model in which virtue is an ideal of life, and to a 
Kantian ethical  
 
model  




xxix Harville Hendrix, PhD and Helen LaKelly Hunt, PhD developed Imago Relationship Therapy 
“Getting the  
Love You Want: A Guide for Couples” and “Keeping the Love You Find: A Guide for Singles”.  
 




xxx While this section of the chapter addresses constructions of being in love with someone 
other than one’s  





xxxi This connection can also be recognised in the two other analysis chapters on love in doubt 
and love in  
danger. One can question whether pairing psychology and ideals for a good relationship 
ultimately reinforces the  
female gender script of the significance of emotion and communication, and whether such an 
effect has  
advantages in a therapeutic context.  
 
xxxiiAristotelian use of the virtue of ethic, and MacIntyre, After Virtue. Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame  









xxxiv This view of humans can be traced in the history of philosophy. According to Hobbes, 
human beings left to  
 
their own  
egoism and strategies will kill each other if following their natural instincts, as in a state of 
chaos. His recipe  
 
for how to  
survive with optimal benefits is the rule of law and order governing behaviour and protecting 
us from one another  
 
so that we  
can pursue our personal pleasures.  
 
xxxv When writing this thesis I heard on a radio programme that this hit by Nazareth was 
ranked by many as the  
 




xxxvi Such a belief about love can be recognised in the pre-modern view of love and through 
descriptions of the  
love-sick in which love is regarded as passionate and in which there is no intention to 
institutionalise it within  
the framework of marriage.  
 
xxxvii Still, Macy Grey:  
 
In my last years with him there were bruises  
 
On my face  
 
In my dawn and new day  
 
I finally got away  
 
But my head's all messed up and he knows  
 
Just what to say  
 
No more dawn and new days  
 
I'm goin’ back to stay  
 
Why say bye bye  
 
When it only makes me cry  
 
I still  
 
Light up like a candle burnin’ when he calls me up  
 
I still  
 
Melt down like a candle burnin’ every time we touch  
 
Oh say what you will  
 
He does me wrong and I should be gone  
 
I still  
 




xxxviii http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-05-29-roseneil-en.html - footNoteNUM45  
 




xl In fact, it is often common practice in the field of family therapy to accord such a crisis 
emergency priority,  
especially when there are children involved and the adults report being psychologically and 
emotionally  










xlii See Thuen, 2006 :Utroskap, Kjærlighetens bakgater, Gyldendal Forlag, Oslo  
 
xliii “Sign, Structure, and Play” A paper delivered at a conference on structuralism at Johns 





xliv In keeping with and as a consequence of such a perspective, I as researcher must also be 
considered a  
participant in both the research process and its final product, making in turn such an 
acknowledgement  
necessary. See Methodology chapter (p. x).  
 
xlv This definition is inspired by C. Harris’ research on gender and infidelity (2000), 
Psychophysiological  
responses to Imagined infidelity: the specific innate modular view of jealousy reconsidered, 
Journal of  
Personality and Social Psychology, Vol.78 (6), 1082-1091, as well as by clients’ own words 
when describing  
this feeling towards a relationship they feel insecure and unsure about.  
 
  
xlvi This thereby potentially includes all experience registers, including cyberspace-sex, 













xlix From this perspective, the individual is seen as a creature of a society in which everyone is 
attributed a  
 
defined position; in  
short, society emphasizes a functional work allocation between man and woman as positioned 
in the productive and  






l Manifested for instance in Norway by a statute known as the Convention of Children’s Rights 
and through the  












liii I realised though, during further reading about discourse analysis, that at-stakeness, 
though, is a well known  
dimension in DA.  
 
Liberal humanism is, according to Downing (2000), the approach that has dominated 
mainstream counselling  
and psychotherapy. The liberal humanist tradition pioneered in the 1960s is influenced by 
psychologists such as  
Allport, Maslow and Rogers and this approach identifies the individual as the central agent of 
all social  
phenomena, framing the self as independent and stable and emphasising the individual’s 
capacity for choice,  




lv See for instance Zimmerman, Holm, Starrels: “A feminist analysis of self-help bestsellers for 
improving  





lvi I have argued throughout this thesis that a romantic discourse, makes available positions to 
take up which  
reproduce gender inequality and it is an issue for further research how therapists doing couple 
therapy are  
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APPENDIX 1  
 






Name of study  
 





Who researcher is  
 
Anne Øfsti; Diakonhjemmet College in Oslo.  
 
My research project is part of my Doctorate in Systemic Psychotherapy at Tavistock Institute/ 











Despite the fact that systemic couple therapy is an established area of professional  
counselling, very little academic literature concerning what the content of systemic couple  
therapy is or might be is available. This is surprising, especially given the inherent conflicts in  
providing couple therapy that face all practitioners. Some of these conflicts may perhaps stem  
from the challenges in separating professional competence from private experiences.  
 
I suggest there are at least three different sources of knowledge influencing applied  
couple therapy. The first one is the practitioners own life experience, i.e., knowledge and  
ideas gained through their own families, friends and relationships. The second one is the  
different discourses about intimacy in society conveyed by media, literature, philosophy and  
religion. A third source is the therapists’ own professional training and reading of therapy  
theories.  
 
Traditionally, research on relationship beliefs and intimate relationships has been  
grounded in psychoanalytically oriented therapies, attachment theory and anthropology. This  
research has focused on the differences between well-functioning and dysfunctional couples.  
Moreover, it offered a conceptual guideline for the aims of therapy and the methods to use.  
 
Systemic theory, on the other hand, offers some concepts and ideas of what couple  
therapy is and should be. However, systemic theory is fragmented and lacks practical  
guidance for practitioners of couple therapy. Partnerships and close relationships are inherent  
parts of everyday life and are experienced by most adults during their lives. Conducting  
couple therapy with the aim of repairing or enriching relationships is a profession that  
challenges the therapist with respect to his or her beliefs about intimate relationships and how  
to make use of them in a therapeutic context. Since the general body of theory is vague and  
unclear, it is left to the therapist to draw the line between professional therapy models and 
the  
therapist’s own private beliefs acquired through his or her own experiences. My hypothesis is  
that is likely that the therapist's private beliefs are commonly utilized when conducting couple  
therapy. Hence, therapists probably experience a constant “covert negotiation” between  
private and professional ideas about intimate relationship in their mind. This dilemma will be  











My research questions will be:  
 
• What ideas are contained, both theoretical and private value laden, within systemic  
couple therapy and how are these ideas shown in the therapy?  
 
 
• What ideas and theories about intimate relationships are therapists drawing on in  
couple therapy?  
 
 
• How do therapists negotiate the dialogue between covert/private ideas and publicly  







Use of tape or video recording  
 
I am not going to video record any sessions, but the participant will be asked to record his/her  
own therapy sessions and I will go through the video with the therapist for an interview with  




How results will be used (including publication)  
 
My research work is part of my Doctorate in Systemic Psychotherapy at Tavistock Clinic, that  
is a Doctorate Dissertation. In addition I will (probably) write an article aimed for a  




What is involved for the informant  
 
The informant will be asked to reflect her/his own practical work with couples. I am  
particularly interested in his/her relationship beliefs about adult, intimate couples. The  
participant will be encouraged to share his/her thoughts about what kind of knowledge he/she  
make use of in therapy and where this knowledge “comes from”, both academically and from  
more private experiences.  
 
The informant will be asked to go through his/her own therapy sessions with me and explore  




Why you have been chosen  
 
I am writing to you because you, at first hand, were recommended by … . …. has given me  
some information about your Family Therapy Guidance Centre and your ways of working,  
and this may in my view be valuable experiences in my project. However, I will need to  
inform you about my project in more detail, about my aims and how the study could be  
carried out. I therefore want to invite you to a meeting in order to discuss your possible  
participation. I enclose a copy of my “research proposal” so you can have a look at my  






 The data I collect is to be used in a research project and the other course members (3 other  
students) and the 3 other staff at Tavistock Clinic in London will have access to the data that I  







My transcriptions (in Norwegian) will be confidential and only used as material during my  




To be sure that anonymity is observed, I will send a copy of my report (a rough draft) and ask  
for the participants comments, among others on issues concerning anonymity, before I finally  









Withdrawal at any stage of the research  
 
Individual members of the group who do not wish to participate are free to stay outside the  
project. Each participant might also withdraw from the project at any stage, and I will not use  
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Title of Project: What Ideas and Theories about Intimate Relationships are Therapists  





















1. I have read and understand the information sheet and have had the opportunity  







2. My participation is voluntary and confidential and I am free to withdraw at any  







3. I understand that any tape or video-recording made will be destroyed at the end  







4. I understand that any publication resulting from this research will not identify  
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Title of Project: What Ideas and Theories about Intimate Relationships are Therapists  

















1. We have been informed about the research project in which we will be involved  
through our sessions will be videotaped. We have had the opportunity to ask the  








2. Our participant is voluntary and confidential and we have been free to withdraw  







3. We understand that any tape or video-recording made will be destroyed at the  
end of the research.  
 
 
4. We understand that any publication resulting from this research will not identify  
our couple in any way.  
 
 
5. We consent on letting the therapists show the videotape to the researcher and  

















Researcher Date Signature  
 
  
 
 
